JUDGMENT NO. 47
YEAR 2024
ITALIAN REPUBLIC
IN THE NAME OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE
THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT
composed of:
President: Augusto Antonio BARBERA;
Judges: Franco MODUGNO, Giulio PROSPERETTI, Giovanni AMOROSO, Francesco VIGANÒ, Luca ANTONINI, Stefano PETITTI, Angelo BUSCEMA, Emanuela NAVARRETTA, Maria Rosaria SAN GIORGIO, Filippo PATRONI GRIFFI, Marco D'ALBERTI, Giovanni PITRUZZELLA, Antonella SCIARRONE ALIBRANDI,
has pronounced the following
JUDGMENT
in the proceedings concerning the constitutional legitimacy of Articles 9, paragraph 1, and 10, paragraphs 1 and 2, of Decree-Law No. 14 of 20 February 2017 (Urgent Provisions on City Security), converted, with amendments, into Law No. 48 of 18 April 2017, initiated by the Ordinary Court of Florence, First Criminal Division, in single-judge formation, in the criminal proceedings against G. P., by order of 30 January 2023, registered under no. 28 of the 2023 Register of Orders and published in the Official Gazette of the Republic No. 11, first special series, of the year 2023, the hearing of which was scheduled for the meeting in the council chamber of 23 January 2024.
Seen the instrument of intervention of the President of the Council of Ministers;
Heard in the council chamber of 24 January 2024, the reporting Judge, Franco Modugno;
Resolved in the council chamber of 24 January 2024.
Considered in fact
1.– By order of 30 January 2023, registered under no. 28 of the 2023 Register of Orders, the Ordinary Court of Florence, First Criminal Division, in single-judge formation, raised questions of constitutional legitimacy:
a) of Article 10, paragraph 2, of Decree-Law No. 14 of 20 February 2017 (Urgent Provisions on City Security), converted, with amendments, into Law No. 48 of 18 April 2017, with reference to Articles 3, 16 and 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, the latter in relation to Article 2 of Protocol No. 4 to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR);
b) of Articles 9, paragraph 1, and 10, paragraph 1, of Decree-Law No. 14 of 2017, as converted, with reference to Article 16 of the Constitution;
c) of Article 9, paragraph 1, of the same Decree-Law, as converted, with reference to Article 3 of the Constitution.
1.1.– The referring judge states that he is seized of the proceedings against a person accused of the offense under Article 10, paragraph 2, of Decree-Law No. 14 of 2017, as converted, for not having complied with the order of the Police Commissioner of Florence, which, pursuant to the same provision, had forbidden him from accessing the Santa Maria Novella railway station for six months, as well as the square in front of it and two adjacent streets.
The referring court also reports that, in light of the procedural findings, the order was based on the fact that the administrative penalty provided for in Article 9, paragraph 1, of Decree-Law No. 14 of 2017, as converted, had been applied to the accused on three previous occasions, with a simultaneous order to leave the place, for having hindered the accessibility and use of the infrastructures of the aforementioned station: conduct from which it was considered that a danger to security could derive, also because their author was "burdened by previous police records for numerous offenses". In the aforementioned occasions, in particular, the person concerned, violating the prohibitions of standing in the railway area, had requested, "with an insistent and annoying attitude," money from people who were buying tickets at the automatic vending machines or who were using the staircase to access the station, thus preventing the regular use of such machines and the internal areas of the infrastructure.
Before the expiry of the term of validity of the access ban ordered by the Police Commissioner, the accused had been found by the police in the square in front of the railway station, without providing any justification for his presence there. Therefore, according to the referring judge, the elements of the alleged offense would exist.
1.2.– The referring court, however, considers that the verification of the constitutionality of Articles 9, paragraph 1, and 10, paragraphs 1 and 2, of Decree-Law No. 14 of 2017, as converted, is prejudicial to the establishment of the criminal liability of the accused.
According to the referring judge, the questions are relevant, since, should the declaration of unconstitutionality of the legislation that forms the basis of the Police Commissioner's power to adopt the preventive measure, the non-compliance with which is the subject of assessment in the main proceedings, occur, this would "render void" the measure itself, with the consequent cessation of the offense.
1.3.– With regard to the non-manifest groundlessness of the questions, the referring judge observes that Decree-Law No. 14 of 2017, as converted, in envisaging a complex of urgent interventions aimed at safeguarding the security of cities, has introduced, in Article 9, new "[m]easures to protect the decorum of particular places."
Paragraph 1 of this article subjects, in particular, to a pecuniary administrative penalty anyone who, in violation of prohibitions of standing or occupation of spaces, engages in conduct that prevents the accessibility and use of the infrastructures of the transport services indicated therein. Simultaneously with the ascertainment of the unlawful conduct, the offender is also ordered to leave the place where the act was committed: an order that - as specified in Article 10, paragraph 1 - has a duration of forty-eight hours and whose violation entails a further pecuniary administrative penalty.
Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 9, the order to leave is also issued against anyone who, in the same areas, commits the offenses of drunkenness, acts contrary to public decency, illegal trade, unauthorized exercise of the activity of parking attendant or car watchman, and sale without authorization of tickets for admission to sporting events.
Paragraph 3 then provides that municipal police regulations may identify further urban areas, having the destinations listed therein (health facilities, schools, school complexes and university sites, museums, and so on), to which the application of the provisions of the preceding paragraphs is extended.
In turn, Article 10 of Decree-Law No. 14 of 2017, as converted, after having regulated, in paragraph 1, the order to leave adopted by the ascertaining bodies pursuant to the preceding article (providing in particular for its transmission to the Police Commissioner), establishes, in paragraph 2, that "[i]n cases of repeated conduct as referred to in Article 9, paragraphs 1 and 2, the Police Commissioner, if the conduct may cause a danger to security, may order, by reasoned provision, for a period not exceeding twelve months, a ban on access to one or more of the areas referred to in Article 9, expressly specified in the provision, also identifying methods of applying the ban that are compatible with the mobility, health, and work needs of the recipient of the act". Violation of the ban is punishable by imprisonment from six months to one year.
The aforementioned articles would therefore outline, in essence, a "progressively formed case," in which the measures prepared to protect urban security are gradually aggravated, culminating - in the case of violation of the order of the Police Commissioner (the so-called urban DASPO) - in a contravention offense.
1.4.– In the opinion of the referring judge, the aforementioned legislation would generate multiple doubts of constitutional legitimacy. These would involve, first of all, the access ban measure contemplated by Article 10, paragraph 2, of Decree-Law No. 14 of 2017, as converted.
1.4.1.– The order of the Police Commissioner would, in fact, entail a limitation on the freedom of movement of the recipient, preventing him from accessing certain city areas, which are normally freely accessible, for a long period of time.
In guaranteeing the freedom of movement of citizens, Article 16 of the Constitution, however, only saves "the limitations that the law establishes in general for reasons of health or security." Given that "health reasons" are not relevant in the case under consideration, with regard to "security" reasons, the referring court notes that this Court has clarified, since the beginning of its activity, that the term "security" should be given the meaning of a situation in which citizens are assured, as far as possible, the peaceful exercise of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution, without being threatened by offenses against their physical or moral integrity: it is, therefore, the "orderly civil life" (reference is made to judgment no. 2 of 1956).
The contested provision, in subordinating the access ban not only to the reiteration of the conduct referred to in Article 9, paragraphs 1 and 2, but also to the circumstance that "the conduct may cause a danger to security," would, however, refer to a concept of security much broader than the one indicated above. Article 4 of Decree-Law No. 14 of 2017, as converted, establishes, in fact, that for the purposes of the same decree, "urban security" must be understood to mean "the public good that relates to the liveability and decorum of cities, to be pursued also through interventions of requalification, including urban, social, and cultural requalification, and recovery of degraded areas or sites, the elimination of factors of marginalization and social exclusion, the prevention of crime, in particular of a predatory nature, the promotion of a culture of respect for legality, and the affirmation of higher levels of social cohesion and civil coexistence, to which the State, the Regions and the Autonomous Provinces of Trento and Bolzano, and local authorities contribute primarily, also with integrated interventions, in compliance with their respective powers and functions."
In this regard, the referring judge recalls that this Court - called upon to rule on regional laws for alleged violation of the division of powers under Article 117 of the Constitution - has emphasized that Decree-Law No. 14 of 2017, as converted, has adopted a broad understanding of security, which sees alongside the security in the strict sense (or primary), constituting the hard core of the exclusive legislative competence of the State pursuant to Article 117, second paragraph, letter h), of the Constitution, a security in the broad sense (or secondary), suitable for including intertwined functions, corresponding to multiple legislative competences also of regional responsibility (reference is made to judgment no. 285 of 2019).
Apart from the aspects concerning the division of powers, it would be - according to the referring court - in the presence of an "omnivorous" concept of security, which embraces, in addition to the essential interests for the maintenance of an orderly civil coexistence, also aspects of an aesthetic nature or relating to customs, such as "decorum."
Various elements would, on the other hand, suggest that the "security" to which Article 10, paragraph 2, alludes should be understood precisely in this very broad sense: Chapter II of the decree, within which the provision is located, makes explicit reference, in the title, to "urban decorum"; Article 9, which provides for the conduct whose repetition legitimizes the order of the Police Commissioner, bears the heading "[m]easures to protect the decorum of particular places"; the very nature of some of this conduct would evoke interests that go beyond the prerequisites of an orderly civil life; in the contested provision, moreover, the term "security" is not accompanied by the adjective "public," nor associated with the concept of "order."
It should, therefore, be concluded that the rule in question allows limitations to the freedom of movement in function of the protection of interests (urban security) that transcend the security to which Article 16 of the Constitution refers, consequently violating the latter.
1.4.2.– The reported *vulnus* would be further accentuated by the fact that Article 10, paragraph 2, of Decree-Law No. 14 of 2017, as converted, does not even require, for the purposes of adopting the measure, that there be a danger to security, even if so broadly understood, that is, that the occurrence of a prejudice to the interest aimed at is probable, but simply requires that the conduct "may cause a danger to security," thus making "a mere non-qualified possibility" sufficient.
This would lead to doubts about the constitutional legitimacy of the rule also with reference to the "principle of proportionality/reasonableness of legislative intervention," which can be inferred from Article 3 of the Constitution: in fact, a sacrifice would be imposed on a fundamental right without this being strictly necessary, since the danger to the interest that the legislator intends to protect is only eventual (an interest delineated, moreover, "in particularly generic, almost all-encompassing terms").
1.4.3.– The description in very broad and generic terms of the prerequisites of the measure would, moreover, leave excessive margins of discretion to the administrative authority, in contrast with the principle affirmed by the European Court of Human Rights in the judgment of 23 February 2017, De Tommaso v. Italy, precisely with regard to the freedom of movement protected by Article 2 Prot. No. 4 ECHR: the principle according to which every rule that constitutes the legal basis of an interference with the fundamental rights of the person must be characterized by sufficient precision and certainty, so as to offer effective protection against arbitrary interference by public authorities.
In the case in point, the "not very clear" description of the conduct referred to in Article 9, paragraph 1, the "omnivorous or at least ambiguous" concept of security adopted by Article 10, paragraph 2, and the fact that even a merely eventual danger to security is sufficient in order to legitimize the Police Commissioner's order, would all be elements that contribute to making the rule not sufficiently precise and certain, consequently leaving the individual exposed to the substantial discretion of the administrative authority.
1.4.4.– The elements indicated above, of a literal and systematic nature, would not, on the other hand, allow an interpretation of the contested provision that is in accordance with the constitutional principles invoked: it would, in fact, be "to distort its scope and not simply to interpret it."
1.5.– The referring court doubts, in the second place, the constitutional legitimacy of the order to leave measure, regulated by Articles 9, paragraph 1, and 10, paragraph 1, of Decree-Law No. 14 of 2017, as converted.
1.5.1.– In the opinion of the referring judge, this measure would be in contrast, even more evidently, with Article 16 of the Constitution. If Article 10, paragraph 2, subordinates the order of the Police Commissioner to prohibit access, albeit with the criticisms indicated above, to the existence of a possible danger to security, the rules now under examination, in providing that the ascertaining body order the transgressor to leave for forty-eight hours from the place where the unlawful conduct took place - a measure that must also be considered to be restrictive of the freedom of movement - do not, conversely, make any mention of possible security (or health) reasons.
The order in question - which, according to the referring court, can be qualified as an atypical preventive measure - therefore automatically follows the detection of the conduct referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 9, without the ascertaining body having any power of assessment: an aspect of which, during the conversion of the decree-law, the Study Service of the Chamber of Deputies itself had highlighted the criticality, recalling that this Court has repeatedly declared the constitutional illegitimacy of absolute presumptions of social dangerousness.
1.5.2.– On the other hand, although the proceedings *a quo* concern the offense consisting of the violation of the access ban ordered by the Police Commissioner, and not of the order to leave, the question would be - according to the referring court - equally relevant.
As already highlighted, in fact, Articles 9 and 10 of Decree-Law No. 14 of 2017, as converted, would outline a "progressively formed case," characterized by a gradual increase in the severity of the measures to protect urban security. It would follow that, regardless of the literal wording of Article 10, paragraph 2 - which links the Police Commissioner's order to the repetition of the conduct and to the possible danger to security, and not also to previous orders to leave - if the provisions that contemplate this latter measure were deemed constitutionally illegitimate, "the entire construct," and therefore also the rule that contemplates the Police Commissioner's order, "would lose reasonableness."
1.5.3.– Also in this case, moreover, a constitutionally oriented interpretation of the contested rules would not be possible, as they clearly require the ascertaining body to issue the order to leave at the moment in which it detects the unlawful conduct, regardless of any reference to dangers to security.
1.6.– The referring court identifies, finally, a further profile of unconstitutionality, for violation of Article 3 of the Constitution, in the identification of the unlawful conduct operated by Article 9, paragraph 1, of Decree-Law No. 14 of 2017, as converted.
1.6.1.– The legislator has, in fact, provided for the order to leave and the access ban order against anyone who, violating prohibitions of standing or occupation of spaces, engages in conduct that prevents the accessibility and use of transport infrastructures: conduct that may not have any criminal relevance, just as the conduct, contemplated by paragraph 2 of the same Article 9 - not included, however, by the referring court among the provisions submitted to the scrutiny of this Court - of drunkenness, acts contrary to public decency, and so on, have no criminal relevance. Similar measures are not, however, provided against those who, in the same areas, commit acts that are far more dangerous for security and criminally relevant.
The measures in question would thus apply to the *clochard* who sleeps on the ground, at one of the entrances to the railway station, preventing access to the latter, or to the beggar placed in front of the automatic ticket office (as well as to the drunk, not necessarily troublesome, who travels on board a tram, and to the seller of small objects who operates in the hall of a metro stop), while exempting those who, in the same areas, participate in brawls or commit acts of threats, assaults, injuries, carrying white weapons or objects capable of offending without justified reason. These are crimes for which arrest in the act is not permitted, or is only permitted under certain conditions, which may not occur: so that the preventive function could not be fulfilled by the arrest.
Nor could this deficiency be remedied by the provision of Article 10, paragraph 5, of Decree-Law No. 14 of 2017, as converted, according to which, in cases of conviction for crimes against the person or property committed in the places and areas referred to in Article 9, the granting of the suspended sentence may be conditional on compliance with the prohibition, imposed by the judge, to access specifically identified places or areas. The ban in question could, in fact, only be ordered when the suspended sentence is granted and only in relation to crimes against the person or property. In any case, it would become operative only with the passing of the final judgment, and therefore after a long period of time, whereas, in the face of less serious conduct, such as that described in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 9, the order is adopted by the Police Commissioner in predictably faster times and is immediately enforceable.
1.6.2.– The referring court excludes, again, that an interpretation that conforms to the Constitution is possible, given the textual data of the contested provision.
1.7.– In the face of the type and plurality of the defects reported, the referring judge concludes that he must ask this Court for a ruling of an ablative nature, and not a manipulative one, noting that it would not give rise to unsustainable gaps in protection for the interests protected.
2.– The President of the Council of Ministers intervened in the proceedings, represented and defended by the State General Counsel, who requested that the questions be declared unfounded.
2.1.– According to the defense of the intervening party, the questions raised with reference to Articles 16 and 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution (the latter in relation to Article 2 Prot. No. 4 ECHR) could be easily overcome, on the basis of a different interpretation of the concept of "security" to which Article 10 of Decree-Law No. 14 of 2017, as converted, refers.
In this regard, the State Attorney General notes that this Court, with judgment no. 195 of 2019, ruling on the constitutional legitimacy of Article 21, paragraph 1, letter a), of Decree-Law No. 113 of 4 October 2018 (Urgent provisions on international protection and immigration, public security, as well as measures for the functionality of the Ministry of the Interior and the organization and functioning of the National Agency for the administration and destination of assets seized and confiscated from organized crime), converted, with amendments, into Law No. 132 of 1 December 2018 - which added to the list of places referred to in Article 9, paragraph 3, of Decree-Law No. 14 of 2017, as converted, "health facilities" and "areas intended for the carrying out of fairs, markets, public shows" - has stated that the provision in question pursues "the purpose of avoiding disturbances of public order in the areas to which the police regulations may extend the applicability of the urban DASPO," and therefore concerns the matter of public order and security, belonging to the exclusive legislative competence of the State pursuant to Article 117, first paragraph, letter h), of the Constitution.
The need to interpret the notion in question restrictively would also be supported by administrative case law, which has considered the access ban order adopted by the Police Commissioner to be illegitimate if its reasons do not make clear the reasons why the conduct contested against the offender would be suitable for causing a danger to public security.
The concept of security to which the aforementioned Article 10 refers would therefore coincide, in essence, with that of "public order": which would make the contested legislation fully respectful of the provisions of Article 16 of the Constitution, excluding, at the same time, the feared incompatibility with the guarantee of freedom of movement ensured by Article 2 Prot. No. 4 ECHR.
2.2.– The criticisms put forward by the referring judge with reference to Article 3 of the Constitution would also be unfounded.
According to the State Attorney General, for the adoption of the access ban, the ascertainment of the danger to security is expressly required, as an additional requirement with respect to the repetition of the conduct that gave rise to the order to leave: which would make the doubt of constitutional legitimacy concerning the failure to provide for the necessary existence of such a danger unfounded. The control of the criminal judge who, when applying the rule that sanctions the violation of the Police Commissioner's order, must first ascertain its legitimacy, would also serve to prevent the risk, outlined in the order for reference, that a criminal sanction be imposed on the basis of an arbitrary assessment of the dangerousness of the subject to whom the order to leave is addressed.
The criticism of violation of Article 3 of the Constitution for disparity of treatment with respect to more dangerous conduct, some of which are criminally relevant, would also be without merit.
In the first place, in fact, Articles 13 and 13- *bis* of the same Decree-Law No. 14 of 2017, as converted, provide for the possibility of adopting an access ban to public establishments and places of public entertainment, as well as standing in the immediate vicinity thereof, against perpetrators of offenses relating to drugs, against the person or against property.
In the second place, moreover, in outlining the constitutional *vulnus* in question, the referring judge would have taken into consideration very different types of crime, not having a habitual or repeated nature. Such conduct would not be comparable to the troublesome behaviors held in some "sensitive" areas of urban areas, taken into consideration by the contested legislation, which, although not criminally relevant, due to their habitual and repeated nature, may hinder the use of public transport.
3.– The State Attorney General reiterated his request and his defenses with a subsequent memorandum.
Considered in law
1.– The Ordinary Court of Florence, First Criminal Division, in single-judge formation, raises three distinct groups of questions of constitutional legitimacy, concerning the particular measures introduced by Articles 9 and 10 of Decree-Law No. 14 of 2017, as converted.
1.1.– The referring judge doubts, in the first place, the constitutional legitimacy of Article 10, paragraph 2, of the aforementioned decree, pursuant to which, in cases of repeated conduct referred to in Article 9, paragraphs 1 and 2, the Police Commissioner, "if the conduct may cause a danger to security", may order, for a period not exceeding twelve months, a ban on access to one or more of the areas referred to in Article 9 (the so-called urban DASPO).
In the opinion of the referring court, the contested provision would be in contrast, first of all, with Article 16 of the Constitution, since, in subordinating the application of the measure to the existence of a possible danger to security, it would refer to a concept of security much broader than that contemplated by the constitutional provision as a reason for possible limitations on the freedom of movement: a concept to be understood, according to the indications of this Court, as a guarantee of the freedom of citizens to carry out their activities shielded from offenses against their physical and moral integrity. The measure envisaged by the provision under examination would, in fact, constitute an instrument for the protection of "urban security," as defined by Article 4 of Decree-Law No. 14 of 2017, as converted: a notion that goes beyond the maintenance of the prerequisites of orderly civil life, also embracing aspects of an aesthetic nature or relating to customs, such as "urban decorum."
Article 3 of the Constitution would also be violated, for lack of reasonableness and proportionality of the measure, since the contested rule does not even require that there be a danger to security so broadly understood, that is, that the occurrence of prejudice to it appears probable, but only requires that there be a possibility, not qualified, of such danger. Consequently, a sacrifice would be imposed on a fundamental right without this being strictly necessary, since the danger to the interest that the legislator has intended to protect is merely eventual.
The contested rule would be in contrast, lastly, with Article 117, first paragraph, of the Constitution, in relation to Article 2 Prot. No. 4 ECHR, concerning freedom of movement, since it does not identify with sufficient precision the prerequisites for the application of the measure. The "not very clear" description of the conduct referred to in Article 9, paragraph 1, the "omnivorous or at least ambiguous" concept of security, and the fact that, for the purposes of adopting the access ban, even an only eventual danger to the latter is sufficient, would in fact attribute too wide margins of discretion to the administrative authorities, in contrast with the principle affirmed by the ECHR in the judgment of 23 February 2017, De Tommaso v. Italy.
1.2.– The referring court doubts, in the second place, the constitutional legitimacy of Articles 9, paragraph 1, and 10, paragraph 1, of Decree-Law No. 14 of 2017, as converted, which provide that, simultaneously with the ascertainment of the unlawful conduct referred to in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 9, the ascertaining body order the offender to leave for forty-eight hours from the place where the act was committed.
These provisions would violate Article 16 of the Constitution even more evidently, since the application of the measure in question, which is also restrictive of the freedom of movement, would automatically follow the detection of the unlawful conduct, regardless of any connection with security (or health) reasons and without leaving any margin of assessment to the ascertaining body.
1.3.– Finally, the Florentine Court criticizes the identification of the unlawful conduct that is likely to give rise to the order to leave and the access ban, operated by Article 9, paragraph 1, of Decree-Law No. 14 of 2017, as converted, deeming it to be in contrast with Article 3 of the Constitution.
It would, in fact, be unreasonable to punish with the measures in question those who, violating prohibitions of standing or occupation of spaces, engage in conduct that prevents the accessibility and use of transport infrastructures - conduct that is normally devoid of criminal relevance - when instead similar measures are not provided for against those who, in the same areas, engage in conduct that is far more dangerous for security and criminally relevant, such as participation in brawls, threats, assaults, injuries, carrying white weapons or objects capable of offending without justified reason.
2.– Prodromal to the analysis of the individual questions is a concise reconstruction of the relevant regulatory framework.
The questions relate to the two institutions - the order to leave and the ban on access to specific city areas - introduced by Articles 9 and 10 of Decree-Law No. 14 of 2017, as converted (provisions subsequently affected by multiple amendments of an expansive nature), in the framework of a complex of urgent interventions aimed - according to what is stated in the preamble to the provision - "at strengthening the security of cities and the liveability of territories," as well as "at maintaining urban decorum."
The institutions in question - and particularly the second one - assume as an archetype the ban on access intended to counter the phenomena of violence during sporting events (DASPO), provided for by Article 6 of Law No. 401 of 13 December 1989 (Interventions in the field of clandestine gambling and betting and protection of correctness in the carrying out of sporting events) and attributed, by *communis opinio*, to the category of atypical personal preventive measures.
In the case in point, the underlying idea - expressed in the report on the draft conversion law C. 4310 - is that one of the factors of urban decay is represented by the occupation of certain public areas, particularly "sensitive" because they constitute "key points of mobility," or in any case with high frequentation, by subjects who, by improperly standing there and often carrying out abusive or troublesome activities, compromise their free and full usability, thus contributing to creating a sense of insecurity in users. A phenomenon in relation to which - again according to the aforementioned report - "there is difficulty or inappropriateness in intervening with exclusively sanctioning forms."
The areas taken into consideration for this purpose are primarily those serving transport services: in particular, the internal areas of railway, airport, maritime and local public transport infrastructures, urban and extra-urban, as well as their appurtenances (Article 9, paragraph 1, of Decree-Law No. 14 of 2017, as converted). It is, however, provided that municipal police regulations may extend the measures in question to further "sensitive" urban areas, specifically identified by them: in particular, those "on which there are health facilities, schools, school complexes and university sites, museums, archaeological areas and parks, monumental complexes, or other institutions and places of culture, or which are otherwise affected by substantial tourist flows," as well as those "intended for the carrying out of fairs, markets, public shows, or used as public green spaces" (Article 9, paragraph 3).
The protection mechanism is structured.
Article 9, paragraph 1, subjects to a pecuniary administrative penalty of between one hundred and three hundred euros anyone who, "in violation of prohibitions of standing or occupation of spaces," engages in "conduct that prevents the accessibility and use" of the areas under consideration. Simultaneously with the ascertainment of the unlawful conduct, the offender is also ordered to leave the place where the act was committed. As specified in Article 10, paragraph 1, the order is issued in writing by the ascertaining body, must be reasoned, and ceases to be effective after forty-eight hours from the ascertainment. Its violation gives rise to the application of a pecuniary administrative penalty of double the amount.
Pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 9, the order to leave is also adopted against anyone who, in the same areas, commits the offenses of drunkenness (Article 688 of the Criminal Code), acts contrary to public decency (Article 726 of the Criminal Code), unauthorized exercise of trade (Article 29 of Legislative Decree No