JUDGMENT NO. 38

YEAR 2024

ITALIAN REPUBLIC

IN THE NAME OF THE ITALIAN PEOPLE

THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT

composed of:

President: Augusto Antonio BARBERA

Judges: Franco MODUGNO, Giulio PROSPERETTI, Giovanni AMOROSO, Francesco VIGANÒ, Luca ANTONINI, Stefano PETITTI, Angelo BUSCEMA, Emanuela NAVARRETTA, Maria Rosaria SAN GIORGIO, Filippo PATRONI GRIFFI, Marco D’ALBERTI, Giovanni PITRUZZELLA, Antonella SCIARRONE ALIBRANDI,

has delivered the following

JUDGMENT

in the proceedings concerning the constitutional legitimacy of Articles 7, paragraph 5, of Law No. 223 of 23 July 1991 (Rules regarding wage supplementation, mobility, unemployment benefits, implementation of directives of the European Community, placement in employment and other provisions concerning the labor market), 77 of Royal Decree-Law No. 1827 of 4 October 1935 (Improvement and legislative coordination of social security), converted into Law No. 1155 of 6 April 1936, and 52 of Royal Decree No. 2270 of 7 December 1924 (Approval of the regulation for the execution of Royal Decree No. 3158 of 30 December 1923, concerning provisions for compulsory insurance against involuntary unemployment), initiated by the Ordinary Court of Ravenna, acting as labor court, in the proceedings between G.S. and the National Social Security Institute (INPS), with order of 12 June 2023, registered under number 112 of the 2023 orders register and published in the Official Gazette of the Republic no. 37, first special series, of the year 2023.

Having reviewed the instrument of constitution of INPS and the instrument of intervention of the President of the Council of Ministers;

Having heard at the public hearing of 24 January 2024 the Reporting Judge Antonella Sciarrone Alibrandi;

Having heard the lawyer Mauro Sferrazza for INPS and the State Attorney Fabrizio Urbani Neri for the President of the Council of Ministers;

Having deliberated in the Chamber of Council on 24 January 2024.

Facts of the Case

1.– By order of 12 June 2023 (reg. ord. No. 112 of 2023), the Ordinary Court of Ravenna, acting as labor court, raised questions of constitutional legitimacy of Article 7, paragraph 5, of Law No. 223 of 23 July 1991 (Rules regarding wage supplementation, mobility, unemployment benefits, implementation of directives of the European Community, placement in employment and other provisions concerning the labor market), as well as, "if deemed necessary," of Article 77 of Royal Decree-Law No. 1827 of 4 October 1935 (Improvement and legislative coordination of social security), converted, with amendments, into Law No. 1155 of 6 April 1936, and of Article 52 of Royal Decree No. 2270 of 7 December 1924 (Approval of the regulation for the execution of Royal Decree No. 3158 of 30 December 1923, concerning provisions for compulsory insurance against involuntary unemployment), considered to be in violation of Articles 3, first and second paragraphs, and 41, first paragraph, of the Constitution, insofar as, "in the interpretation given to them by the established case law of the Court of Cassation," they "exclud[e] the compatibility of the mobility allowance received in installments and periodically with the performance of self-employment, imposing on the self-employed worker the need to request advance payment, under penalty of loss of the right."

2.– The referring court reports that it was seized of the objection filed by G.S. against the decree containing the order to pay in favor of the National Social Security Institute (INPS) a sum as recovery of the undue receipt of the mobility allowance.

The opposing party, dismissed in November 2008 for justified objective reasons and registered on the mobility lists, as per Law No. 223 of 1991, enjoyed the mobility allowance provided for by Article 7 of the same law, from December 2008 to December 2010. From 1 May 2009, and therefore while still receiving the aforementioned allowance on a monthly basis, G.S. registered with the traders' management as a collaborator in a family business of a commercial nature (owned by his spouse), carrying out collaboration activities within it.

INPS requested the issuance of the injunction in order to recover the sums received by G.S. as a mobility allowance during the aforementioned collaboration with the family business, considering that the performance of self-employment during the period of enjoyment of the mobility allowance entails the loss of the right to the benefit. In particular, in the opinion of the social security institution, once the performance of self-employment began, G.S. could only have submitted a request for advance payment of the residual allowance, pursuant to Article 7, paragraph 5, of Law No. 223 of 1991, in the absence of which he would have unduly continued to receive the monthly allowance, with the consequent need to recover the sums paid.

3.– The referring court doubts the constitutional legitimacy of Article 7, paragraph 5, of Law No. 223 of 1991, according to which "[w]orkers on mobility lists who request it in order to undertake self-employment or to associate in a cooperative in compliance with the applicable rules may obtain advance payment of the allowance in the amounts indicated in paragraphs 1 and 2, deducting the number of monthly installments already received.”

It specifies, in this regard, that although the provision was repealed, as of 1 January 2017, by Article 2, paragraph 71, letter b), of Law No. 92 of 28 June 2012 (Provisions on labor market reform in a growth perspective), it is nevertheless applicable, ratione temporis, to the case under its scrutiny.

That being said, according to the Court of Ravenna, in application of this provision, in the interpretation offered by the case law of the Court of Cassation, which in its judgment can be configured as actual established case law, the performance of self-employment would be incompatible with the receipt of the mobility allowance, except for the only case in which the beneficiary requests advance payment, deducted from the monthly installments already received.

The judge a quo, in reconstructing the jurisprudential framework, notes that the approach definitively consolidated within the case law of the Court of Cassation had been contested in the past by a previous orientation (which the referring court considers summarized by the Court of Cassation, labor division, judgment No. 6463 of 1 April 2004), according to which such incompatibility was instead to be excluded, since the receipt of the sums in a single payment would constitute a mere option (and not an obligation) granted to those who had undertaken self-employment during registration on the mobility lists.

However, this reconstruction would have been abandoned as early as by the Court of Cassation, labor division, judgment No. 15890 of 14 August 2004, which would have identified the function of the advance payment in question as the financing of so-called self-entrepreneurship, by virtue of the reference, made by paragraph 12 of Article 7 of Law No. 223 of 1991, to the provisions on unemployment (Article 77 of Royal Decree-Law No. 1827 of 1935, as converted, and Article 52 of Royal Decree No. 2270 of 1924), which provide for the cessation of the subsidy when the insured "has found new employment"; consequently, the only form of receipt of the mobility allowance compatible with the performance of self-employment would be that of its advance payment.

All subsequent judgments of the Court of Cassation would have followed the same line of reasoning, identifying the purpose pursued by the aforementioned provision in the reduction of pressure on the subordinate labor market.

According to the described approach, which the referring court considers now consolidated as established case law, the only hypothesis of compatibility between self-employment and installment receipt of the mobility allowance would be that – different from the case that gave rise to the judgment a quo – of the performance of self-employment already before registration on the mobility lists (obviously, only in cases where this possibility is allowed by the law to the dependent worker): in this sense, in fact, the Court of Cassation, labor division, judgment No. 6943 of 11 March 2020, would have stated, most recently.

It is precisely on this overall interpretation of the provision, assumed as established case law, that the referring court asks this Court for a compatibility check with the constitutional parameters invoked.

4.– With regard to the relevance of the questions raised, the judge a quo states that it is not disputed between the parties that G.S. undertook self-employment following registration on the mobility lists, without having requested advance payment in a single lump sum of the residual allowance, but rather continuing to receive the latter monthly; therefore, the request for restitution of the undue payment submitted by INPS should be accepted, precisely (and only) in application of the contested provision, in the interpretation provided by the illustrated case law of the Court of Cassation.

5.– From the point of view of the non-manifest lack of merit, the referring court considers that the hermeneutical outcome that, in its view, has risen to established case law is in contrast with Articles 3, first and second paragraphs, and 41, first paragraph, of the Constitution.

5.1.– From a first point of view, the rule would be "illogical and unreasonable" and, as such, in violation of Article 3, first paragraph, of the Constitution.

For the referring court, it would be "nonsense" to postulate that one can legitimately obtain an advance payment of a sum to which one would not be entitled if it were paid in installments: in this way, the entitlement to a benefit would be made dependent on a requirement – the request for advance payment – "completely neutral" with respect to the constituent elements of the right (i.e., coming from a surplus with respect to dependent employment and the undertaking of self-employment).

Nor would it be decisive, to the contrary, to overestimate the nature of a financial contribution that the allowance would assume only if paid in a single sum, since there are, and are very widespread, other forms of financing disbursed periodically, on the basis of the needs and requests of the financed subject, such as "commercial paper financing subject to collection," factoring, credit lines or overdrafts without credit facilities.

Moreover, the referring court adds, the law does not provide for any form of control over the actual use of the allowance in question, nor a detailed accounting or expenditure deadlines, so that even the sum received in a lump sum could well be "spent little by little", according to the needs of the accipiens and even for purposes "other than entrepreneurial ones", including those related to the support of the family.

This would confirm the neutral character "of the timing of the disbursement of the sum", with respect to the very purpose of financing pursued.

5.2.– Article 3, first paragraph, of the Constitution, would also be violated from the point of view of the unjustified disparity of treatment "of situations that are homogeneous if not even identical."

With respect to two surplus workers placed on the mobility list and both "undertaking a self-employment activity", the incentive to self-entrepreneurship would be provided only to the one who submits an application for advance payment of the benefit, and not also to the one who, "by choice or by oversight", does not fulfill this requirement, despite the identical need to finance their own activity.

Equally in violation of the principle of equality would be the further disparity of treatment between those who, already before being placed on the mobility lists, were engaged in self-employment together with subordinate employment (to whom the allowance would also be due in installment payments during the continuation of self-employment) and those who, on the contrary, begin to engage in self-employment only after being placed on the aforementioned lists (who should, instead, be subject to the unreasonable rule of the necessary request for advance payment of the sum).

5.3.– In close connection with the first two criticisms, the referring court notes that the interpretation favored by the case law of the Court of Cassation would also be in conflict with the "freedom of enterprise" protected by Article 41, first paragraph, of the Constitution.

In fact, "a constraint on the entrepreneur's action" would be introduced, without this corresponding to "any social necessity or utility, nor creating damage to health, the environment, safety, freedom or human dignity."

Nor would it be possible to justify the contested rule in light of the third paragraph of Article 41 of the Constitution, and, therefore, in an "anti-evasion function", given that the legislator would not have provided "income or asset barriers to access or ex post controls of any kind", leaving, instead, the sum paid "in the total discretion of the entrepreneur".

5.4.– Finally, the principle of "substantial equality" established in Article 3, second paragraph, of the Constitution, would be violated.

In the interpretation shaped by established case law, Article 7, paragraph 5, contested, would place unjustified obstacles "of an economic and social nature" to the "full development of the human person", which would consist in "the possibility of becoming self-employed", thus preventing former employees from participating "in the economic organization of the Country".

6.– Based on these premises, the Court of Ravenna asked this Court to declare the constitutional illegitimacy of Article 7, paragraph 5, of Law No. 223 of 1991 – but also, "if deemed necessary," of Article 77 of Royal Decree-Law No. 1827 of 1935, as converted, and of Article 52 of Royal Decree No. 2270 of 1924 – under the terms indicated in the preceding point 1.

7.– INPS, the plaintiff in the injunction, was constituted in the proceedings, which, after retracing the salient passages of the motivation of the referral order and having reconstructed the relevant regulatory framework, raised an objection of inadmissibility of all the questions raised or, in the alternative, their lack of merit.

7.1.– From the first point of view, according to the defense of the social security institution, the order does not indicate, "in clear terms," the specific provisions contested and would also be flawed by insufficient motivation on the point of relevance.

Furthermore, the Court of Ravenna would have limited itself to illustrating the evolution of the case law of the Court of Cassation, without adequately arguing about the impossibility of reaching a different interpretative solution, respectful of the constitutional parameters invoked. In particular, the judge a quo would have "taken refuge" "behind the construction of the case of the 'established case law'", the real existence of which, moreover, the party doubts, in light of different orientations expressed within the same case law of the Court of Cassation and in the absence of a clarifying intervention by the Joint Divisions of the Court of Cassation.

Also in support of the objection of inadmissibility of the questions, INPS argues that the judge a quo would not have clarified the scope of the intervention requested from this Court, i.e. whether it considers the complete annulment of the contested provision necessary or an intervention of a manipulative type, with consequent uncertainty and ambiguity of the petitum.

7.2.– As for the merits, the party argues about the lack of merit of the questions raised.

7.2.1.– With regard to the criticism of violation of Article 3, first paragraph, of the Constitution, it highlights the incorrectness of the premise from which the referring court starts, according to which both the mobility allowance paid in installments and that paid in a lump sum and in advance could be used by the beneficiary not only to finance the performance of self-employment, but also for other purposes completely unrelated to this purpose.

Between the two measures, in the opinion of INPS, there would be a profound difference, which would have also been highlighted by this Court in judgment No. 194 of 2021: the installment payment of the allowance would be a typical social security measure aimed at supporting the income of the worker on mobility; the advance payment of the allowance would instead be aimed at allowing and encouraging the beginning of self-employment (or a business), so that it could not be used for purposes other than this purpose.

Moreover, it could not be considered unreasonable – nor even in violation of the principle of equality – the legislator's choice to grant a certain financial contribution at the request of the interested party, and to deny it, instead, to those who "by choice or by oversight" have not submitted such a request. In this regard, it is highlighted that the right to advance payment of the mobility allowance does not arise automatically upon the occurrence of the prescribed prerequisites, it being necessary for the interested party to request its recognition through the presentation of a specific administrative application to INPS which, according to Article 1, paragraph 2, of the decree of the Minister of Labor and Social Security of 17 February 1993, No. 142 (Regulation implementing Article 7, paragraph 5, of Law No. 223 of 23 July 1991, on advance payment of the mobility allowance), must be accompanied by the documentation necessary to certify the concrete undertaking of the initiative to perform self-employment by the applicant. This would demonstrate the nature of a financing for a specific purpose – and not a generic support for income – of the advance payment in question.

7.2.2.– The suspicion of conflict with Article 3, second paragraph, of the Constitution, is considered, before being unfounded, inadmissible due to a lack of motivation, being "only stated, but in no way explained and, much less, motivated".

On the merits, INPS observes that the criticism "invades the field of discretionary assessments reserved to the legislator", without the limit of manifest unreasonableness of the provision of differentiated treatment being exceeded.

7.2.3.– With regard to the alleged violation of Article 41, first paragraph, of the Constitution, finally, INPS objects in the first place to its inadmissibility, due to a lack of motivation on the reasons for the conflict with the invoked parameter.

On the merits, it observes that it would certainly not be the contested provision that introduces "a constraint on the entrepreneur's action", but rather the mere fact, attributable to the interested party himself, of not having exercised his right in the forms and according to the methods provided for by the social security system, dictated in relation to the different "public needs" underlying the two different measures being compared.

8.– The President of the Council of Ministers intervened in the proceedings, represented and defended by the State Attorney's Office.

The intervening party, having reconstructed the argumentative parabola of the referring court and the relevant regulatory context, requested that all the questions raised be declared inadmissible or unfounded.

8.1.– In the first place, the State Attorney's Office objected to the insufficient reconstruction of the concrete case, which would not allow the relevance of the questions raised to be understood.

It then highlighted the repeal of the contested provision by Article 2, paragraph 71, letter b), of Law No. 92 of 2012, with which the referring court would not have engaged.

Finally, in the opinion of the intervening party, the criticisms would be inadmissible because they focused, rather than on the content of the provision suspected of constitutional illegitimacy, "on the interpretation given to the same by the established case law", from which the referring court "could well depart, with adequate motivation", choosing, among the conflicting orientations of the Court of Cassation – also highlighted in the order introducing the proceedings – the one that complies with the invoked parameters, without the need to request an inadmissible interpretative endorsement from this Court.

8.2.– As for the merits, the State Attorney's Office also highlights the ratio underlying the advance payment of the mobility allowance, aimed at favoring the relocation of the involuntarily unemployed worker outside the subordinate labor market, according to methods that the legislator would have dictated by exercising his discretion, in a manner that is neither disproportionate nor manifestly unreasonable.

This would also exclude "any hypothesis of disparate treatment between objectively different situations".

Since there is no imposition of "income barriers" for access to this contribution, the criticism of violation of Article 41, first paragraph, of the Constitution, would also be manifestly unfounded.

Considered in Law

1.– The Court of Ravenna, acting as labor court, raises questions of constitutional legitimacy of Article 7, paragraph 5, of Law No. 223 of 1991, pursuant to which "[w]orkers on mobility lists who request it in order to undertake self-employment or to associate in a cooperative in compliance with the applicable rules may obtain advance payment of the allowance in the amounts indicated in paragraphs 1 and 2, deducting the number of monthly installments already received.”

It also criticizes, but only "if deemed necessary" by this Court, Article 77 of Royal Decree-Law No. 1827 of 1935, as converted, which, with reference to the different institution of the unemployment allowance and as far as is relevant here, provides in the third paragraph that "[r]ules are established in the regulation for the control of unemployment, for the assessment of the conditions for the right to the allowance and for the suspension of the same right." The regulatory provision referred to is contained in Article 52 of Royal Decree No. 2270 of 1924, also criticized "if deemed necessary", which provides, in the part relevant to this case: "[t]he insured person shall cease to receive the subsidy: [...] b) when they have found new employment; [...]".

These provisions are considered to be in conflict with Articles 3, first and second paragraphs, and 41, first paragraph, of the Constitution, insofar as, "in the interpretation given to them by the established case law of the Court of Cassation," they "exclud[e] the compatibility of the mobility allowance received in installments and periodically with the performance of self-employment, imposing on the self-employed worker the need to request advance payment, under penalty of loss of the right."

2.– The main proceedings concern the objection filed by a worker, dismissed for justified objective reasons and registered on the mobility lists, against the decree containing the order to return to INPS the amounts received monthly as a mobility allowance, in a period in which the former employee would have performed self-employment as a collaborator of a family business of a commercial nature owned by their spouse.

In the opinion of INPS, in fact, the only possible form of disbursement of the mobility allowance in favor of the former subordinate worker who intends to undertake self-employment or business activity would be the advance payment in a single sum provided for by Article 7, paragraph 5, of Law No. 223 of 1991. This advance payment in a lump sum, which entails the cancellation from the mobility lists, however, presupposes a specific application, in the absence of which the installment receipt of the amounts continued during the performance of the self-employment activity would be undue.

3.– According to the referring court, this interpretation would now find the solid support of the case law of the Court of Cassation, which, despite an initial conflict, would have definitively settled – thus rising to the rank of established case law – in the sense of considering the performance of self-employment incompatible with the receipt of the mobility allowance, except for the only case (different from that of the judgment a quo) of the performance of self-employment already before registration on the mobility lists. Outside of this limited exception, the former worker who intended to undertake self-employment or business activity would have no other choice but to request the advance payment of the mobility allowance, under penalty of loss of the related right.

Since the illustrated reconstruction of the contested provisions would have now imposed itself on the interpreter as actual established case law, the objection explained in the main proceedings would have no possibility of being accepted and this would establish the relevance of the questions raised.

4.– Regarding the non-manifest lack of merit, the Court of Ravenna believes that the hermeneutical outcome that has risen to established case law is in violation of the constitutional parameters invoked.

4.1.– The rule modeled by the case law of the Court of Cassation, in the first place, would be "illogical and unreasonable", in violation of Article 3, first paragraph, of the Constitution, insofar as it would make the entitlement or otherwise to the mobility allowance dependent on a requirement – the request for advance payment – "completely neutral" with respect to the constituent elements of the right (i.e., coming from a surplus with respect to dependent employment and the undertaking of self-employment).

Nor could the nature of financing that the allowance would assume be overestimated, only if paid in a single sum, since there are other forms of financing disbursed periodically, on the basis of the needs and requests of the financed subject, such as "commercial paper financing subject to collection", factoring, credit lines or overdrafts without credit facilities.

4.2.– Article 3, first paragraph, of the Constitution, would also be violated from the point of view of the unjustified disparity of treatment, since it would be incomprehensible why the incentive to self-entrepreneurship would be provided only to the one who submits an application for advance payment of the allowance, and not also to those who, "by choice or by oversight", do not fulfill this requirement, even in the face of the identical need to finance their own activity.

From another point of view, the principle of equality would also be violated by the recognized entitlement to the mobility allowance in installments only to former employees who have continued to perform self-employment activities started before registration on the mobility lists.

4.3.– This interpretation, imposed as established case law, would also be in conflict with the "freedom of enterprise" protected by Article 41, first paragraph, of the Constitution, since "a constraint on the entrepreneur's action" has been introduced, outside of the conditions and limits dictated by the invoked parameter.

4.4.– Finally, the principle of "substantial equality" established in Article 3, second paragraph, of the Constitution, would be violated, since the contested provision would place unjustified obstacles "of an economic and social nature" to the "full development of the human person", which would consist in "the possibility of becoming self-employed".

5.– INPS was constituted in the proceedings, which, after retracing the salient passages of the motivation of the referral order and having reconstructed the relevant regulatory framework, raised an objection of inadmissibility of all the questions raised. In the alternative, it asked that they be declared unfounded.

In particular, the order would not clearly identify the specific provisions criticized and would be flawed by insufficient motivation on the point of relevance, given the repeal of Article 7, paragraph 5, of Law No. 223 of 1991. Furthermore, since the real existence of an established case law in the terms presented by the judge a quo must be excluded, the referring court would not have adequately explored the possibility of adopting a constitutionally oriented interpretation.

The intervention requested from this Court would not even have been precisely indicated, in a matter characterized by the broad discretion recognized to the legislator.

Finally, the criticisms leveled against the benchmark of Articles 3, second paragraph, and 41, first paragraph, of the Constitution, would be excessively generic, the referring court not having sufficiently explained the reasons for the alleged conflict with the aforementioned constitutional parameters.

On the merits, INPS asked this Court to declare all the questions raised unfounded.

6.– The President of the Council of Ministers also intervened in the proceedings, represented and defended by the State Attorney's Office, asking that all the questions raised be declared inadmissible or unfounded, for reasons that largely overlap with the defenses explained in the proceedings by INPS.

7.– Also in light of the arguments put forward by the parties in the case, a brief reconstruction of the relevant regulatory framework appears appropriate.

Before the repeal ordered by Article 2, paragraph 71, letter b), of Law No. 92 of 2012, Articles 7, 8 and 9 of Law No. 223 of 1991 regulated the mobility allowance, provided for workers employed in companies operating in certain production sectors and having certain dimensional requirements, provided they possessed the length of service established by law. The disbursement was provided for in the event that they had lost their jobs as a consequence of the impossibility on the part of the company, which had made use of the extraordinary intervention of the Wage Supplementation Fund, to re-employ all the suspended workers (with consequent initiation of the mobility procedure); or in the event that they had been involved in a collective dismissal, regardless of the intervention of wage supplementation, due to reduction or transformation of activity or work. These (former) workers were registered on special lists, precisely mobility lists, compiled pursuant to Article 6 of the same law, acquiring rights of precedence and reservation in subsequent hirings (including in public administrations) and becoming a pool of labor from which other entrepreneurs could (and, in certain cases, had to) "draw" to hire staff, with the enjoyment of tax and contribution benefits (Article 8, paragraphs 1 to 5).

The allowance in question replaced any other unemployment benefit (Article 7, paragraph 8) and was paid by INPS, in exchange for a preventive contribution borne by companies falling within the scope of application of the extraordinary wage supplementation fund.

This protection aimed to guarantee, to those who had involuntarily lost their income from dependent employment, the receipt of economic support to combat the consequent and inevitable state of need, in the time reasonably necessary for the search for new employment. The rule was the monthly payment of a sum for twelve months, a term raised to twenty-four months for workers who had reached the age of forty and to thirty-six months for workers who had reached the age of fifty (Article 7, paragraph 1).

Article 8, paragraph 6, allowed the worker on mobility – after specific communication to INPS – to carry out subordinate employment, but only on a part-time basis, or for a fixed term, maintaining registration on the list. However, for the days of work performed, the treatments and allowances were suspended (Article 8, paragraph 7).

In particular cases, concerning workers who, in certain disadvantaged areas and possessing certain age and contribution requirements, had obtained an extension of the mobility allowance until retirement (so-called long mobility), paragraph 9 of Article 9 attributed the right to partially cumulate the mobility allowance with income from work (not only subordinate, but also) self-employment, within the limits of the remuneration due at the time of the placement on mobility, revalued according to ISTAT indices.

Article 9 also regulated the cancellation from the mobility list, with consequent loss of the right to the allowance.

Paragraph 1, in particular, provided for five cases of cancellation – under letters a, b, c, d and d-bis) – as a sanction against workers who had behaved in ways considered unsuitable and contrary to the purposes of the mobility allowance itself, as they were characterized by a lack of cooperation with respect to new employment opportunities.

Paragraph 6 of Article 9 then provided for three other cases of cancellation from the mobility lists, without a sanctioning nature, but linked to certain events, such as the subsequent hiring of the worker with a full-time and open-ended contract, the expiry of the period of enjoyment of the treatments and allowances, and the payment of the mobility allowance in a single sum, pursuant to Article 7, paragraph 5.

This latter provision, contested in this judgment, regulated one of the main instruments of "reallocation" in the world of work, constituted by the incentive to self-entrepreneurship, in the form of the advance payment of the mobility allowance in a single sum, deducted from any monthly installments already received.

Finally, paragraph 12 of Article 7 provided for an explicit reference to the legislation governing compulsory insurance against involuntary unemployment, "insofar as applicable