European Court of Human Rights
FIRST SECTION
CASE OF BANCSÓK AND LÁSZLÓ MAGYAR (no. 2) v. HUNGARY
(Applications nos. 52374/15 and 53364/15)
JUDGMENT
Art 3 • Inhuman and degrading punishment • Life sentences for applicants whose eligibility for release is reviewable only
after serving forty years, not regarded
as reducible despite ability to seek presidential clemency without limitation
STRASBOURG
28 October 2021
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article
44 § 2 of the Convention. It may
be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Bancsók and László
Magyar (no.2) v. Hungary,
The
European Court of Human Rights
(First Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Ksenija Turković, President,
Péter Paczolay,
Krzysztof Wojtyczek,
Alena Poláčková,
Gilberto Felici,
Lorraine Schembri Orland,
Ioannis Ktistakis, judges,
and Renata Degener, Section
Registrar,
Having regard to:
the applications (nos. 52374/15 and 53364/15) against Hungary lodged with the Court under
Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by two Hungarian
nationals, Mr József Bancsók and Mr László Magyar (“the applicants”), on 7 October 2015
and 20 October 2015 respectively;
the decision to give notice to the Hungarian Government (“the Government”) of the complaints concerning the applicants’ life sentences and to
declare the remainder of the applications
inadmissible;
the parties’ observations;
Having deliberated in private on
5 October 2021,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted
on that date:
INTRODUCTION
1. The cases concern the applicants’ sentences of life imprisonment
with the possibility of release on parole once they have served
a forty-year term. The applicants complained that their sentences
constituted inhuman and degrading punishment, in breach of Article 3 of the
Convention.
THE FACTS
2. Mr Bancsók (“the first applicant”) was born in 1979. Mr Magyar (“the second applicant”)
was born in 1960 and is detained in Tiszalök Prison. The first applicant was represented
before the Court by Ms E. Kadlót, a lawyer practising in Budapest. The second applicant
was represented by Mr D.A. Karsai, a lawyer practising in Budapest.
3. The Government were
represented by their Agent,
Mr Z. Tallódi, of the Ministry of Justice.
4. The facts of
the cases, as submitted by the parties, may be summarised as follows.
- THE FIRST
APPLICANT
5. The first applicant
was found guilty of murder by the Budapest Surroundings
High Court on 18 June 2013. The court held that he would
be eligible for release on parole once he had served forty
years’ imprisonment. His sentence was upheld
on appeal by the Budapest Court of Appeal on 22 April 2015.
6. On 24 July
2015 the first applicant lodged
a constitutional complaint against that judgment.
He argued that setting the earliest date of his release once
a term of forty years had been
served was contrary to the case-law of the
Court and constituted inhuman
treatment.
7. The Constitutional
Court declared the complaint
admissible on 22 February
2016. The proceedings are still
pending.
- THE SECOND
APPLICANT
8. The second applicant
was sentenced on 28 September 2010 to life imprisonment
without eligibility for
parole under Article 40 § 1 and Article 47/A
of Act no. IV of 1978 on the Criminal Code (as in force at the material time). In László
Magyar v. Hungary (no. 73593/10, 20 May 2014) the Court found a violation of Article 3 of the Convention on the grounds that the applicant’s life sentence could not be regarded as reducible for the purposes of Article 3 of the
Convention.
9. Following the Court’s
judgment, both the second applicant’s legal representative and the public prosecutor applied to the Kúria for
a review of the final judgment. The
public prosecutor requested that
the Kúria set the earliest date for release on parole in the applicant’s case once a term of thirty years had
been served.
10. In the meantime,
the Hungarian Parliament enacted Act no. LXXII of 2014 (which
entered into force on 1 January 2015), prescribing mandatory clemency proceedings for prisoners sentenced to life imprisonment without eligibility for release
on parole.
11. Accordingly,
the public prosecutor amended the application
before the Kúria, arguing that with the introduction of the mandatory clemency proceedings, Hungary had fulfilled
its international obligations.
It thus requested
the Kúria to maintain
the second applicant’s life sentence
without eligibility for
parole, but to make it subject to mandatory clemency proceedings once forty years of the sentence had been
served. The second applicant
argued, referring to the Court’s case-law, that the mandatory clemency proceedings after forty years’ imprisonment
– as enacted through Act no. CCXL of 2013 – did
not remedy the breach of Article 3 of the
Convention. He requested the Kúria to
set the date of his eligibility
for parole after twenty-five years
of his sentence had been served.
In judgment no. BfV.II.1812/2014/7 of 11 June 2015, the Kúria found the following:
“Pursuant to Article 47/A of the Criminal Code
as in force at the time when the offence was committed, the trial court was to set the earliest date of eligibility for parole or to exclude
any eligibility for parole.
Having regard to the above, the breach of the
Convention can be remedied by omitting
from the final judgment a reference to the exclusion of
release on parole and by setting the earliest date of
eligibility for parole.”
12. The Kúria thus upheld the second applicant’s life sentence but held that
he was eligible for release
on parole. It set the earliest
date for release on parole after forty years of the sentence had been served.
It found that this period
was capable both of remedying the breach of the Convention and fulfilling
the goals of punishment in respect
of the second applicant – a multiple recidivist who had committed several
of the gravest violent
crimes against persons in vulnerable situations.
13. On 16 October
2015 the second applicant lodged
a constitutional complaint against that judgment.
Relying on the judgment delivered by the Court in his own case and in T.P. and A.T. v. Hungary (nos. 37871/14 and 73986/14, 4 October 2016), he argued that setting the earliest date of his release once
a term of forty years had been
served was contrary to Hungary’s obligations under the Convention.
14. The Constitutional
Court declared the complaint
admissible on 21 March 2016. The proceedings are still pending.
RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE
15. Act no. IV of
1978 on the Criminal Code (as
in force from 1 March 1999 until 30 June 2013, when it was replaced
by Act no. C of 2012 on the Criminal Code) provided as follows:
Imprisonment
Article 40
“1. Imprisonment
shall last for life or for a fixed
duration.
...”
Release on parole
Article 47/A
“1. If a life sentence is imposed,
the court shall define in
the judgment the earliest
date of eligibility for parole or it
shall exclude eligibility for parole.
2. If eligibility for parole is not excluded, the earliest date of release on parole shall
be after a term of twenty years has been
served, or at least a term of thirty years if
the life sentence was imposed for a criminal act that is punishable
without a statute of limitations.
3.[1] Release
on parole can be excluded in respect
of the following offences: if
the offence has been committed with violence against a person or an object; the offence of attempting to overturn the constitutional order
by force (Article 139 § 1); aggravated
sabotage (Article 142 § 2);
genocide (Article 155 § 1); apartheid (Article 157 §§ 1 and 3); aggravated
violence against the civilian population (Article 158 § 2); war crimes (Article
160); use of weapons prohibited
by an international convention (Article 160/A § 1); aggravated violence against a war emissary (Article 163 § 2); aggravated
murder (Article 166 § 2); aggravated
kidnapping (Article 175/A §§ 3 and 4); aggravated trafficking in human beings (Article 175/B § 5); aggravated public endangerment (Article 259 § 3); terrorism (Article 261 § 1); aggravated seizure of aircraft, any means of rail,
water or road transport or any
means of freight transport (Article 262 § 2); aggravated insubordination (Article 352 §§ 3 and 4); aggravated
violence against a superior or a law-enforcement officer (Article 355 § 5); aggravated compromising of combat readiness (Article 363 § 2); breach of duty
by a commander (Article
364); or desertion (Article
365).”
16. The relevant
parts of Act no. C of 2012 on the Criminal Code (as in force from 1 July 2013) read as follows:
Imprisonment
Article 34
“Imprisonment shall be imposed for a fixed duration or for a life term.”
Life imprisonment
Article 41
“1. Only persons over the age of 20 at the
time of the commission of the criminal
act may be sentenced to
life imprisonment.
...”
Release on parole from life imprisonment
Article 42
“In the event that a sentence of life imprisonment is imposed, the court shall specify the earliest date of eligibility for
parole or shall exclude any eligibility for parole.”
Article 43
“1. If the
court does not exclude any eligibility
for parole, the court shall set the earliest date of eligibility for
parole after a term of twenty-five
years has been served and the latest after forty years.
...”
17. The relevant
parts of Act no. CCXL of 2013 on the Execution of Punishments, Measures, Certain Coercive Measures and Detention for Regulatory Offences, as amended by Act no. LXXII of
2014, in force as of 1 January
2015, read as follows:
Section 57
“...
(8) If the prison judge does
not release on parole an offender sentenced
to life imprisonment, eligibility
for release on parole shall be examined
after two years, at the latest, and every year thereafter
...”
Section 188
“(1) A person sentenced to imprisonment may be released on parole if:
(a) if, on the basis of the prisoner’s exemplary conduct as demonstrated during imprisonment, and the ability to maintain such conduct, it
can be presumed that the aim of the punishment can be achieved without further deprivation of liberty;
and
(b) in the case of a fixed-term
prison sentence, the term set in Article 38 § 2 of the
Criminal Code or in the judgment
convicting the person has been served;
or, in the case of life imprisonment, the term set by the court based on Article 43 § 1 of the Criminal
Code has been served.
...”
18. Act No. CLI of 2011 on the Constitutional Court (hereinafter
“the Constitutional Court Act”) provides, in so far as relevant, as follows:
Section 26
“(1) Under Article 24 §
2(c) of the Fundamental Law,
persons or organisations affected by a particular case may submit a constitutional
complaint to the Constitutional
Court if, as a result of the application of a law contrary to the Fundamental Law in the court proceedings conducted in their case,
(a) their rights secured under the Fundamental Law were violated; and
(b) the possible remedies have already
been exhausted or no possible remedies exist.
(2) By way of derogation
from subsection (1), Constitutional
Court proceedings may, exceptionally, also be initiated where:
(a) as a result of the application of, or
the coming into effect of,
a legal provision contrary to the Fundamental Law, a violation of the rights [of persons referred to in subsection (1)] has occurred directly,
without a court decision;
and
(b) no possible remedy to redress the violation exists, or the petitioner has already exhausted the possible remedies.”
Section 27
“Under Article 24 § 2(d)
of the Fundamental Law, a person or organisation affected by a court decision contrary to the Fundamental Law may lodge a constitutional complaint with the
Constitutional Court where
the decision on the merits
of the case or another decision
terminating the court proceedings
(a) violates their rights secured
under the Fundamental Law;
and
(b) the possible remedies have already
been exhausted by the petitioner or no possible remedies are available.”
THE LAW
- JOINDER OF THE
APPLICATIONS
19. Having regard to the similar subject matter of the applications, the Court finds it appropriate to examine them jointly in
a single judgment.
- ALLEGED VIOLATION
OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION
20. The applicants
complained that their sentences of life imprisonment, with the possibility
of release on parole after serving forty years, remained de
facto irreducible, in breach
of Article 3 of the Convention, which
reads as follows:
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman
or degrading treatment or punishment.”
- Admissibility
21. The Government invited
the Court to reject the applications
on the ground that the applicants
had failed to exhaust domestic remedies as required
under Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. They submitted that the applicants had lodged constitutional
complaints under section 27
of the Constitutional Court Act, which
had constituted an effective remedy for their alleged grievances,
and the proceedings were still pending before
the Constitutional Court.
22. The first applicant
argued that a constitutional complaint could not be regarded
as an effective remedy. He submitted that, although he had lodged a constitutional
complaint, this was not because
he had considered such proceedings to be capable of remedying his situation. Moreover, the proceedings had been pending for years and he could not be expected to wait further for the outcome of the proceedings before the Constitutional Court.
23. The second applicant
argued that the Government had failed to submit
any relevant case-law substantiating that a constitutional complaint constituted an effective remedy in the case of
life-imprisonment. In any
event, he had lodged a constitutional complaint on 16 October 2015 and the proceedings were still pending.
In his view, owing to this unprecedented
delay, that legal avenue was ineffective in practice in his case.
24. The Court has
previously found that a constitutional complaint under section 27 of the
Constitutional Court Act represents
an effective remedy to be used for the purposes of Article 35 § 1 of the Convention in situations where the application concerns Convention rights that are equally protected by the Fundamental Law of Hungary (see Szalontay v. Hungary (dec.),
no. 71327/13, 12 March 2019). On the other
hand, the Court reiterates that
the speed of the procedure for remedial action may also be relevant
to whether it is practically effective in the particular circumstances of a given case for
the purposes of Article 35
§ 1 of the Convention (see Story
and Others v. Malta, nos. 56854/13 and 2 others, § 80,
29 October 2015, and Mikalauskas
v. Malta, no. 4458/10, § 50, 23 July 2013).
25. In this
connection, the Court does not
consider it necessary to decide in abstracto whether the remedy relied on by the Government satisfies
the requirements of Article 35 §
1 in respect of life imprisonment
under Articles 34 and 43 of the Criminal Code.
26. In the
instant case it is sufficient to note that the proceedings before the Constitutional Court in respect
of the applicants’ complaints
have been pending since 2015. At this point in time, such a delay undermines the potential effectiveness of the remedy in question (see, for comparison, Longin v. Croatia,
no. 49268/10, §§ 38-41, 6 November 2012).
27. It follows that the Government’s objection concerning the non-exhaustion of domestic remedies must be dismissed.
28. The Court notes that
the applications are neither
manifestly ill-founded nor inadmissible on any other grounds listed in Article 35 of the
Convention. They must therefore
be declared admissible.
- Merits
- The parties’ submissions
(a) The
applicants
29. The applicants
submitted that life imprisonment with a possibility
of release on parole after a forty-year term had been
served amounted in practice to a whole life sentence. The forty-year term to be served before being eligible
for conditional release corresponded
to the term that whole life prisoners had to serve before having access to mandatory clemency proceedings. The fact that all
life prisoners served their terms under the same prison regime was further evidence
that there was no de facto distinction
between the two types of life sentence.
30. The applicants
pointed out that the possibility of release could not be considered real if it
was so distant that it would
only allow the prospect of dying in a care facility or a hospice. Having
regard to their age, they simply would
not live long enough to be eligible for release on parole, and thus
any change in their behaviour would be irrelevant for the purpose of being eligible for release. In this sense their sentences
were purely punitive and did not serve any
resocialisation purpose.
31. The applicants
maintained that the
punitive element of punishment
was only relevant at the time of sentencing, whereas the review of
such sentences was to focus on reintegration or
the threat that the
offender posed to society. In their
view, the forty-year term to be served before being considered
for release on parole went beyond
the State’s margin of appreciation.
32. As regards the ordinary pardon proceedings, the applicants asserted that this
avenue did not result in the de facto or de jure reducibility of their life sentence.
(b) The
Government
33. The Government submitted
that the applicants’ life sentences were reducible both de jure and de facto; they
had not been
deprived of all hope of being released
from prison one day. The Government argued that the applicants’ sentences were therefore compatible with Article 3 of the
Convention.
34. The Government pointed
out that sentencing fell under the general criminal
policy of the Contracting States, in which context they
were accorded a wide margin of appreciation.
35. As to the applicants’ contention that the forty-year term was contrary
to the Court’s case-law on this issue, the Government argued that the reference to a twenty-five-year term in the Court’s case-law could not
be interpreted as the Court
prescribing when a review
of life imprisonment should
take place. The forty-year period
first of all corresponded
to the retribution phase of
a whole life sentence and was proportionate to the circumstances of the offence concerned, including, among other things,
its gravity, the danger it posed
to society and the offender’s criminal
liability. The Government submitted that conditional release could only be envisaged
once the retribution phase
of the sentence had been served and that any conditional
release was subject to an assessment of whether maintaining an offender’s imprisonment could still be justified by any legitimate aim of punishment.
36. Furthermore,
the Government asserted that
the establishment of the retribution phase of imprisonment at forty years
could be compared to a lengthy (fixed-term) prison sentence of up to forty-five or fifty years, as was
possible in some Council of
Europe member States.
37. The Government also
maintained that the age of
the applicants was irrelevant in assessing whether life imprisonment constituted inhuman punishment.
38. Lastly, referring to Törköly
v. Hungary ((dec.),
no. 4413/06, 5 April 2011), the Government submitted
that before the expiry of the forty-year period, the applicants could avail themselves
of the general pardon procedure, whereby a pardon could be granted by the President of Hungary, affording them the possibility of release if extraordinary circumstances deserving special consideration existed.
- The Court’s assessment
(a) General
principles
39. In Murray v. the
Netherlands ([GC], no. 10511/10, 26 April 2016), the Court reiterated and further developed its previous
case-law concerning the need for life sentences to
be de facto reducible (see also T.P. and A.T.
v. Hungary, cited above; Kafkaris v.
Cyprus [GC], no. 21906/04, ECHR 2008; Vinter
and Others v. the United Kingdom [GC], nos. 66069/09 and 2 others,
ECHR 2013 (extracts); and László Magyar, cited above).
40. In particular,
it reiterated that the imposition of a sentence of life imprisonment on
an adult offender was not in itself prohibited
by or incompatible with Article
3 or any other Article of the Convention. A life sentence
could remain compatible with Article 3 of the
Convention only if there was both
a prospect of release and a possibility
of review, both of which had to exist from the imposition of the sentence (see Murray, cited above, § 99, and Vinter
and Others, cited above,
§§ 104‑18 and 122).
41. Furthermore,
having regard to the margin of appreciation which must be accorded to Contracting States in matters of criminal justice and sentencing, it is not the Court’s
task to prescribe the form
– executive or judicial – which
that review should take, or
to determine when that review should take place. However, comparative and international-law
material shows clear support for the institution of a
dedicated mechanism guaranteeing a review no later than twenty-five years after the imposition of a
life sentence, with further
periodic reviews thereafter
(see Vinter
and Others, cited above,
§ 120; see also Harakchiev and Tolumov
v. Bulgaria, nos. 15018/11 and 61199/12, § 246, ECHR 2014 (extracts),
and Murray, cited above,
§ 99). Where domestic law does not
provide for the possibility
for such a review, a whole
life sentence will not measure up to the standards
of Article 3 of the Convention (see Vinter and Others, cited
above, § 121).
(b) Application
of those principles to the present case
42. In Hungary,
the penalty of life imprisonment can take the form of a whole life sentence without the possibility of parole and is reserved for offences that are particularly serious. It exists
alongside the penalty of “simple”
life imprisonment, as in
the present case, which affords the possibility of the conditional release of the prisoner
(Article 42 of the Criminal
Code; see paragraph 16 above). Article 43 of the Criminal Code provides for the possibility of the conditional
release of life prisoners after they
have served a certain portion of their term. The minimum term to be served before an offender can be released
on parole is to be set between
the statutory minimum of twenty-five
years and the maximum of forty
years in the judgment convicting the offender. If the prison judge refuses
to commute the offender’s sentence of life imprisonment to probation, eligibility for
release must be re-examined after a further two years,
and on a yearly basis thereafter.
43. Furthermore,
the requirements which a person sentenced to a prison term must fulfil in order to be conditionally
released are set out in section 188
of Act no. CCXL of 2013 on the Execution of Punishments, Measures, Certain Coercive Measures, and Detention for Regulatory Offences; satisfactory compliance with those
requirements is subject to assessment by a court
(see paragraph 17 above).
44. Thus,
national law and practice afford the possibility of a dedicated judicial review of the
life sentence imposed on
the applicants. However, in
the present case, the applicants
could be eligible for
release after having served
forty years of their term. It
remains to be determined whether the review mechanism in the
case of the applicants satisfies
the criteria set out in the Court’s
case-law.
45. In that
connection, the Court notes that the forty years during
which the applicants must wait before they
can for the first time expect to be considered for release on parole is
a significantly longer period than the maximum recommended time frame after which
the review of a life sentence should
be guaranteed, established
on the basis of a consensus in comparative and
international law (see Vinter and Others, cited
above, § 120, and T.P. and A.T., cited above, § 45). It is also
hardly comparable with the twenty-six-year
period that the applicant in Bodein
v. France (no. 40014/10, 13 November 2014) had
to wait before being eligible to apply for parole (see paragraph 42 above; see also Bodein,
cited above, § 61).
46. Finally, in
so far as the Government relied
on the fact that, even before the lapse of the forty years required for eligibility for release on parole, a life prisoner could seek presidential clemency in ordinary pardon proceedings without any limitation, the Court has already found
that a possibility of being granted a pardon or release
on compassionate grounds for reasons related to ill health, physical incapacity or old age does not
correspond to the notion of
“prospect of release” (see Vinter and Others, cited
above, § 127).
47. In sum, the fact
that the applicants in the present case can hope to have their progress towards release reviewed only after they have served forty
years of their life sentences is sufficient
for the Court to conclude that the applicants’ life sentences cannot be regarded as reducible for the purposes of Article 3 of the
Convention. Such a long waiting
period unduly delays the domestic authorities’ review of “whether any changes
in the life prisoner are so significant,
and such progress towards rehabilitation has been made in the course of the sentence, as to mean that continued
detention can no longer be justified on legitimate penological grounds” (see Vinter and Others, cited
above, § 119).
48. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention.
- APPLICATION OF
ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
49. Article 41
of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there
has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols
thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial
reparation to be made, the Court shall,
if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
- Damage
50. The first applicant
claimed 30,000 euros (EUR)
in respect of non-pecuniary
damage. The second applicant
claimed EUR 10,000 in respect
of non-pecuniary damage.
51. The Government found
these claims excessive.
52. The Court considers
that its finding of a violation constitutes sufficient just satisfaction and accordingly
makes no award under this head.
- Costs and expenses
53. The first applicant
claimed EUR 3,000 in respect
of the costs and expenses incurred
before the Court. The second applicant
claimed EUR 8,000 plus value-added
tax (VAT) in respect of the costs and expenses incurred before the domestic courts. This sum corresponds to forty hours of legal work billable by his lawyer at
an hourly rate of EUR 200 plus VAT. He also claimed EUR 2,600 plus VAT
in respect of expenses incurred before the Court. This sum corresponds to thirteen hours of legal work billable by his lawyer at an hourly
rate of EUR 200 plus VAT.
54. The Government contested
these claims.
55. According
to the Court’s case-law, an
applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of
costs and expenses only in
so far as it has been shown
that these were actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of
EUR 3,000 to the first applicant for the proceedings before the Court,
plus any tax that may be chargeable to him. It also
considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 10,600 to the second applicant covering costs under all heads, plus any tax that may be chargeable
to him.
- Default interest
56. The Court considers
it appropriate that the
default interest rate should
be based on the marginal
lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage
points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
- Decides to join the applications;
- Declares the applications admissible;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of
the Convention;
- Holds that the finding of a violation constitutes in itself sufficient just satisfaction for any non-pecuniary damage sustained by the applicants;
- Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay to the applicants, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2
of the Convention, the following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:
(i) EUR 3,000 (three thousand euros) to the first applicant, plus any tax that may be chargeable
to him, in respect of costs
and expenses;
(ii) EUR 10,600 (ten thousand six hundred
euros) to the second applicant,
plus any tax that may be chargeable to him, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until
settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending
rate of the European Central Bank during
the default period plus three
percentage points;
- Dismisses the
remainder of the applicants’ claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified
in writing on 28 October 2021, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Renata Degener Ksenija Turković
Registrar
President
APPENDIX
List of Applicants
|
Application no. |
Case name |
Lodged on |
Applicant |
|
|
1. |
Bancsók v. Hungary |
07/10/2015 |
József BANCSÓK |
|
|
2. |
László Magyar v. Hungary no. 2 |
20/10/2015 |
László MAGYAR |
[1] Enacted by Act no. CL of 2011.