European Court of Human Rights
FIRST SECTION
CASE OF RECZKOWICZ v. POLAND
(Application no. 43447/19)
JUDGMENT
Art 6 § 1 (civil) • Very essence of the right to a
”tribunal established by law” impaired due to grave irregularities in
appointment of judges to the newly established Supreme Court’s Disciplinary
Chamber following legislative reform • Art 6 applicable under its civil head •
Application of three-step test formulated in Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson
v. Iceland [GC] • Supreme Court’s thorough assessment and
reasoned finding of a manifest breach of domestic law due to inherently
deficient judicial appointment procedure by reformed National Council of the
Judiciary which lacked independence from legislature and executive • Constitutional Court’s failure to carry out
comprehensive, balanced and objective analysis of the questions before it in
Convention terms and actions aimed at undermining Supreme Court’s findings •
Lack of domestic remedy to challenge the alleged defects
STRASBOURG
22 July 2021
This judgment will become final in the
circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be
subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Reczkowicz v. Poland,
The
European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as
a Chamber composed of:
Ksenija
Turković, President,
Krzysztof Wojtyczek,
Gilberto Felici,
Erik Wennerström,
Raffaele Sabato,
Lorraine Schembri Orland,
Ioannis Ktistakis, judges,
and Renata Degener, Section Registrar,
Having regard to:
the application (no. 43447/19) against the Republic of Poland lodged with the
Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Polish national, Ms Joanna
Reczkowicz (“the applicant”), on 6 August 2019;
the decision to give notice to the Polish Government
(“the Government”) of the complaint that the applicant’s case was not dealt
with by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law, as required
by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, and to declare inadmissible the
remainder of the application;
the decision to give priority to the application
(Rule 41 of the Rules of Court);
the observations submitted by the respondent Government
and the observations in reply submitted by the applicant;
the comments submitted by the
Polish Commissioner of Human Rights and the International Commission of
Jurists, who were granted leave to intervene by the President of the Section;
Having deliberated in private
on 22 June 2021,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted
on that date:
INTRODUCTION
1. The applicant, who is a barrister,
complained that the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court that dealt with
her case had not been an independent and impartial “tribunal established by
law” and alleged a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
THE FACTS
2. The applicant was born in 1980 and
lives in Gdynia. Having been granted legal aid, she was represented by Ms M. Gąsiorowska, a lawyer practising in Warszawa.
3. The Polish Government (“the
Government”) were represented by their Agent Mr J. Sobczak, of the Ministry of
Foreign Affairs.
4. The National Council of the Judiciary
(Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa, hereinafter “the NCJ”) is a body which
was introduced in the Polish judicial system in 1989, by the Amending Act of
the Constitution of the Polish People’s Republic (ustawa z dnia 7 kwietnia
1989 r. o zmianie Konstytucji Polskiej Rzeczypospolitej Ludowej).
5. Its organisation was governed by
the 20 December 1989 Act on the NCJ as amended and superseded on several
occasions (ustawa z dnia 20 grudnia 1989 r. o Krajowej Radzie
Sądownictwa). The second Act on the NCJ was enacted on 27 July
2001. Those two Acts provided that the judicial members of the Council were to
be elected by the relevant assemblies of judges at different levels, and from
different types of court, within the judiciary.
6. The 1997 Constitution of the Republic
of Poland provides that the purpose of the NCJ is to safeguard the independence
of courts and judges (see paragraph 59 below). Article 187 § 1
governs the composition of its twenty-five members: seventeen judges (two
sitting ex officio: the First President of the Supreme Court, the
President of the Supreme Administrative Court and fifteen judges elected from
among the judges of the Supreme Court, ordinary courts, administrative courts
and military courts); four Members of Parliament chosen by Sejm;
two members of the Senate; the Minister of Justice, and one person indicated by
the President of the Republic of Poland (“the President” or “the President
of Poland”).
7. The subsequent Act of 12 May 2011
on the National Council of the Judiciary (Ustawa o Krajowej
Radzie Sądownictwa – “the 2011 Act on the NCJ”), in
its wording prior to the amendment which entered into force on 17 January
2018, provided that judicial members of this body were to be elected by the
relevant assemblies of judges at different levels within the judiciary (see
paragraph 62 below).
- Legislative
process
8. As part of the general reorganisation
of the Polish judicial system prepared by the government, Sejm enacted
three new laws: the 12 July 2017 Law on amendments to the Act on the
Organisation of Ordinary Courts and certain other statutes (Ustawa o zmianie
ustawy - Prawo o ustroju sądów powszechnych oraz niektórych innych
ustaw, “Act on the Ordinary Courts”), the 12 July 2017 Amending
Act on the NCJ and certain other statutes (Ustawa o zmianie ustawy o
Krajowej Radzie Sądownictwa oraz niektórych innych ustaw) and the 20
July 2017 Act on the Supreme Court (Ustawa o Sądzie Najwyższym).
9. The 12 July 2017 Law on amendments to
the Act on the Ordinary Courts was signed by the President of Poland on 24 July
2017 and entered into force on 12 August 2017 (see
paragraph 69 below).
10. On 31 July 2017 the President vetoed
two acts adopted by Sejm: one on the Supreme Court and the Amending
Act on the NCJ. On 26 September 2017 the President submitted his proposal
for amendments to both acts. The bills were passed by Sejm on
8 December and by the Senate on 15 December 2017. They were signed
into law by the President on 20 December 2017.
- New National
Council of the Judiciary
- Election of
the new members of the NCJ
11. The Amending Act on the NCJ of
8 December 2017 (ustawa z dnia 8 grudnia 2017 o zmianie ustawy o
Krajowej Radzie Sądownictwa oraz niektórych innych ustaw, “the 2017
Amending Act”) entered into force on 17 January 2018 (see paragraphs 7 above
and 63 below).
12. The 2017 Amending Act granted
to Sejm the competence to elect judicial members of the NCJ
for a joint four-year term of office (section 9a(1) of the 2011 Act on the
NCJ, as amended by the 2017 Amending Act). The positions of the judicial
members of the NCJ who had been elected on the basis of the previous Act were
discontinued with the beginning of the term of office of the new members of the
NCJ (section 6). The election of new judicial members of the NCJ required
the majority of 3/5 of votes cast by at least half of the members of Sejm (section 11d(5)).
The candidates for the NCJ were to present a list of support from either
2,000 citizens or twenty-five judges (section 11a).
13. On 5 March 2018 a list of fifteen
judges, candidates for the NCJ, was positively assessed by the Commission of
Justice and Human Rights of Sejm.
14. On 6 March 2018 Sejm, in a
single vote, elected fifteen judges as new members of the NCJ.
15. On 17 September 2018 the
Extraordinary General Assembly of the European Network of Councils for the
Judiciary (ENCJ) decided to suspend the membership of the Polish NCJ. The
General Assembly found that the NCJ no longer met the requirements of being
independent from the executive and the legislature in a manner which ensured
the independence of the Polish judiciary (see also
paragraph 175 below).
- Non-disclosure
of endorsement lists
16. On 25 January 2018 a Member of Parliament (“MP”),
K.G.-P., asked the Speaker of Sejm (Marszalek Sejmu) to
disclose the lists, containing names of persons supporting the candidates to
the NCJ, which had been lodged with Sejm. The MP relied on the Act
on Access to Public Information (ustawa o dostępie do informacji
publicznej). Her request was dismissed on 27 February 2018 by the Head
of the Chancellery of Sejm (Szef Kancelarii Sejmu). The
MP appealed.
18. The Head of the Chancellery of Sejm lodged
a cassation appeal against the judgment.
19. On 28 June 2019 the Supreme
Administrative Court (Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny) dismissed the
cassation appeal (I OSK 4282/18). The court agreed with the conclusions of the
Regional Administrative Court. It found that the attachments to the
applications of candidates to the NCJ in the form of lists of citizens and
lists of judges supporting the applications had fallen within the concept of
public information. The limitation of this right to public information in
relation to the lists of judges supporting the applications of candidates for
the NCJ could not be justified by the reason that this information was related
to the performance of public duties by judges. The court held that access to
the list of judges supporting the applications of candidates for the NCJ should
be made available after prior anonymisation of the judges’ personal
registration numbers (PESEL).
20. On 29 July 2019 the Head of the
Personal Data Protection Office (Prezes Urzędu Ochrony Danych
Osobowych – “UODO”) decided that the endorsement lists should
remain confidential and should not be published (two decisions were issued on
that day, one initiated ex officio and one upon the
application of Judge M.N., a member of the NCJ).
21. Appeals against the decisions of the
Head of UODO were lodged by the Commissioner of Human Rights, the MP K.G.-P.
and a foundation, F.C.A. On 24 January 2020 the Warsaw Regional
Administrative Court quashed the decisions of 29 July 2019 (II SA/Wa 1927/19 and II SA/Wa 2154/19). The court referred to findings contained in the
final judgment of the Supreme Administrative Court of 28 June 2018 which had
not been enforced to date (see paragraph 19 above).
22. On 14 February 2020 the lists of
persons supporting candidates to the NCJ were published on the Sejm website.
- The Supreme
Court
- New Chambers
23. The Act on the Supreme Court of 8
December 2017 (“the 2017 Act on the Supreme Court”) modified the
organisation of that court by, in particular, creating two new Chambers: the
Disciplinary Chamber (Izba Dyscyplinarna) and the Chamber of
Extraordinary Review and Public Affairs (Izba Kontroli Nadzwyczajnej
i Spraw Publicznych; see paragraph 66 below).
24. The Disciplinary Chamber of the
Supreme Court became competent to rule on cases concerning the employment,
social security and retirement of judges of the Supreme Court (the 2017 Act on
the Supreme Court, section 27(1)). The Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme
Court was composed of newly elected judges; those already sitting in the
Supreme Court were excluded from it (section 131).
25. The Chamber of Extraordinary Review and
Public Affairs became competent to examine extraordinary appeals (skarga
nadzwyczajna), electoral protests and protests against the validity of the
national referendum, constitutional referendum and confirmation of the validity
of elections and referendums, other public law matters, including cases
concerning competition, regulation of energy, telecommunications and railway
transport and cases in which an appeal had been lodged against a decision of
the Chairman of the National Broadcasting Council (Przewodniczący
Krajowej Rady Radiofonii i Telewizji), as well as complaints concerning the
excessive length of proceedings before ordinary and military courts and the
Supreme Court (section 26).
- Appointments of
judges
(a) Act
announcing vacancies at the Supreme Court
26. On 24 May 2018 the President announced
sixteen vacant positions of judges of the Supreme Court in the Disciplinary
Chamber (obwieszczenie Prezydenta, Monitor Polski – Official
Gazette of the Republic of Poland of 2018, item 633). By the same act the
President announced other vacant positions at the Supreme Court: twenty in the
Chamber of Extraordinary Review and Public Affairs, seven in the Civil Chamber
and one position in the Criminal Chamber.
27. At its sessions held on 23, 24, 27
and 28 August 2018, the NCJ closed competitions for vacant positions of judges
at the Supreme Court.
(b) Disciplinary
Chamber
28. On
23 August 2018 the NCJ issued a resolution (no. 317/2018) recommending
twelve candidates for judges of the Disciplinary Chamber and submitted the
requests for their appointment to the President.
29. On 19 September 2018 the President
decided to appoint ten judges, from among those recommended by the NCJ, to the
Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court. On 20 September 2018 the President
handed the letters of appointment to the appointed judges and administered the
oath of office to them.
(c) Chamber
of Extraordinary Review and Public Affairs
30. On 28 August 2018 the NCJ issued a
resolution (no. 331/2018) recommending twenty candidates for judges of the
Chamber of Extraordinary Review and Public Affairs and submitted the requests
for their appointment to the President.
31. On 10 October 2018 the President
decided to appoint nineteen judges, as recommended by the NCJ on 28 August
2018, to the Chamber of Extraordinary Review and Public Affairs of the Supreme
Court. On the same day the President handed the letters of appointment to the
appointed judges and administered the oath of office to them. The twentieth
candidate to be appointed, Judge A.S., was appointed by the President on
30 January 2019 after he had relinquished a foreign nationality.
(d) Criminal
and Civil Chambers
32. On
24 August 2018 the NCJ issued a resolution (no. 318/2018)
recommending one candidate for the position of judge of the Criminal Chamber of
the Supreme Court.
33. On 28 August 2018 the NCJ issued a
resolution (no. 330/2018) recommending seven candidates for judges of the
Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court.
34. On 10 October 2018 the President
decided to appoint one judge to the Criminal Chamber and seven judges
to the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court, as recommended by the NCJ on
24 and 28 August 2018. On the same day the President handed the
letters of appointment to the appointed judges and administered the oath of
office to them.
- Appeals against
the NCJ resolutions recommending judges for appointment to the Supreme
Court
(a) Disciplinary
Chamber
35. On 25, 27 September and 16 October 2018
the Supreme Administrative Court dismissed requests lodged by various
appellants to stay the execution (o udzielenie
zabezpieczenia) of the NCJ’s resolution no. 317/2018 recommending
candidates for appointment to the Disciplinary Chamber (see
paragraph 28 above). The court noted that the NCJ resolution of 23
August 2018 had been delivered to the candidate G.H. on 14 September 2018,
and he had lodged his appeal with the Supreme Administrative Court on 17 September 2018.
However, on 19 September 2019 the President had appointed the judges
recommended by the NCJ. NCJ resolution no. 317/2018 had therefore been
enforced, which precluded any stay of execution.
(b) Chamber
of Extraordinary Review and Public Affairs
36. On 27 September 2018 the Supreme
Administrative Court (case no. II GW 28/18) stayed the execution of the NCJ resolution of
28 August 2018 (no. 331/2018; see
paragraph 30 above) recommending twenty candidates to the Chamber of
Extraordinary Review and Public Affairs and not recommending other candidates,
including the claimant A.B.
(c) Criminal
and Civil Chambers
(i) Staying
the execution of the NCJ’s resolutions
37. On 25 September 2018 the Supreme
Administrative Court (case no. II GW 22/18) stayed the execution of the NCJ resolution of
24 August 2018 (no. 318/2018; see paragraph 32 above)
recommending one candidate to the Criminal Chamber of the Supreme Court and not
recommending other candidates, including the appellant C.D.
38. On 27 September 2018 the Supreme
Administrative Court (case no. II GW 27/18) stayed the execution of the NCJ resolution of
28 August 2018 (no. 330/2018; see paragraph 33 above)
recommending seven candidates for appointment to the Civil Chamber of the
Supreme Court and not recommending other candidates, including the appellant
I.J. The court noted that the NCJ had never transferred to the Supreme
Administrative Court the appeal lodged by the appellant on 20 September
2018 although it had been obliged to do so under the law.
(ii) Case
of A.B. (II GOK 2/18)
39. On
1 October 2018 Mr A.B. lodged an appeal against the NCJ’s resolution of 28
August 2019 (no. 330/2018; see paragraph 33 above) which
recommended seven candidates for judges to the Civil Chamber of the Supreme
Court and decided not to recommend other candidates, including the appellant.
On the same date the appellant asked for an interim measure to stay the
execution of the resolution.
40. On 8 October 2018 the Supreme
Administrative Court (case no. II GW 31/18) stayed the execution of the impugned resolution. The
court noted that A.B.’s appeal of 1 October 2018 against the resolution
had never been transmitted by the NCJ to the Supreme Administrative Court.
41. On 26 June 2019
the Supreme Administrative Court made a request for a preliminary ruling to the
Court of Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) and the latter gave judgment on
2 March 2021 (see paragraphs 165-167 below).
42. On 6 May
2021 the Supreme Administrative Court gave judgment (case no. II GOK 2/18).
It quashed the impugned NCJ resolution no. 330/2018 in the part concerning the
recommendation of seven candidates for appointment to the Civil Chamber of the
Supreme Court. As regards the part of the resolution concerning the refusal to
recommend certain other candidates it quashed it in so far as it concerned the
appellant, A.B. (see also paragraphs 122‑125 below).
43. In the
judgment, the Supreme Administrative Court held, pursuant to the CJEU judgments
of 19 November 2019 and 2 March 2021 (see
paragraphs 162-167 below), that the NCJ did not offer guarantees of
independence from the legislative and executive branches of power in the
process of appointment of the judges (see paragraph 123 below).
44. The court also noted that it did not
appear that the NCJ – a body constitutionally responsible for safeguarding the
independence of judges and courts – had been fulfilling these duties and
respecting the positions presented by national and international institutions.
In particular, it had not opposed actions which did not comply with the legal
implications resulting from the interim order of the CJEU of 8 April 2020
(C-791/19; see paragraph 169 below). The actions of the NCJ in the
case under consideration also showed that it had intentionally and directly
sought to make it impossible for the Supreme Administrative Court to carry out
a judicial review of the resolution to recommend (and not to recommend)
candidates to the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court. The NCJ transferred the
appeal lodged by A.B. on 1 October only on 9 November 2019, while in the
meantime it had transmitted the resolution to the President for him to appoint
the recommended candidates.
45. Lastly, the Supreme Administrative
Court agreed with the interpretation of the Supreme Court presented in the
judgment of 5 December 2019 and the resolution of 23 January 2020 (see
paragraphs 71‑86 and 89-105 below), that the President’s
announcement of vacancies at the Supreme Court (see paragraph 26 above)
necessitated, for it to be valid, a countersignature of the Prime Minister.
- The Court of
Justice of the European Union judgment of 19 November 2019 (Joined
Cases C‑585/18, C-624/18, C-625/18)
46. In August and September 2018 the Labour
and Social Security Chamber of the Supreme Court made three requests to the
CJEU for a preliminary ruling (pytania prejudycjalne). The opinion of
Advocate General Tanchev in those cases, delivered on 27 June 2019, analysed
the qualifications required by the NCJ with reference to the Court’s case-law
and concluded that the Disciplinary Chamber of the Polish Supreme Court did not
satisfy the requirements of judicial independence (see
paragraph 163 below).
47. The CJEU delivered a judgment on 19
November 2019 in which it considered that it was for the national court, i.e.
the Supreme Court, to examine whether the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme
Court was an impartial tribunal. The CJEU clarified the scope of the
requirements of independence and impartiality in the context of the
establishment of the Disciplinary Chamber so that the domestic court could
itself issue a ruling (see paragraph 164 below).
- The Supreme
Court’s rulings
- Judgment of 5
December 2019
48. On 5 December 2019 the Supreme Court
issued the first judgment in cases that had been referred for a preliminary
ruling to the CJEU (case no. III PO 7/180; see
paragraph 71 below). The Supreme Court concluded that the NCJ was not
an authority that was impartial or independent from legislative and executive
branches of power. Moreover, it concluded that the Disciplinary Chamber of the
Supreme Court could not be considered a court
within the meaning of domestic law and the Convention.
- Resolution of 8
January 2020
49. On 8 January 2020 the Chamber of
Extraordinary Review and Public Affairs of the Supreme Court issued a
resolution in which it interpreted the consequences of the CJEU judgment
narrowly (I NOZP 3/19,
see paragraph 87 below). The independence of the NCJ was to be
examined only if raised in the appeal and the appellant would have to justify
that the lack of independence of the NCJ had adversely affected
the content of the resolution given in his or her case.
- Resolution of
23 January 2020
50. On 23 January 2020 three joined
Chambers of the Supreme Court issued a joint resolution (see
paragraph 89 below). The court agreed with the assessment in the
judgment of 5 December 2019 that the NCJ had not been an independent and
impartial body and that this had led to defects in the procedures for the
appointment of judges carried out on the basis of the NCJ’s recommendations.
With respect to the Disciplinary Chamber, the Supreme Court took into account
its organisation, structure and appointment procedure and concluded that it
structurally failed to fulfil the criteria of an independent court.
Accordingly, the judgments given by the Disciplinary Chamber were not judgments
given by a duly appointed court. In consequence, according to the resolution,
court formations including Supreme Court judges appointed through the procedure
involving the NCJ were unduly composed within the meaning of the relevant
provisions of the domestic law.
- Constitutional
Court
Pending case before the Constitutional Court
51. On 29 March 2021 the Prime Minister
referred the following request to the Constitutional Court:
“Application to examine the compatibility of:
(1) the first and second paragraphs of Article 1, in
conjunction with Article 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union of 7
February 1992, hereinafter ‘TEU’, understood as empowering or obliging a
law-applying body to derogate from the application of the Constitution of the
Republic of Poland or ordering it to apply legal provisions in a manner
inconsistent with the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, with
Article 2; Article 7; Article 8 § 1 in conjunction with Article
8 § 2, Article 90 § 1 and Article 91 § 2; and Article
178 § 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland;
(2) Article 19(1), second subparagraph, in
conjunction with Article 4(3) TEU, interpreted as meaning that, for the
purposes of ensuring effective legal protection, the body applying the law is
authorised or obliged to apply legal provisions in a manner inconsistent with
the Constitution, including the application of a provision which, by virtue of
a decision of the Constitutional Court, has ceased to be binding as being
inconsistent with the Basic Law, with Article 2; Article 7; Article 8
§ 1 in conjunction with Article 8 § 2 and
Article 91 § 2; Article 90 § 1; Article 178 § 1; and
Article 190 § 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland;
(3) Article 19(1), second subparagraph, in
conjunction with Article 2 TEU, interpreted as empowering a court to
review the independence of judges appointed by the President of the Republic of
Poland and to review a resolution of the National Council of the Judiciary
concerning an application to the President of the Republic of Poland for
appointment of a judge, with Article 8 § 1 in conjunction with
Article 8 § 2, Article 90 § 1 and
Article 91 § 2; Article 144 § 3 (17); and Article 186 § 1
of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland.”
52. On 17 May 2021 the Polish
Commissioner for Human Rights joined the proceedings as a third-party
intervener. He considered that the first two issues should not be examined by
the Constitutional Court at all, and as regards the third, that it should turn
to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling.
53. The proceedings are pending before
the Constitutional Court (K 3/21).
54. The
applicant is a barrister.
55. On 12 July 2017 the Pomerania Bar
Chamber Disciplinary Court in Gdańsk (Sąd Dyscyplinarny Pomorskiej
Izby Adwokackiej w Gdańsku) imposed a disciplinary penalty on the
applicant. She was suspended for a period of three years in connection with
various breaches of the Code of Bar Ethics (Kodeks Etyki Adwokackiej) in
the course of performing her duties as representative of certain clients. The
charges against her concerned, first, events dating back to October 2013 in
respect of which she was charged with failure to display particular diligence
when acting as her client’s representative, in particular by
failing to settle financial accounts with him and return all documents. The
second charge related to her non-compliance with a previous disciplinary order
suspending her from practice and related to events in August 2015 when the
applicant had continued to provide legal services despite that order.
56. The applicant appealed, contesting
the facts as established by the Disciplinary Court and their assessment.
57. On 12 May 2018 the High Disciplinary
Court of the Bar (Wyższy Sąd Dyscylinarny Adwokatury) upheld
the ruling. The applicant lodged a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court.
58. On 14 February 2019 the Supreme
Court, sitting as a panel of three judges of the Disciplinary Chamber (K.W.,
P.Z., and T.P.), dismissed the applicant’s cassation appeal. The decision
contained no reasons. It was notified to the applicant’s lawyer on 20 February
2019.
RELEVANT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND PRACTICE
- DOMESTIC LAW AND
PRACTICE
- Domestic Law
- Constitution of the Republic of Poland
59. The relevant provisions of the
Constitution read as follows:
Article 2
“The Republic of Poland shall be a democratic State
governed by the rule of law and implementing the principles of social justice.”
Article 7
“The organs of public authority shall function on
the basis of, and within the limits of, the law.”
Article 8 § 1
“The Constitution shall be the supreme law of the
Republic of Poland.”
Article 10
“1. The system of government of the
Republic of Poland shall be based on the separation of, and balance between,
the legislative, executive and judicial powers.
2. Legislative power shall be vested
in Sejm and the Senate, executive power shall be vested in the
President of the Republic of Poland and the Council of Ministers, and judicial
power shall be vested in courts and tribunals.”
Article 32
“1. All persons shall be equal before the
law. All persons shall have the right to equal treatment by public authorities.
2. No one shall be discriminated against
in political, social or economic life for any reason whatsoever.”
Article 45 § 1
“Everyone shall have the right to a fair and public
hearing of his case, without undue delay, before a competent, impartial and
independent court.”
Article 144
“1. The President of the Republic,
exercising his constitutional and statutory authority, shall issue Official
Acts.
2. Official Acts of the President shall
require, for their validity, the signature of the Prime Minister who, by such
signature, accepts accountability therefor to Sejm.
3. The provisions of paragraph 2
above shall not relate to:
...
(17) appointing judges;...”
Article 179
“Judges shall be appointed for an indefinite period
by the President of the Republic on the motion of the National Council of the
Judiciary.”
Article 180
“1. Judges shall not be removable.
2. Recall of a judge from office,
suspension from office, or transfer to another bench or position against his or
her will, may only occur by virtue of a court judgment and only in those
instances prescribed by statute.
3. A judge may be put on retirement as a
result of illness or infirmity which prevents him discharging the duties of his
office. The procedure for doing so, as well as for appealing against such
decision, shall be specified by statute.
4. A statute shall establish an age limit
beyond which a judge shall take retirement. ...”
Article 183 § 1
“The Supreme Court shall exercise supervision over
ordinary and military courts in respect of their judgments.”
Article 186 § 1
“The National Council of the Judiciary shall
safeguard the independence of courts and judges.”
Article 187
“1. The National Council of the Judiciary
shall be composed as follows:
(1) the First President of the Supreme Court, the
Minister of Justice, the President of the Supreme Administrative Court and an
individual appointed by the President of the Republic;
(2) fifteen judges chosen from among the judges of
the Supreme Court, ordinary courts, administrative courts and military courts;
(3) four members chosen by Sejm from
among its Deputies and two members chosen by the Senate from among its
Senators.
2. The National Council of the Judiciary
shall choose, from among its members, a chairperson and two deputy
chairpersons.
3. The term of office of those chosen as
members of the National Council of the Judiciary shall be four years.
4. The organisational structure, the
scope of activity and working procedures of the National Council of the
Judiciary, as well as the manner of choosing its members, shall be specified by
statute.”
Article 190
“1. Judgments of the Constitutional Court
shall be of universally binding application and shall be final.
2. Judgments of the Constitutional Court
regarding matters specified in Article 188 shall be immediately published
in the official publication in which the original normative act was
promulgated. If a normative act has not been promulgated, then the judgment
shall be published in the Official Gazette of the Republic of Poland, Monitor
Polski.
3. A judgment of the Constitutional Court
shall take effect from the day of its publication, however, the Constitutional
Court may specify another date for the end of the binding force of a
normative act. Such time period may not exceed 18 months in relation to a
statute or 12 months in relation to any other normative act. Where a judgment
has financial consequences not provided for in the Budget, the Constitutional
Court shall specify a date for the end of the binding force of the normative
act concerned, after seeking the opinion of the Council of Ministers.
4. A judgment of the Constitutional Court
on the non-conformity with the Constitution, an international agreement or a
statute, of a normative act on which a legally binding judgment of a court, a
final administrative decision or a settlement of other matters was based,
shall be a basis for reopening proceedings, or for quashing the decision or
other settlement in a manner and on principles specified in provisions applicable
to the given proceedings.
5. Judgments of the Constitutional Court
shall be made by a majority of votes.”
- Relevant
provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure and Code of Civil Procedure
60. Article 439 § 1 of the Code
of Criminal Procedure (Kodeks postępowania karnego) deals with
absolute grounds of appeal (bezwzględne przyczyny
odwoławcze):
“Regardless of the scope of the appeal and the
arguments raised, or the impact of any defects on the content of the ruling,
the appellate court shall, at a sitting, revoke the decision appealed against
if:
...
(2) the court was unduly composed or any of its
members was not present at the entire hearing”.
61. Article 379 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (Kodeks postępowania cywilnego) deals with invalidity of
proceedings (nieważność postępowania):
“Proceedings shall be null and void:
...
(4) if the composition of the adjudicating court was
inconsistent with the provisions of the law, or if a judge excluded [from
sitting in the case] by virtue of the law took part in the examination of the
case;
...”
- The 2011 Act on
the National Council of the Judiciary as in force prior to 17 January
2018
62. The relevant provisions of the 2011 Act
on the NCJ as in force until 17 January 2018 (see
paragraph 7 above) read:
Section 11
“1. The general assembly of judges of the
Supreme Court elects two members of the Council from among the judges of that
court.
2. The general assembly of judges of the
Supreme Administrative Court, together with the representatives of general
assemblies of provincial administrative courts, elects two members of the
Council from among the judges of the administrative courts.
3. The meeting of representatives of
general assemblies of judges of courts of appeal elects two members of the Council
from among judges of the courts of appeal.
4. The meeting of representatives of
general assemblies of regional court judges elects eight members of the Council
from among their number.
5. The assembly of judges of military
courts elects one member of the Council from among its body.”
Section 12
“1. General assemblies of judges of
Regional Administrative Courts elect two representatives from among their
members.
2. Representatives of the general
meetings of judges of regional administrative courts are elected at the latest
one month before the expiry of the term of office of the Council members,
elected from among the judges of the administrative courts. The representatives
are elected for a period of four years.”
Section 13
“1. General assemblies of judges of
courts of appeal elect representatives of general assemblies of judges of
courts of appeal from among judges of the courts of appeal in the proportion of
one fifth of the number of those judges.
2. The general assemblies of regional
judges elect representatives of the general assemblies of regional judges from
among their members in the proportion of one fiftieth of the number of regional
judges.
3. The election of representatives of the
general assemblies shall be carried out at the latest one month before the
expiry of the term of office of the members of the Council, elected from among
the judges of ordinary courts. The representatives are elected for a period of
four years.
4. The Minister of Justice, in agreement
with the Chairman of the Council, convenes the meeting of the representatives
in order to elect the members of the Council. The Chairman of the Council
convenes the meeting of representatives once every two years, and also at the
request of one third of the number of representatives or at the request of the
Council.
5. The meetings of the representatives
evaluate the activity of the members of the Council elected by them, make
proposals to the Council concerning its activity and adopt resolutions
concerning the problems arising in the activity of the ordinary courts.
6. The meeting of representatives is
chaired by the oldest judge in terms of age. The meetings deliberate according
to the rules of procedure adopted by them.”
- The 2017
Amending Act
63. The relevant provisions of the 2011 Act
on the NCJ, as amended by the 2017 Amending Act (see
paragraph 11 above – ustawa z dnia 8 grudnia 2017 o
zmianie ustawy o Krajowej Radzie Sądownictwa oraz niektórych innych
ustaw) read as follows:
Section 9a
“1. Sejm shall appoint, from
among the judges of the Supreme Court, ordinary courts, administrative courts
and military courts, fifteen members of the Council for a joint four-year term
of office.
2. When making the selection referred to
in subsection 1, Sejm, to the extent possible, shall take into
account the need for representation of judges of particular types and levels of
court in the Council.
3. The joint term of office of new
members of the Council elected from among the judges shall begin on the day
following that on which they are elected. Members of the Council from the
previous term shall perform their duties until the first day of the joint term
of office of new members of the Council."
Section 11a
“1. The Speaker of Sejm, not
earlier than one hundred and twenty days and not later than ninety days before
the expiry of the term of office of the members of the Council elected from
among the judges, shall announce in the Official Gazette of the Republic of
Poland, Monitor Polski, the commencement of the procedure for
submitting candidatures for election to the Council.
2. The entities entitled to nominate a
candidate for the Council shall be groups of at least:
(1) two thousand citizens of the Republic
of Poland who are over eighteen years of age, have full capacity to perform
legal acts and enjoy full public rights;
(2) twenty-five judges, excluding retired
judges.
3. One application may concern only one
candidate for election to the Council. The entities referred to in subsection 2
may submit more than one application.
4. Candidates for election to the Council
shall be notified to the Speaker of Sejm within thirty days
from the date of the announcement referred to in subsection 1.
5. A candidate’s application shall
include information about the candidate, the duties and social activities
performed to date and other significant events occurring during the candidate’s
term of office as judge. The application shall be accompanied by the judge’s
consent to be a candidate.
6. Within three days of receiving a candidate’s
application, the Speaker of Sejm shall send a written request
to the president of the court having jurisdiction in respect of the nominated
candidate, and if the application concerns the president of:
(1) a district court, a regional court or
a military court - to the president of the higher court;
(2) a court of appeal, district
administrative court or military district court – to the vice-president or
deputy president of that court – with a request to compile and forward, within
seven days of receiving the request, information on the candidate’s judicial
achievements, including socially significant or precedent-setting judgments,
and relevant information on the candidate’s judicial culture, primarily
disclosed during inspections and lustrations.
7. If the information referred to in
subsection 6 is not prepared within the time-limit referred to in that
subsection, the Speaker of Sejm shall send a written request
to the candidate for election to the Council to have the information prepared
by the candidate within seven days of receiving the request of the Speaker
of Sejm. The candidate for election to the Council shall forward a
copy of the information he or she prepares to the president of the court having
jurisdiction in respect of the nominated candidate, the president of the higher
court or the vice-president or deputy president of the court of appeal, the
regional administrative court or the military regional court, respectively.
8. If the information referred to in
subsection 6 is not prepared by the candidate for election to the Council
within the time-limit referred to in subsection 7, the Speaker of Sejm shall
refuse to accept the application. The decision on that matter, together with
the justification, shall immediately be delivered to the proxy and to the
candidate for election to the Council.
9. The information referred to in
subsection 6 shall be attached by the Speaker of Sejm to the
candidate’s application.”
Section 11d
“1. The Speaker of Sejm shall
request the parliamentary groups to indicate, within seven days, their
candidates for election to the Council.
2. The parliamentary group shall
indicate, from among the judges whose candidatures have been put forward under
section 11a, no more than nine candidates for election to the Council.
3. If the total number of candidates
indicated by the parliamentary groups is less than fifteen, the Presidium
of Sejm shall indicate, from among the candidates nominated
under the section 11a procedure, the number of candidates that are lacking up
to fifteen.
4. The competent committee of Sejm shall
establish the list of candidates by selecting, from among the candidates
indicated pursuant to the provisions of subsections 2 and 3, fifteen candidates
for election to the Council, with the proviso that the list shall include at
least one candidate indicated by each parliamentary group which has been active
within sixty days from the date of the first sitting of Sejm during
the term of office in which the election is to take place, provided that such candidate
has been indicated by the group within the framework of the indication referred
to in subsection 2.
5. Sejm shall elect the
members of the Council, for a joint four-year term of office, at its next
sitting, by a three-fifths majority in the presence of at least one half of the
statutory number of Deputies, voting on the list of candidates referred to in
subsection 4.
6. In the event of failure to elect
members of the Council in accordance with the procedure set forth in subsection
5 Sejm shall elect the members of the Council by an absolute
majority of votes cast in the presence of at least a half of the statutory
number of members, voting on the list of candidates referred to in
subsection 4.
7. If, as a result of the procedure
referred to in subsections 1‑6, fifteen members of the Council are not
elected, the provisions of sections 11a‑11d shall apply accordingly.”
Section 43
“1. An NCJ resolution shall become final
if no appeal lies against it.
2. Unless all the participants in the
procedure have challenged the resolution referred to in section 37(1),
that resolution shall become final for the part comprising the decision not to
present the recommendation for appointment to the office of judge of the
participants who did not lodge an appeal, subject to the provisions of
section 44(1b).”
64. Section 44 underwent several
amendments. Section 44(1a) of the 2011 Act on the NCJ was inserted by an
amendment of 8 December 2017 which entered into force on 17 January
2018. Section 44(1b) and (4) were inserted by the amendment of 20 July 2018,
which entered into force on 27 July 2018.
Section 44 of the 2011 Act on the NCJ, in the
version in force between 27 July 2018 and 22 May 2019, read as follows:
“1. A participant in the procedure may
appeal to the Supreme Court on the grounds that the [NCJ] resolution is
unlawful, unless separate provisions provide otherwise. ...
1a. In individual cases concerning
appointments to the office of judge of the Supreme Court, an appeal may be
lodged with the Supreme Administrative Court. In those cases it is not possible
to appeal to the [Supreme Court]. An appeal to the [Supreme Administrative
Court] may not be based on an allegation that there was an incorrect assessment
of the candidates’ fulfilment of the criteria taken into account when
making a decision on the presentation of the recommendation for appointment to
the [Supreme Court].
1b. Unless all the participants in the
procedure have challenged the resolution [indicated above]... in individual
cases concerning appointment to the office of judge of the [Supreme Court],
that resolution shall become final in the part containing the decision to
present the recommendation for appointment to the [Supreme Court] and in the
part comprising the decision not to present the recommendation for appointment
to the office of judge of the same court for participants in the procedure who
did not lodge an appeal ...
4. In individual cases concerning
appointment to the office of judge of the Supreme Court, the annulment by the [Supreme
Administrative Court] of the [NCJ] resolution not to present the recommendation
for appointment to the office of judge of the [Supreme Court] is equivalent to
accepting the candidature of the participant who lodged an appeal in the
procedure for the vacant position of judge at the [Supreme Court], for a
position for which, on the date of delivery of the [Supreme Administrative
Court] judgment, the procedure before the [NCJ] has not ended or, in the
absence of such a procedure, for the next vacant position of judge in the
[Supreme Court] which is the subject of the announcement.”
65. On 25 March 2019 the Constitutional
Court declared section 44(1a) unconstitutional and repealed it with effect
from 1 April 2019 (case K 12/18; see paragraph 114 below).
Subsequently, section 44 was amended by an Act
of 26 April 2019, which entered into force on 23 May 2019 (the Act
amending the Act on the NCJ and the Act on the System of Administrative
Courts; ustawa o zmianie ustawy o Krajowej Radzie Sądownictwa oraz
ustawy ‐ Prawo o ustroju sądów administracyjnych),
which entered into force on 23 May 2019. Section 44(1b) was quashed
and section 44(1) was amended and now states as follows:
“A participant in the procedure may appeal to the
Supreme Court on the grounds that the [NCJ] resolution was unlawful, unless
separate provisions provide otherwise. There shall be no right of appeal
in individual cases regarding the appointment of Supreme Court judges.”
Furthermore, section 3 of the Act of
26 April 2019 referred to above provides that “the proceedings in cases
concerning appeals against NCJ resolutions in individual cases regarding the
appointment of Supreme Court judges, which have been initiated but not
concluded before this Act comes into force, shall be discontinued by law”.
- The 2017 Act on
the Supreme Court
66. The
2017 Act on the Supreme Court entered into force on 3 April 2018 (ustawa
z dnia 8 grudnia 2017 o Sądzie Najwyższym).
67. Under Section 29 the judges
shall be appointed to the Supreme Court by the President of the Republic acting
on a recommendation from the NCJ. Section 30 sets out the conditions which
a person must satisfy in order to qualify for the post of judge of the Supreme
Court.
68. Section 3 provides for the creation
of two new chambers within the Supreme Court: the Disciplinary Chamber (Izba
Dyscyplinarna) and the Chamber of Extraordinary Review and Public Affairs (Izba
Kontroli Nadzwyczajnej i Spraw Publicznych).
Section 4
“The President of the Republic of Poland, after
obtaining the opinion of the Supreme Court Board, shall determine by ordinance
the rules of procedure of the Supreme Court, in which he shall fix the number
of posts of judge of the Supreme Court at not less than 120, including their
number in the respective chambers, the internal organisation of the Supreme
Court, the rules of internal procedure and the detailed scope and manner of
performance of activities by assistant judges, taking into account the need to
ensure the efficient functioning of the Supreme Court, its chambers and organs,
the specificity of the proceedings conducted before the Supreme Court,
including disciplinary proceedings, and the number and type of cases heard.”
Section 20
“With regard to the Disciplinary Chamber and the
judges who adjudicate in it, the powers of the First President of the Supreme
Court, as defined in:
(1) Section 14(1)(1), (4) and (7),
section 31(1), section 35(2), section 36(6), section 40(1)
and (4) and section 51(7) and (14), shall be exercised by the President of
the Supreme Court who directs the work of the Disciplinary Chamber;
(2) and those in section 14(1)(2)
and the second sentence of section 55(3), shall be exercised by the
First President of the Supreme Court in agreement with the President of the
Supreme Court who directs the work of the Disciplinary Chamber.”
Section 25
“The Labour and Social Security Chamber shall have
jurisdiction to hear and rule on cases concerning labour law, social security
...”
Section 26 ((2) - (6) added with effect from 14
February 2020)
“1. The jurisdiction of the Chamber of
Extraordinary Review and Public Affairs shall include the examination of
extraordinary appeals, examination of election protests and protests against
the validity of the national referendum and the constitutional referendum, and
ascertaining the validity of elections and the referendum, other public law
cases, including cases in the field of competition protection, energy regulation,
telecommunications and railway transport, and cases in which an appeal has been
filed against the decision of the Chairman of the National Broadcasting
Council, as well as complaints concerning the excessive length of proceedings
before ordinary and military courts and the Supreme Court.
2. It shall be within the jurisdiction of
the Extraordinary Review and Public Affairs Chamber to hear motions or
declarations for the exclusion of a judge or for the designation of the court
before which the proceedings are to be held, involving a plea of lack of
independence of the court or lack of independence of the judge. The court
examining the case shall immediately forward the motion to the President of the
Extraordinary Review and Public Affairs Chamber for further proceedings under
rules laid down in separate provisions. The forwarding of the motion to the
President of the Extraordinary Review and Public Affairs Chamber shall not stay
the course of the proceedings pending.
3. The motion referred to in subsection 2
shall be left without consideration if it concerns the determination and
assessment of the legality of the appointment of a judge or his authority to
perform judicial duties.
4. The jurisdiction of the Extraordinary
Review and Public Affairs Chamber shall include consideration of complaints
about the determination of the unlawfulness of a final decision of the Supreme
Court, ordinary courts, military courts and administrative courts, including
the Supreme Administrative Court, if the unlawfulness consists in challenging
the status of the person appointed to the office of judge who issued the
decision in the case.
5. The proceedings in cases referred to
in subsection 4 shall be governed by the relevant provisions on establishing
the unlawfulness of final judgments, and in criminal cases by the provisions on
the resumption of judicial proceedings concluded with a final judgment. It is
not necessary to establish probability or damage caused by the issuance of the
decision which is the subject of the complaint.
6. The complaint about the unlawfulness
of a final decision, referred to in subsection 4 may be lodged with the Supreme
Court’s Extraordinary Review and Public Affairs Chamber, bypassing the court
which issued the appealed decision, and also in the event that the party does
not make use of the legal remedies to which it is entitled, including an
extraordinary complaint to the Supreme Court.”
Section 27 § 1
“The following cases shall fall within the
jurisdiction of the Disciplinary Chamber:
(1) disciplinary proceedings:
(a) involving the Supreme Court judges,
(b) heard by the Supreme Court in connection with
disciplinary proceedings conducted under the act:
- of 26 May 1982 on the Bar (Prawo o adwokaturze)
...
(2) proceedings in the field of labour law and
social security involving the Supreme Court judges;
(3) proceedings concerning the compulsory retirement
of a Supreme Court judge.”
Section 29
“Appointment to judicial office at the Supreme Court
shall be carried out by the President of Poland pursuant to a recommendation of
the National Council of the Judiciary.”
Section 48
“7. A judge of the Supreme Court adjudicating in the
Disciplinary Chamber ... shall be entitled to a [additional] allowance equal to
40% of the basic salary and the function allowance jointly. The allowance shall
not be due for any period of absence from work due to illness of a judge,
unless the total period of such absence does not exceed 30 days in a calendar
year.”
Section 73
“1. The disciplinary courts in disciplinary cases
concerning judges of the Supreme Court shall be:
(1) in the first instance – the Supreme Court,
composed of 2 judges of the Disciplinary Chamber and 1 lay judge of the Supreme
Court;
(2) in the second instance – the Supreme Court,
composed of 3 judges of the Disciplinary Chamber and 2 lay judges of the
Supreme Court.”
Section 79
“Labour law and social security cases concerning the
Supreme Court judges and cases relating to the retirement of a Supreme Court
judge shall be heard:
(1) at first instance by one judge of the
Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court;
(2) at second instance by three judges of the
Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court.”
Section 89
“1. An extraordinary appeal may be filed
against a final decision of an ordinary court or a military court discontinuing
proceedings in a case if it is necessary to uphold the rule of law and social
justice and:
(1) the ruling violates the principles or
freedoms and rights of a human being and a citizen laid down in the
Constitution,
(2) the ruling grossly violates the law
through its misinterpretation or misapplication, or
(3) there is an obvious contradiction
between significant findings of the court and the content of evidence collected
in the case – and the ruling may not be reversed or amended under other
extraordinary appeals.
2. An extraordinary complaint may be
lodged by the Prosecutor General, the [Polish Commissioner for Human Rights]
and, within the scope of his competence, the President of the Office of
Prosecutor General of the Republic of Poland, the Children’s Rights Ombudsman,
the Patient’s Rights Ombudsman, the Chairman of the Financial Supervision
Authority, the Financial Ombudsman and the President of the Office for
Competition and Consumer Protection.
3. The extraordinary complaint shall be
lodged within 5 years from the date on which the appealed decision becomes
final, and if a cassation appeal has been lodged – within one year from the
date of their examination. It shall be inadmissible to consider an
extraordinary appeal to the detriment of the defendant lodged after one year
has elapsed from the date on which the ruling has become final, and if a
cassation appeal or appeal in cassation has been lodged – after 6 months from
the date of its consideration.
4. If five years have passed since the
appealed decision became final and the decision has had irreversible legal
consequences, or the principles of human and civil liberties and rights set
forth in the Constitution speak in favour of it, the Supreme Court may confine
itself to stating that the appealed decision was issued in violation of the law
and indicating the circumstances due to which it issued such a decision.”
Section 97
“1. If the Supreme Court detects an
obvious violation of the law when examining a case, regardless of its other
prerogatives, it shall issue a finding of error to the relevant court. Before
issuing a finding of error, it must inform the judge or the judges of the
adjudicating panel of the possibility of submitting written explanations within
seven days. The detection of an error and the issuance of a finding of error
shall not affect the outcome of the case. ...
3. Whenever a finding of error is issued,
the Supreme Court may file a request for a disciplinary case to be examined by
a disciplinary court. The disciplinary court of first instance shall be the
Supreme Court.”
Section 131
“Until all of the judges of the Disciplinary Chamber
of the Supreme Court have been appointed, the other judges of the Supreme Court
cannot sit within that chamber.”
Section 134
“On entry into force of the present Act, the judges
sitting in the Labour, Social Security and Public Affairs Chamber of the
Supreme Court shall sit in the Labour and Social Security Chamber.”
- Act on the
Ordinary Courts
69. The disciplinary regime for the judges
of the ordinary courts is also regulated by the Act on the ordinary courts of
27 July 2001 which was amended, in particular, by the 2017 Act on the
Supreme Court (see paragraphs 8 and 9 above). It reads, in
so far as relevant, as follows:
Section 107(1)
“A judge shall be liable to disciplinary action for
professional misconduct, including obvious and gross violations of the law and
breaches of the dignity of the office (disciplinary offences).”
Section 110(3)
“The disciplinary court within whose jurisdiction
the judge who is the subject of the disciplinary proceedings holds office shall
not hear the cases referred to in subsection 1(1)(a). The disciplinary
court competent to hear the case shall be designated by the President of the Supreme
Court directing the work of the Disciplinary Chamber at the request of the
disciplinary officer.”
Section 112b
“1. The Minister of Justice may appoint a
Disciplinary Officer of the Minister of Justice to conduct a specific case
concerning a judge. The appointment of a Disciplinary Officer of the Minister
of Justice shall preclude another disciplinary officer from acting in the case.
2. The Disciplinary Officer of the
Minister of Justice shall be appointed from among the ordinary court judges or
the Supreme Court judges. In the case of disciplinary offences having the
characteristics of wilful offences prosecuted by public indictment, the
Disciplinary Officer of the Minister of Justice may also be appointed from
among the public prosecutors indicated by the National Public Prosecutor. In
justified cases, in particular if the Disciplinary Officer of the Minister of
Justice dies or is unable to perform his duties for a prolonged period, the
Minister of Justice shall appoint in his place another judge or, in the case of
a disciplinary offence having the characteristics of a wilful offence
prosecuted by public indictment, a judge or a public prosecutor.
3. The Disciplinary Officer of the
Minister of Justice may initiate proceedings at the request of the Minister of
Justice or join ongoing proceedings.
4. The appointment of the Disciplinary
Officer of the Minister of Justice is equivalent to a request to initiate
investigative or disciplinary proceedings.
5. The function of the Disciplinary
Officer of the Minister of Justice shall expire as soon as a ruling refusing to
initiate disciplinary proceedings, discontinuing disciplinary proceedings or
closing disciplinary proceedings becomes final. The expiry of the office of the
Disciplinary Officer of the Minister of Justice shall not preclude the
re-appointment by the Minister of Justice of the Disciplinary Officer of the
Minister of Justice in the same case.”
Section 113a
“Activities related to the appointment of ex
officio defence counsel and the taking up of the defence by that
counsel shall not have a suspensive effect on the course of proceedings.”
Section 114(7)
“Upon notification of the disciplinary charges, the
disciplinary officer shall request the President of the Supreme Court directing
the work of the Disciplinary Chamber to designate the disciplinary court to
examine the case at first instance. The President of the Supreme Court
directing the work of the Disciplinary Chamber shall designate that court
within seven days from receipt of the request.”
Section 115a(3)
“The disciplinary court shall conduct proceedings
despite the justified absence of the notified accused or his defence counsel,
unless this is contrary to the interests of the disciplinary proceedings being
conducted.”
- Act on the Bar
70. The relevant provisions of the law of
26 May 1982 – “the Act on the Bar” (prawo o adwokaturze) read in so far
as relevant, as follows:
Section 50
Section 81(1)
“Disciplinary sanctions shall be as follows:
(1) an admonition (upomnienie);
(2) a reprimand (nagana);
(3) a fine;
(4) suspension from practising law for a period
ranging from three months to five years;
(5) (repealed);
(6) disbarment.”
Section 91a
“(1) The parties, the Minister of Justice, the
Commissioner for Human Rights and the President of the Supreme Bar Council
shall be entitled to lodge a cassation appeal with the Supreme Court against a
judgment given by the High Disciplinary Court of the Bar in the second
instance.
(2) The judgment against which the entities referred
to in paragraph (1) above are entitled to lodge a cassation appeal shall not be
enforced until a cassation appeal has been lodged or until the time-limit for
that purpose has expired.”
Section 91b
“A cassation appeal may be lodged on the ground of a
flagrant breach of law, or manifest disproportionality of a disciplinary
sanction.”
Section 91c
“A cassation appeal shall be lodged with the Supreme
Court through the High Disciplinary Court within thirty days from the date of
delivery of a reasoned judgment.”
Section 91d
“(1) No court fee shall be due in respect of a
cassation appeal referred to in section 91a(1) hereof.
(2) The decision against which a cassation appeal
has been lodged shall not be enforced until the cassation appeal has been
examined.
(3) The Supreme Court shall examine a cassation
appeal at a hearing before a panel of three judges.”
- Domestic
Practice
- The Supreme
Court’s case-law
(a) Judgment
of 5 December 2019 (case no. III PO 7/180)
71. On 5 December 2019 the Supreme Court,
sitting in the Labour and Social Security Chamber, gave judgment in the first
of three cases that had been referred for a preliminary ruling to the Court of
Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”), the subject of a judgment of
19 November 2019 (case C‑585/18; see
paragraph 48 above and paragraphs 162-164 below).
72. As regards its jurisdiction to examine
the compatibility of domestic laws with European Union (“EU”) law, and its role
as a court applying EU binding legislation, the Supreme Court noted as
follows[1]:
“32. It must be stressed that Article 91
§ 3 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland directly empowers the Supreme
Court to examine the compatibility of statutes such as the ASC and the Act on
the National Council of the Judiciary with Union law. That provision directly
implies, with no reservation or limitation, that statutes have to be compatible
with Union law and the Convention, and not the other way around. The
jurisdiction to review the compatibility of statutes with Union law rests,
according to the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, not with the
Constitutional Court but, as a condition of Union accession, with any Polish
court examining a case falling within an area covered by Union law.”
73. As regards the Constitutional Court’s
judgment of 20 June 2017 (see paragraph 109 below), the Supreme
Court held:
“33... In that judgment, the [Constitutional Court]
called into question its earlier position taken in the judgment of 18 July
2007, K 25/07 ..., to the effect that NCJ members must be
judges elected by other judges. This implies that, in the absence of any
amendment to the Constitution, the Constitutional Court not so much changed its
position as regards appointment to the NCJ (judgment in K 5/17 vs. judgment
in K 25/07) as created a divergence in its case-law regarding
systemic issues of fundamental importance to the enforcement of the right to a
fair trial enshrined in the national constitution and fundamental obligations
of member States of the European Union, as a Union (community) of law. In that
context, the two judgments of the Constitutional Court are evidently in
conflict with each other. The interpretation offered in K 5/17 is
not supported by legal theory, which considers that judgment to be a
manifestation of a constitutional crisis, as it was passed by a formation that
included two members appointed to non-vacant positions of judges ... One should
also consider information in the public domain, including statements of those
members of the Constitutional Court, concerning various dependencies and
informal relations with politicians, which implies that the Constitutional
Court cannot be considered to safeguard independence in the exercise of its
constitutional powers (Article 195 of the Constitution of the Republic of
Poland).”
74. As regards
the standards set out in the preliminary ruling of the CJEU, the Supreme Court
held, in so far as relevant, as follows:
“35. The CJEU judgment of 19 November
2019 sets a standard which includes a comprehensive assessment of safeguards of
the right to a fair trial by an independent and impartial court. Such
assessment follows a two-step rule: (a) assessment of the degree of
independence enjoyed by the National Council of the Judiciary in respect of the
legislature and the executive in exercising the responsibilities attributed to
it under national legislation, as the body empowered to ensure the independence
of the courts and of the judiciary, as relevant when ascertaining whether the
judges which it selects will be capable of meeting the requirements of
independence and impartiality arising from Article 47 of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights (judgment in C‑585/18, §§ 139‑140); (b) assessment of the
circumstances in which the new judges of the Disciplinary Chamber of the
Supreme Court were appointed and the role of the Council in that regard
(judgment in C-585/18, § 146) ...
37. Following the guidance provided in
the CJEU judgment of 19 November 2019, C‑585/18, one should in the first place consider the
circumstances concerning the National Council of the Judiciary. That assessment
requires no evidential proceedings; in any case, such proceedings would be
beyond the remit of the Supreme Court and consist in the consideration of
positions that are publicly known and available to all parties to the
proceedings.
38. With respect to the National Council
of the Judiciary, the CJEU judgment of 19 November 2019 requires the
examination of the following: (-) the objective circumstances in which that
body was formed; (-) the means by which its members have been appointed; (-)
its characteristics; (-) whether the three aforementioned aspects are capable
of giving rise to legitimate doubts, in the minds of subjects of the law, as to
the imperviousness of that court to external factors, in particular, as to the
direct or indirect influence of the legislature and the executive and its
neutrality with respect to the interests before it.”
75. The Supreme Court further underlined
its role as an EU court implementing the CJEU judgment:
“39. ...[T]he Supreme Court categorically declares
(once again) that, acting as a Union court in the enforcement of the CJEU
judgment of 19 November 2019, it does not examine the constitutionality of the
provisions of the Act on the National Council of the Judiciary in the wording
effective as of 2018 but their compatibility with Union law. The Supreme Court
has the jurisdiction to undertake such examination not only in the light of
uniform well-established case-law (cf. CJEU judgment of 7 September 2006,
C-81/05) but also under the unequivocal powers vested in it by the Constitution
which require no complex interpretation in the case in question.
Article 91 § 3 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland provides
clearly and beyond any doubt: ‘If an agreement, ratified by the Republic
of Poland, establishing an international organisation so provides, the laws
established by it shall be applied directly and have precedence in the event of
a conflict of laws.’ Furthermore, the examination of how the applicable
provisions governing the functioning of the Council and its practice in the
performance of functions under the Constitution of the Republic of Poland and
provisions of national law influence the fulfilment of the requirements of
independence and impartiality under Union law by a court formed with the
participation of the Council represents a typical judicial examination of
certain facts and provisions of law. It should be recalled once again that such
examination is completely unrelated to the jurisdiction vested in the
Constitutional Court by the Constitution of the Republic of Poland and the Act
on the Constitutional Court.”
76. With respect to the circumstances
surrounding the setting-up of the new NCJ and the role of the Constitutional
Court’s judgment of 20 June 2017 in that context, the Supreme Court noted:
“40. [As regards the circumstances under which the
Council was established], one should bear in mind the shortened term of the
previous Council (a constitutional body pursuant to Article 187 § 3 of the
Constitution of the Republic of Poland): Article 6 of the [2017 Amending
Act]. As intended by the legislature, the new provisions were to ensure
conformity with the Constitution of the Republic of Poland in connection with
the Constitutional Court judgment of 20 June 2017 (K 5/17...),
pursuant to which section 11(2-4) and section 13(3) of the NCJ Act are in
breach of the Constitution to the extent that they provide for the individual
term of office for Council members who are judges. To that end, the Supreme
Court concludes that the referenced Constitutional
Court ‘judgment’ was issued with the participation of judges elected
in breach of Article 190 § 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of
Poland, as ascertained under the following judgments of that court: 16 December
2015, K 34/15 ...; 9 March 2016, K 47/15 ...; 11 August 2016, K 39/16 ...”
77. With respect to the change in the
manner of election of the fifteen judicial members of NCJ the Supreme Court
held:
“43. The mechanism for electing NCJ
members was considerably modified pursuant to [the 2017 Amending Act]. Pursuant
to section 1(1), Sejm shall elect fifteen Council members for
a joint four-year term of office from among judges of the Supreme Court,
ordinary courts, administrative courts, and military courts. When making its
choice, Sejm shall – to the extent possible – recognise the
need for judges of diverse types and levels of court to be represented on the
Council. Notably, the provisions of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland
have not been amended in respect of NCJ membership or NCJ member appointment.
This means that a statute could only lawfully amend the manner of election of
Council members (judges) by judges rather than introducing a procedure whereby
NCJ judicial members are elected by the legislature. The aforementioned
amendment to the NCJ Act passed jointly with the new Act on the Supreme Court
provides a solution whereby the legislature and the executive – regardless of
the long statutory tradition of a part of the Council members being elected by
judges themselves, thus reflecting the Council’s status and mandate, and those
of the judiciary recognised as a power separate from other authorities under
the Constitution of the Republic of Poland – gain a nearly monopolistic
position in deciding on NCJ membership. Today, the legislature is responsible
for electing 15 members of the NCJ who are judges, with another 6 NCJ
members being parliamentary representatives (4 and 2 of whom are elected
by Sejm and the Senate, respectively). The new mechanism of
electing NCJ members who are judges has resulted in the decision to appoint as
many as twenty-one of the twenty-five (84%) of Council members lying with both
parliamentary houses. Furthermore, the Minister of Justice and a representative
of the President of the Republic of Poland are ex officio Council
members: consequently, twenty-three of the twenty-five Council members are
ultimately appointed by authorities other than the judiciary. This is how the division
and balance of the legislative, executive, and judiciary branches have been
distorted, while having been duly described under Article 10 of the
Constitution of the Republic of Poland as a foundation of a democratic state of
law model (Article 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland).
44. Since Sejm and the
Senate are responsible for electing from among their respective members, judges
representing various levels shall elect Council members from among individuals
applying as candidates. In consequence, the checks and balances rule anchored
in Article 10 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland will also be
adhered to, in support of the process of rationalising the parliamentary
governance system.”
78. As regards the submission of candidatures,
candidate endorsement lists, the election to the NCJ and the non-disclosure of
the endorsement lists, the Supreme Court held:
“45. The Supreme Court’s appraisal in
acting on the binding legal interpretation expressed in the CJEU’s judgment of
19 November 2019 attaches considerable importance to the process of electing
present-day Council members. With regard to this particular matter, the point
at issue concerns the endorsement lists that were apparently offered to
candidates by judges. To date, it has not been verified whether new Council
members were lawfully nominated as candidates, or who endorsed them. Relevant
documents have not been disclosed yet, despite the relevant judgment of the
Supreme Administrative Court of 28 June 2019, OSK 4282/18 ... It is common knowledge that the
enforcement of the judgment has faced an obstacle in a decision issued by the
Chair of the Personal Data Protection Authority on 29 July 2019 on the
initiative of a new NCJ member. Consequently, it has come to pass that a body
of the judiciary responsible for a review of administrative authorities has in
effect itself fallen under the review of the latter. The failure to implement
the Supreme Administrative Court’s judgment justifies an assumption that the
content of the lists of endorsement for individual judicial candidates for the
NCJ corroborates the dependence of candidates on the legislature or the
executive.
46. The Supreme Court further concludes
that it is common knowledge that the public had been informed of judicial
candidates to the Council having been recommended by presidents of district
courts appointed by the Minister of Justice; other judges were recommended by judges
dependent on (reporting to) candidates in managerial positions in courts of
higher instance; judicial Council candidates were also recommended by the
plenipotentiary of the Institute of the Judiciary at the Ministry of Justice;
last but not least, some candidatures were submitted by the next of kin;
candidates recommended other candidates; some of the elected members of the
future Council were Ministry of Justice employees. All these facts prove that
the executive branch – acting through its direct or indirect subordinates – had
stood behind the majority of recommendations for NCJ judicial member
candidatures. Such circumstances accompanying the process of electing current
Council members may well raise doubts among the general public as to the Council’s
independence from the executive.
47. Furthermore, persons submitting
endorsement forms would withdraw them before the expiry of the candidature
submission term; at least one new NCJ member had endorsed his/her own
application ...
48. Such circumstances preclude the
notion of representativeness stipulated in Article 187 § 2 of the
Constitution of the Republic of Poland....”
79. The Supreme Court further pointed out
that some members of the NCJ had become beneficiaries of the Government’s reorganisation
of the judiciary:
“49. Practice also shows that elected
Council members have directly benefitted from recent changes. They have been
appointed to managerial positions at courts whose presidents and
vice-presidents have been dismissed ad hoc, or applied for
promotion to a court of higher instance ... The general public may also learn
of various dependencies between elected judges – new Council members and the
executive branch ...”
80. As regards the manner in which the NCJ
exercised its constitutional duty of safeguarding the independence of the
judiciary, the Supreme Court made the following findings:
“50. The fourth test component is the
important assessment of how the body performs its constitutional duty to
safeguard the independence of courts and judges; and how it performs its
competencies, and in particular whether it proceeds in a manner that could
render its independence from the legislature and the executive doubtful from
the vantage point of a member of the public. With regard to the aforementioned
premises, the following arguments ought to be raised: the National Council of
the Judiciary failed to take action in defence of the independence of the
Supreme Court or of the Court’s judges after the coming into force of the Act
on the Supreme Court and an attempt to force the Court’s judges into retirement
(see the CJEU’s judgment of 24 June 2019, C-619/18).
The Supreme Court further emphasises that Council
members have publicly demanded that disciplinary action be taken against judges
filing preliminary rulings ...; have challenged the right to file preliminary
rulings ... and have challenged the necessity of ‘apologising to justices
for corruption comments.”
81. The Supreme Court reached the following
conclusion as regards the NCJ:
“60. On the basis of an overall
assessment of the above circumstances, the Supreme Court concludes that, as of
this day, the National Council of the Judiciary does not provide sufficient
guarantees of independence from the legislative and executive authorities in
the judicial appointment procedure.”
82. This conclusion was the starting point
for its assessment of whether the Disciplinary Chamber could be considered an
“independent and impartial tribunal established by law”:
“61. The foregoing is the point of
departure for assessing whether the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court
(hereinafter ‘IDSN’) is an impartial and independent tribunal within the
meaning of Article 47 of the Charter and Article 6 of the Convention, and ...
although this is not expressly assessed in the present case, whether it can be
[considered] a court pursuant to domestic law. As in the case of the NCJ, only
the cumulative fulfilment of the conditions indicated by the Court of Justice
of the EU may lead to certain negative consequences in the assessment of the
status of the IDSN as a court.
...
64. Firstly, the ‘IDSN’ was
created from scratch. For the purposes of the present case, it must be
emphasised that, in accordance with the applicable section 79 of [the 2017 Act
on the Supreme Court] it became competent in labour and social security legal
matters concerning judges of the Supreme Court and matters concerning the
retirement of judges of the Supreme Court. In this area, previously, the
ordinary courts and the Labour, Social Security, and Public Affairs Chamber
(now the Labour and Social Security Chamber) were competent. It should be noted
that [the 2017 Act on the Supreme Court] introduced a change which deprived
judges of the Supreme Court of the right to two-instance court proceedings. At
present, an appeal may be lodged only with another panel of the Disciplinary
Chamber ...”
83. The Supreme Court noted who had been
appointed as judges to this Chamber:
“66... it should be noted that only persons with
very strong connections to the legislative or executive power have been elected
to the IDSN, and this, in turn, may raise objective doubts for individuals with
regard to the obligation to secure the right to an independent and impartial
tribunal....It should be recalled that persons appointed to the Chamber are
those who were previously subordinate to the executive power or who, in the
course of the crisis concerning the rule of law covered by the procedure under
Article 7 [TEU], acted on instructions from or in a manner consistent with the
expectations of the political authorities. Selecting only such candidates as
judges of the Supreme Court does not guarantee their independence and thus does
not allow for the constitution of an independent court. Among the elected
members of the Disciplinary Chamber are: the director of a department in the
State Prosecutor’s Office; a deputy regional prosecutor in the Regional
Prosecutor’s Office (appointment in 2016); the director of the legislative
office of the National Institute of Remembrance (IPN); the prosecutor of the
State Prosecutor’s Office, who accused judges of corruption but ultimately the
proceedings in this case were discontinued; the former governor and adviser to
the Speaker of Sejm; a person known in the legal community exclusively
for his activity in the mass media and social media, who in recent times has
repeatedly expressed his unequivocal political sympathies; a prosecutor whose
procedural actions were found to have violated Article 3 of the Convention
(prohibition of torture) as a result of a settlement before the Court
(application no. 32420/07).”
84. The Supreme Court also examined the
appointment process and considered that there had been no effective appeal
procedure against the resolutions of the NCJ recommending the judges. It held:
“67. Fourthly, the conditions of the
competition procedure were changed in the course of that procedure. [The
amendments to the domestic law] removed the obligation on the person seeking a
recommendation by the NCJ to submit the required documents (professional
experience, academic achievements, opinions of superiors, recommendations,
publications, opinion of the collegium of the competent court and the
assessment of the competent assembly of judges). Such documents may be crucial
when there are more candidates for a judicial post than places. This was the
case for candidates to the Disciplinary Chamber, where over 90 candidates
applied for sixteen seats. ... the amendment further introduced the principle
that if resolutions in individual cases concerning appointment to the Supreme
Court are not challenged by all participants to the proceedings, it becomes
final in the part concerning the decision to present a motion for appointment
to the office of judge of the Supreme Court. This type of solution eliminates
the possibility of an effective appeal of a candidate against a resolution of
the NCJ to the relevant court ...
...
72. ...Currently, the legislator has
abandoned the aforementioned standards of non-binding substantive control of
candidates for the position of a judge of the Supreme Court by the community of
judges of the Supreme Court. If one combines this procedure (elimination of the
Supreme Court from participation in the procedure for filling the posts of its
judges) with the ‘new’ solutions serving to select members of the
National Council of the Judiciary, it becomes clear that assessment of the
independence and impartiality of the composition of the new chamber of the
Supreme Court thus selected, measured – as the CJEU indicates – by
the ‘conviction of an individual’, is problematic.”
85. The Supreme Court further analysed the
legal framework of the Disciplinary Chamber, its competences and certain
activities:
“73. Sixthly, this Chamber is given wide
autonomy and a special status as an extraordinary court, which can only be
established for times of war, and which is only ostensibly (by name) part of
the structure of the Supreme Court. This problem has been described in detail
in legal commentary ... The Chamber was established in the structure of the
Supreme Court as a court of first instance: (a) in disciplinary cases of
judges of the Supreme Court; (b) in labour and social security cases concerning
the Supreme Court judges; (c) in cases concerning the retired status of a judge
of the Supreme Court. Subsequently, the legislator made the IDSN a court
adjudicating as a court of first and sole instance in cases involving appeals
against decisions of corporate bodies, adjudicating in disciplinary matters
regarding legal professions (section 27(1) point 1(b)). In the remaining scope
this Chamber acts as a second instance court in disciplinary cases concerning
judges of ordinary courts and prosecutors (Section 27(1) point 1(b)).
In addition, its organisational and financial autonomy points to a number of
distinctions, despite remaining within the structure of the Supreme Court....
75. Seventhly, actions taken by the DCSC
ought to be considered as well; such activities were intended to cause the
withdrawal of referrals for a preliminary ruling [to the CJEU]; prior to their
appointment, persons currently adjudicating in the Chamber publicly criticised
questions referred for a preliminary ruling by the Supreme Court.
After the CJEU judgment of 19 November 2019, the
Disciplinary Chamber flagrantly continued operating, before any decision
resolving the matter referred for a preliminary ruling – as to its status as a
court within the meaning of EU law ‑ had been given.”
86. The Supreme Court reached the following
conclusion regarding the Disciplinary Chamber:
“79. In sum, each of the circumstances
presented, when assessed alone, is not conclusive of a failure to comply with
the standard of Article 47 of the [Charter of Fundamental Rights of the
European Union] (Article 6 of the Convention in conjunction with Article 45 § 1
of the Polish Constitution). However, when all these circumstances are put
together – the creation of a new organisational unit in the Supreme Court from
scratch, staffing of this unit exclusively with new persons with strong
connections to the legislative and executive powers and who, prior to their
appointment, were beneficiaries of the changes to the administration of
justice, and were selected by the NCJ, which does not act in a manner
independent of the legislature and the executive, and its broad autonomy and
competences taken away from other courts and other chambers of the Supreme
Court – it follows clearly and unequivocally that the Disciplinary Chamber of
the Supreme Court is not a tribunal within the meaning of Article 47 of the
Charter, Article 6 of the Convention and Article 45 § 1 of the Polish
Constitution”....
In view of the above conclusions, the Supreme Court
decided not to transfer the case to the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme
Court and quashed the resolution of the NCJ given in the case:
“88. In conclusion, the Supreme Court
holds that the National Council of the Judiciary in its current composition is
not an impartial body and is not independent of the legislative and executive
powers and therefore the resolution adopted by it should be quashed.
Accordingly, the Supreme Court has decided as set out in the operative part of
the ruling.”
(b) Resolution
of 8 January 2020 (case no. I NOZP 3/19)
87. On 8 January 2020 the Chamber of
Extraordinary Review and Public Affairs of the Supreme Court issued a
resolution of seven judges (uchwała; see
paragraph 49 above). The Supreme Court found that a resolution of the
NCJ recommending to the President candidates for the post of judge could be
quashed upon an appeal by a candidate, provided that the appellant proved that
the lack of independence of the NCJ had adversely affected the content of the
impugned resolution, or provided that the appellant demonstrated that the court
had not been independent or impartial according to the criteria indicated in
the CJEU judgment. In respect of the latter, the court stressed that the
Constitution had not allowed for a review of the effectiveness of the
President’s decision concerning the appointment of judges. When dealing with
such appeals the Supreme Court was bound by the scope of the appeal and had to
examine whether the NCJ had been an independent body according to the criteria
determined in the CJEU judgment 19 November 2019 (in paragraphs 134‑144
thereof).
(c) Rulings of 15 January 2020 (case nos. III PO 8/18
and III PO 9/18)
88. On 15 January 2019 the Supreme Court
gave two rulings in two remaining cases that had been referred for a
preliminary ruling to the CJEU (cases C-624/18, C-625/18). The court decided
not to transfer the cases to the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court and remitted
them for consideration to the District Court. The Supreme Court ruled that the
Disciplinary Chamber was not an independent and impartial tribunal, given the
conditions of its creation, the scope of its powers, its composition and the
involvement of the NCJ in its constitution.
(d) Resolution
of 23 January 2020 (case no. BSA I-4110-1/20)
89. In the wake of
the Supreme Court’s judgment of 5 December 2019, and the resolution of 8
January 2020 by the Chamber of Extraordinary Review and Public Affairs of the
Supreme Court (see paragraphs 71-87 above), the First President of
the Supreme Court decided that it was necessary to issue an interpretative
resolution in a formation of the joined Chambers of that court “to resolve
divergences in the interpretation of the law existing in the case-law of the
Supreme Court concerning the legal question” arising in connection with the
interpretation of the CJEU judgment of 19 November 2019. On 23
January 2020 the joined Chambers of the Supreme Court (fifty-nine judges of the
Civil, Criminal and Labour and Social Security Chambers) issued an
interpretative resolution on a request from the First President of
the Supreme Court. It concluded that, as a result of the 2017 Amending
Act, the NCJ was no longer independent and that a judicial formation including
a person appointed as a judge on the recommendation of the NCJ was contrary to
the law. These conclusions, in so far as relevant, read as follows[2]:
“1. A court formation is unduly composed
within the meaning of Article 439 § 1 (2) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, or a court formation is inconsistent with the provisions of
law within the meaning of Article 379 § 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, also
where the court includes a person appointed to the office of judge of the
Supreme Court on the recommendation of the National Council of the Judiciary in
accordance with the [2017 Amending Act].
2. A court formation is unduly composed
within the meaning of Article 439 § 1 (2) of the Code of
Criminal Procedure, or a court formation is inconsistent with the provisions of
law within the meaning of Article 379 § 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure, also
where the court includes a person appointed to the office of judge of an
ordinary or military court on the recommendation of the National Council of the
Judiciary formed in accordance with the [2017 Amending Act], if the deficiency
of the appointment process leads, in specific circumstances, to a violation of the
guarantees of independence and impartiality within the meaning of Article 45 §
1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, Article 47 of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union and Article 6 § 1 of the
[Convention].
3. The interpretation of
Article 439 § 1 (2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure and
Article 379 § 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure provided in points 1 and
2 above shall not apply to judgments given by courts before the date
hereof and judgments to be given in proceedings pending at the date [of the
present resolution] under the Code of Criminal Procedure before a given court
formation.
4. Point 1 [above] shall apply to
judgments issued with the participation of judges appointed to the Disciplinary
Chamber of the Supreme Court under [the 2017 Act on the Supreme Court]
irrespective of the date of such judgments.”
90. The Supreme Court’s resolution
contained an extensive reasoning, the relevant parts of which are rendered
below.
91. The Supreme Court first defined the
scope of the resolution. It held, in so far as relevant:
“11... in the present resolution, the Supreme Court
must address the question whether participation in a formation of an ordinary
court, a military court or the Supreme Court, ..., of a person appointed as a
judge by the President of the Republic of Poland following the procedure
defined in the [2017 Amending Act] causes a breach of the standards of
independence and impartiality of the court which would be inadmissible under
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, Article 45 § 1 of the
Constitution of the Republic of Poland, and Article 47 of the Charter and, if
that is the case, it must define the procedural effect on the administration of
justice under such circumstances ...
To determine under Article 6 § 1 [of the Convention]
and Article 47 of the Charter that a case is heard by a court which is
impartial and independent, established by law, it is necessary to examine the
process of judicial appointment in the national judicial system in order to
establish whether judges can adjudicate independently and impartially ...”
92. The Supreme Court reiterated the
fundamental rules for appointment of judges in Poland:
“31. In the light of Article 179 of the
Constitution of the Republic of Poland, the President of the Republic of Poland
appoints to the office of judge not just anyone, at his sole discretion as to
the candidate’s qualifications and ability to hold office, but exercises that
power on a motion of the [NCJ]. Therefore, a motion of the [NCJ] is a condition sine
qua non for effective appointment. Moreover, a motion concerning a
judicial appointment cannot be lodged by anyone except a body acting as the
[NCJ], not only in name but based on the procedure of its appointment and the
conditions under which it exercises its powers (decision of the Constitutional
Court of 23 June 2008, 1 Kpt 1/08).”
93. As
regards a breach of Article 187 § 1 (2) of the Constitution, resulting from the
change to the appointment process in respect of fifteen judicial members of the
NCJ, the Supreme Court held:
“31. ... New members of the [NCJ] were
appointed by Sejm of the Republic of Poland in accordance with
[the 2017 Amending Act] which stood in conflict with Article 187 § 1 (2)
of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland. That provision removed the
requirement for judges sitting as members of the [NCJ] to be appointed by
judges, .... The Constitution does not allow for that power to be implicitly
granted to Parliament. After [the 2017 Amending Act], fifteen members of the
[NCJ] who were judges were appointed by Sejm of the Republic
of Poland for a joint four-year term of office (section 9a(1) of [the 2011
Act on the NCJ as amended by the 2017 Amending Act]). None of them is a judge
of the Supreme Court, as is required under Article 187 § 1 (2)
of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland.
In view of the procedure of appointment of judges to
the [NCJ] under [the 2017 Amending Act], the judiciary no longer has control
over the membership of the [NCJ] or, indirectly (in connection with amendments
of other systemic provisions), over which candidates are proposed to the
President for appointment to the office of judge of an ordinary court, a military
court, the Supreme Court, or an administrative court. The [NCJ] is dominated by
political appointees of the majority in Sejm. Following the
appointment of 15 judges to sit as members of the [NCJ] by Sejm, as
many as 21 out of the 25 members of the [NCJ] are political appointees of both
Houses of Parliament. Following the appointment of judges to the [NCJ], judges
sitting as members of the [NCJ] no longer represent judges of the Supreme
Court, judges of ordinary courts, administrative courts, or military courts, as
required under Article 187 § 1 (2) of the Constitution of the Republic of
Poland. Judges sitting as members of the [NCJ] by political appointment have no
legitimacy as representatives of the judicial community, who should have
authority and remain independent of political influence. That has largely
weakened the role of the [NCJ] as a guardian of the independence of courts and
judges.”
94. As regards a breach of Articles
10 § 1, 173 and 178 and 187 §§ 1 and 3 of the Constitution,
the Supreme Court held:
“31. ...The provisions of the [2017
Amending Act] governing the appointment of judges to the [NCJ] are inconsistent
with the principle of division and balance of powers (Article 10 § 1 of the
Constitution of the Republic of Poland) and the principle of separation and
independence of courts (Article 173 of the Constitution of the Republic of
Poland) and independence of judges (Article 178 of the Constitution of the
Republic of Poland). The principle of separation of the judiciary is of crucial
relevance in this context. According to that principle, based on the division
and balance of powers, the legislature and the executive may interfere with the
functioning of the judiciary only to the extent allowed by the Constitution of
the Republic of Poland, that is, where expressly provided for in the
Constitution. With respect to the National Council for the Judiciary, the
principle of separation implies that the legislature and the executive may
influence the membership and functioning of the National Council for the
Judiciary only to the extent expressly provided for by the Constitution of the
Republic of Poland (Article 187 § 1 (1) in fine, Article 187
§ 1 (3)‑(4)). Consequently, in determining the system,
responsibilities and rules of procedure of the [NCJ] (Article 187 § 4 of the
Constitution of the Republic of Poland), the legislature cannot exercise the
power to appoint judges to sit as members of the [NCJ], which is not provided
for in the Constitution of the Republic of Poland because its power to appoint
members of the [NCJ] are defined in the Constitution (Article 187 § 1
(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland).
The termination of the mandate of previous members
of the [NCJ] and the appointment of new members of the [NCJ] in accordance with
the Act of 8 December 2019 amending the Act on the [NCJ] raises serious
doubts as to compliance with Article 187 §§ 1 and 3 of the
Constitution of the Republic of Poland and, consequently, doubts as to the
legality of the [NCJ] and the appointment of candidates to the post of judge
with the participation of the [NCJ].”
95. The Supreme Court further analysed the
procedure of election of judicial members of the NCJ and held, in so far as
relevant, as follows:
“Shaped by [the 2017 Amending Act], the procedure
for the election of judges to that body resulted in the judicial authority
losing any influence over its composition, and thus indirectly – also in
connection with the amendments to other systemic laws – also on the candidates
presented to the President for appointment to the position of ordinary court
judge, military court judge, Supreme Court judge and administrative court
judges. The National Council of the Judiciary has been dominated by politically
elected members of the parliamentary majority. After the selection by Sejm of
fifteen judges as members of the National Council of the Judiciary, as many as
twenty-one of the twenty-five persons comprising the Council come from the
political nomination of both chambers of Parliament. As a result of the election
of judges to the National Council of the Judiciary, the judges sitting on that
body ceased to be a group representing judges of the Supreme Court, ordinary
courts, administrative courts and military courts, as provided by Article 187 §
1 (2) of the Constitution. The judges sitting on it as a result of political
nomination were not therefore given a mandate to represent the judiciary, a
task which should be entrusted to persons enjoying authority and independence
from political influence. This has resulted in a fundamental weakening of the
role of the National Council of the Judiciary as a guardian of the independence
of courts and judges.”
96. In respect of the endorsement lists for
candidates for the NCJ, the Supreme Court observed:
“32. The [2017 Amending Act] changed the
procedure for the appointment of judges sitting as members of the [NCJ] as
follows. Authorisation to nominate a candidate to serve as member of the
Council shall be granted to a group of at least: (1) two thousand citizens
of the Republic of Poland who are over 18 years of age, have full legal
capacity and enjoy full public rights; (2) twenty-five judges other than
retired judges ...
Endorsement lists presented by judges running as
candidates for the [NCJ] had to be signed not just by anyone, but by judges....
A request for information concerning persons who signed the lists of
endorsement of judges running as candidates to the [NCJ], according to
regulations governing access to public information, confirmed as legitimate by
a legally binding judgment of the National Administrative Court of 28 June
2019, I OSK 4282/18, dismissing a cassation appeal of the Head of the
Chancellery of Sejm of the Republic of Poland concerning the
judgment annulling the decision on the extent of refusal to disclose such
information, has been disregarded by the Head of the Chancellery of Sejm of
the Republic of Poland and the Speaker of Sejm, who have refused to
comply with the legally valid judgment. That state of affairs has prevailed to
date ...
According to a published statement of [Judge M.N.],
appointed as a member of the [NCJ], he signed his own endorsement list.
According to a published statement of four judges, [Judge M.N.] used withdrawn
endorsements to run as a candidate for the [NCJ]. The endorsements were
withdrawn long before the list was verified and used in a vote; the Speaker
of Sejm was given advance notice of the circumstance (on
25 January 2018). ... If candidates for the [NCJ] signed each other’s
endorsement lists, that is indicative of the scale of endorsement for the
members of the [NCJ] in the judicial community ...”
97. As regards a breach of Article 144 § 2
of the Constitution in that the President’s act announcing vacant positions in
the Supreme Court was issued without a countersignature of the Prime Minister,
the Supreme Court held:
“34. Section 31(1) of [the 2017 Act
on the Supreme Court] deprived the First President of the Supreme Court of the
power to announce vacant positions of judges of the Supreme Court and vested
that power in the President of the Republic of Poland. The new legal power is
not enumerated in Article 144 § 3 of the Constitution of the Republic
of Poland as one of the 30 prerogatives; therefore, it is evident that the
publication in Monitor Polski [Official Gazette] of an
announcement concerning the number of vacant judicial positions in chambers of
the Supreme Court requires a countersignature of the Prime Minister. Under
Article 144 § 2 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, official acts of
the President other than the prerogatives shall require, for their validity,
the countersignature of the Prime Minister. The power to announce vacant
judicial positions in the Supreme Court vested in the President of the Republic
of Poland under the 2017 Act on the Supreme Court cannot be considered a
prerogative derived from the prerogative of appointing judges (Article 144
§ 3 (17) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland) ... Such a
defective announcement by the President of the Republic of Poland could not
initiate a non-defective procedure of appointment for judicial positions at the
Supreme Court ...”
98. As regards the fact that the President
of Poland proceeded with the appointments to the Supreme Court notwithstanding
pending appeals against the NCJ’s resolutions recommending candidates, the
Supreme Court found as follows:
“35. The requirement of holding a
competition procedure before the [NCJ] for the selection of a candidate for the
office of a judge to be presented to the President of the Republic of Poland
not only creates conditions of fair competition for candidates for public
office but, in particular, ensures that the office goes to the person best
positioned to hold it.
The [Act of 20 July 2018 amending the Act on
Organisation of Ordinary Courts] eliminated the requirement for the [NCJ] to
consider, when drawing up a list of candidates recommended for appointment to
the office of a judge, opinions on candidates issued by panels of the relevant
courts and appraisals issued by relevant general assemblies of judges. That was
a reaction to the behaviour of judicial self-government bodies which refused to
exercise their powers in defective proceedings before the [NCJ]. Instead of
eliminating the broadly criticised defects of the system it had devised, the
legislature decided to eliminate from the system the last options of
participation in the procedure of judicial appointments previously left for
judicial self-government bodies.
[Section 44 of the 2011 Act on the NCJ as in
force after of 27 July 2018], without formally eliminating the option for
participants in the competition procedure for the office of judge of the
Supreme Court to lodge an appeal on grounds of an unlawful resolution of the
[NCJ], provides that, unless a resolution in an individual case concerning
appointment to the office of judge of the Supreme Court is appealed against by
all participants in the procedure, it becomes legally valid ... All resolutions
of the [NCJ] naming candidates for the office of a judge of the Supreme Court
were appealed. The [NCJ] ignored the appeals and presented selected candidates
for judicial positions to the President of the Republic of Poland ... As the
resolutions were appealed against, the vacant judicial positions were filled
defectively and the fitness of candidates for office was in fact never duly
checked ...
Despite the pending judicial review of the
resolutions of the [NCJ] concerning all candidates for the Supreme Court and
despite the decisions of the Supreme Administrative Court suspending the effect
of the resolutions concerning the candidates for the Civil Chamber, the
Criminal Chamber, and the Extraordinary Review and Public Affairs Chamber,
being aware of the effect of his decisions that would be difficult to
reverse de lege lata, the President of the Republic of Poland
presented appointments to the persons named in the resolutions of the [NCJ] and
the appointees accepted the appointments.”
99. As regards the question whether the NCJ
had been duly appointed, the Supreme Court concluded as follows:
“36. ... The President
appoints judges, but he does so not just at any time or at his own
discretion but on a motion of the [NCJ]. No appointment may be granted to
anyone who is not concerned by such motion (cf. the decision of the
Constitutional Court of 23 June 2008, 1 Kpt 1/08).
The minimum conditions for the exercise of the
prerogative in question by the President of the Republic therefore require that
his action be initiated by a duly constituted and composed body having the
status of the National Council of the Judiciary. Since [entry into force of the
2017 Amending Act and the 2017 Act on the Supreme Court], the [NCJ] has not
been duly appointed under the Constitution of the Republic of Poland;
consequently, the [NCJ] could not exercise its powers, which the President of
the Republic of Poland should have determined before exercising his
prerogative. Persons named in the lists of recommendations drawn up in a
defective procedure of appointment for judicial positions cannot be considered
to have been candidates for office duly presented to the President of the
Republic of Poland whom the President is competent to appoint to the office.
Even assuming that the issuance of letters of appointment to such persons
renders them formally appointed to the office of judge, it is necessary to
determine whether and to what extent such persons may exercise judicial
functions, so that the requirement of impartiality and independence of a court
administering justice is not thereby infringed.”
100. The Supreme Court also made the
following observations regarding political influence on the election of the NCJ
members:
“38. The procedure for appointment to the
office of judge has a particular bearing on whether the court comprised of such
appointees may be considered an impartial and independent tribunal in a given
case. Any criteria of appointment other than substantive ones would suggest
that the judge is affiliated with a political option or group. The more
political the appointment procedure, i.e., the more the appointment decision
comes directly from politicians or representatives of political authorities,
the less transparent and more arbitrary, or even unlawful, the decision-making
procedure will be. That seriously, and irreversibly, undermines the trust of
the general public in a judge as an independent person free of external
influence and pressure or the willingness to show gratitude to such groups.
Consequently, individual judges in the system of the
judiciary could become permanently identified with specific political groups or
groups of interest (‘our judges’ v. ‘their judges’) and their
legitimacy would be contested by each new parliamentary majority. That is
clearly in conflict with the individual’s right to hearing of his case by an
independent court as the stability of court decisions would hinge on changes of
the country’s political majority.
In this context, it should be noted that, according
to the official statement of the Minister of Justice issued in the legislative
procedure on 15 January 2020 at the Senate of the Republic of Poland, the membership
of the [NCJ] was determined in such a way as to ensure that it was comprised of
persons loyal to the parliamentary majority (the political group represented by
the Minister of Justice): ‘each group could propose judges they are
accountable for. We have proposed judges who we thought were willing to
co-operate with the judicial reform’ – transcript of the third session of
the Senate of the Republic of Poland of the 10th term, 15 January 2020).
Consequently, appointments granted by the [NCJ] are
systemically not independent of political interest, affecting the fulfilment of
the objective criteria of impartiality and independence by persons appointed to
the office of a judge on the motion of the [NCJ]. In other words, because the
[NCJ] has been politicised, competitions for judicial positions are very likely
to be decided not based on substantive criteria but depending on political
loyalties or support for the reform of the judiciary pursued by the
parliamentary majority in conflict with the Constitution of the Republic of
Poland ...
39. Significant influence exerted by the
Minister of Justice, who is also Prosecutor General, on the membership of the
[NCJ] (confirmed in his aforementioned official statement in the Senate of the
Republic of Poland) and consequently on decisions of that body concerning
judicial appointments, undermines the objective conditions of impartiality in
cases where a person so appointed for the position of a judge were to
participate in the court formation while the Prosecutor General or the public
prosecutor’s office headed by the Prosecutor General were a party to such
proceedings.
40. Defective competitions for the office
of a judge carried out by the [NCJ], which is structurally no longer
independent, took place under conditions of long-term intentional steps taken
by representatives of the executive and the legislature seeking to generally
undermine trust in the courts, their impartiality and independence ...”
101. As regards the lack of independence of
the NCJ, the Supreme Court fully endorsed the conclusions in the judgment of
5 December 2019 and held:
“42. The formation of the Supreme Court
passing the present resolution fully shares the position presented in the
judgment of the Supreme Court of 5 December 2019, III PO 7/18 to
the effect that the [NCJ] so formed is not an independent body but a body
subordinated directly to political authorities. Consequently, competitions for
the office of judge carried out by the [NCJ] have been and will be defective,
creating fundamental doubts as to the motivation behind motions for the
appointment of specific individuals to the office of a judge. That
notwithstanding, in view of factual and legal obstacles aiming to prevent the
elimination of doubts as to the legality of the appointment of individual
members of the [NCJ], up to and including unlawful refusal to comply with court
judgments, the stability and legality of decisions of the [NCJ] may be permanently
contested, becoming an object of political dispute, which calls into question
the neutrality of persons appointed by the [NCJ].”
102. With respect to the consequences of the
finding that the NCJ had not been an independent body in the process of
appointment of judges to different courts, the Supreme Court held:
“45. Lack of independence of the [NCJ]
leads to defectiveness in the procedure of judicial appointments. However, such
defect and its effect undermining the criteria of independence and impartiality
of the court may prevail to a different degree. First and foremost, the
severity and scope of the procedural effect of a defective judicial appointment
varies depending on the type of the court and the position of such court in the
organisation of the judiciary. The status of a judge of an ordinary court or a
military court is different from the status of a judge of the Supreme
Court....The severity of irregularities in competition procedures for the
appointment of judges of ordinary and military courts and judges of the Supreme
Court, since the normative changes implemented in 2017, has varied; however, it
was definitely more severe in the case of appointments for judicial positions
in the Supreme Court”....
103. As regards the Chamber of Extraordinary
Review and Public Affairs, it noted:
“45. It is also relevant to note that the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Extraordinary Review and Public Affairs Chamber
includes hearing appeals against resolutions of the [NCJ] concerning candidates
for the office of a judge of ordinary, military and administrative courts. As a
result, a Chamber which is comprised entirely of defectively appointed judges
reviews the appointment of other judges on the application of a [NCJ] formed in
the same way.”
104. As regards the Disciplinary Chamber and
Articles 45 § 1 and 175 § 2 of the Constitution, the
Supreme Court also noted additional elements pertaining to its competence
and structure:
“45. ...It should be mentioned that
additional circumstances arise with regard to judges of the Disciplinary
Chamber, confirming the inability of an adjudicating court with their
participation to fulfil the criteria of independence and impartiality. Such
circumstances concern directly the Chamber’s organisation, system, and appointment
procedure, as well as its separation from the Supreme Court. The formation of
the joined Civil Chamber, Criminal Chamber, and Labour and Social Security
Chamber of the Supreme Court fully shares, in that regard, the legal assessment
and its justification provided in the judgment of the Supreme Court of
5 December 2019 in case III PO 7/18,
which found that the Disciplinary Chamber established in the Supreme Court, under
the 2017 Act on the Supreme Court, structurally fails to fulfil the criteria of
an independent court within the meaning of Article 47 of the Charter and
Article 45 § 1 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland and Article 6
§ 1 ECHR, and that it is an extraordinary court which cannot be
established in time of peace pursuant to Article 175 § 2 of the
Constitution of the Republic of Poland. For those reasons alone, judgments
issued by formations of judges in the Disciplinary Chamber are not judgments
given by a duly appointed court.”
105. In its final remarks, the Supreme
Court referred, among other things, to the current situation of the Polish
judiciary:
“59. The current instability of the
Polish judiciary originates from the changes to the court system over the past
years, which are in breach of the standards laid down in the Constitution, the
EU Treaty, the Charter of Fundamental Rights, and the European Convention on
Human Rights.
The Leitmotif of the change was to
subordinate judges and courts to political authorities and to replace judges of
different courts, including the Supreme Court. That affected the appointment
procedure of judges and the bodies participating in the procedure, as well as
the system for the promotion and disciplining of judges. In particular, a
manifestly unconstitutional attempt was made to remove some judges of the
Supreme Court and to terminate the mandate of the First President of the
Supreme Court, contesting the legitimacy of the Supreme Court.
The systemic changes caused doubts about the
adjudicating legitimacy of judges appointed to the office in the new
procedures. The political motivation for the changes jeopardised the objective
conditions necessary for courts and judges to be perceived as impartial and
independent. The Supreme Court considers that the politicisation of courts and
their subordination to the parliamentary majority in breach of constitutional
procedures establishes a permanent system where the legitimacy of individual
judges and their judgments may be challenged with every new political
authority. That notwithstanding, the politicisation of courts departs from the
criteria of independence and impartiality of courts required under Union law
and international law, in particular Article 47 of the Charter and
Article 6 § 1 [of the Convention].
That, in turn, causes uncertainty about the
recognition of judgments of Polish courts in the Union space of freedom,
justice and security. Even now courts in certain EU Member States refuse to
co-operate, invoking violation of standards, and challenge judgments of Polish
courts. It should be noted that a resolution of the Supreme Court cannot
mitigate all risks arising in the functioning of the Polish judiciary at the
systemic level. In fact, that could only be done by the legislature if it
restored regulations concerning the judiciary that are consistent with the
Constitution of the Republic of Poland and Union law.
The Supreme Court may, at best, take into
consideration such risks and the principles of stability of the case-law and
legal certainty for individuals in its interpretations of provisions which
guarantee that a judgment in a specific case will be given by an impartial and
independent court. In its interpretation of the regulations governing criminal
and civil proceedings, referred by the First President of the Supreme Court,
the Supreme Court considered the effect of the judgment of the Court of Justice
of the European Union of 19 November 2019 in cases C-585/18, C‑624/18 and C-625/18, as well as the obligation to
identify such legislative instruments in the legal system which would guarantee
that a judgment will be issued by an impartial and independent tribunal despite
doubts arising from a range of systemic changes affecting the status of
judges.”
The Supreme Court concluded the resolution as
follows:
“60. ... It should be stressed that,
pursuant to Article 91 § 3 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland, if an
agreement, ratified by the Republic of Poland, establishing an international
organisation so provides, the laws established by it shall be applied directly
and take precedence in the event of a conflict of laws. That concerns in
particular the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Consequently, in the event of a
conflict of laws with norms arising from such legal act, Polish courts are
required to disregard such laws in adjudicating.
In this context, it is important to quote once again in
extenso the principle reiterated on many occasions in the case-law of
the Court of Justice of the European Union ...: ‘any provision of a
national legal system and any legislative, administrative or judicial practice
which might impair the effectiveness of Community law by withholding from the
national court having jurisdiction to apply such law the power to do everything
necessary at the moment of its application to set aside national legislative
provisions which might prevent Community rules from having full force and
effect are incompatible with those requirements which are the very essence of
Community law.’ That is because a ‘national court which is called
upon, within the limits of its jurisdiction, to apply provisions of Community law
is under a duty to give full effect to those provisions, if necessary refusing
of its own motion to apply any conflicting provision of national legislation,
even if adopted subsequently’ (judgment of March 1977,
C-106/77).
Therefore, a law or decision of any national body
cannot prevent Polish courts from applying European Union law, prohibit an
interpretation of Polish law in line with European Union law, or especially
impose any restrictions or sanctions on judges who, exercising their judicial
power and acting as a court, respect the obligations arising from the European
Union membership of the Republic of Poland.
If, however, the Constitution of Poland, in
particular Article 179, which provides that judges shall be appointed by the
President of the Republic of Poland on a motion of the [NCJ], is found to
prevent review of the independence and impartiality of a court adjudicating in
a given case, then the Polish Constitution would be in fundamental conflict
with Article 47 of the Charter. In the territory of the European Union, the
independence and impartiality of courts must be genuine; and their independence
and impartiality cannot be uncontestably decreed by the mere fact of
appointment to the office of judge by the President of the Republic of Poland.”
106. In the wake of the resolution, the
Ministry of Justice published a statement on its website which, in its verbatim
(emphasis included) English version, read as follows:
“Statement on the resolution of the Supreme Court
The resolution of the Supreme Court of 23 January
2020 is ineffective. It was passed in gross violation of law. It violates
Article 179, Article 180(1) and Article 10 of the Polish Constitution.
Contrary to the applicable statutory provisions, the Supreme Court adopted a
resolution in proceedings regarding the challenge of the status of judges
appointed with the participation of the current National Council of the
Judiciary (KRS).
These proceedings were suspended by law on 22
January 2020 upon initiating a dispute of competence between the Supreme Court
and the Sejm and the President of the Republic of Poland before the
Constitutional [Court]. Before the Constitutional [Court]’s ruling, no action
is allowed to be taken in the matter concerned. The resolution of the Supreme
Court is therefore invalid by law.
Pursuant to the Act on the Organisation of the
Constitutional [Court] and the Mode of Proceedings before the Constitutional
[Court], if a dispute of competence is initiated, the proceedings before the
Supreme Court are suspended by law. All actions of the Court during the
suspension are invalid. Before the Constitutional [Court]’s ruling, no action
is allowed to be taken in the matter concerned. A party to a dispute is not
allowed to judge for itself whether a dispute has actually occurred. Pursuant
to the Constitution, this right is vested only in the Constitutional [Court].
The essence of such as dispute is that no Court can
examine, let alone question judicial appointments or act that govern the status
of judges and the manner in which candidates are selected. Therefore, the
Supreme Court cannot encroach upon the competences of the National Council of
the Judiciary, the President of the Republic of Poland or the Sejm, and,
pursuing this line, even the competencies of the Constitutional [Court] itself,
which has already dealt with the case of the National Council of the Judiciary
and declared the current wording of the Act to be in accordance with the
Constitution.
The suspension of the proceedings before the Supreme
Court was also necessary because a case regarding the provision of the Code of
Civil Procedure to which the resolution refers (i.e. Article 379(4) of the Code
of Civil Procedure) is being heard before the Constitutional [Court].
A resolution adopted by three chambers of the
Supreme Court is unlawful and, as such, produces no legal effects. The Supreme
Court is not authorised to examine and assess whether the fact that a judge
appointed by the President of the Republic of Poland at the request of the
National Council of the Judiciary after 2018 sits on common [sic] court,
military court or Supreme Court invalidates the proceedings. Consequently, no
authority, including a judicial one, can question the appointment and
investiture of a judge.
In addition, following the effective date the Act of
20 December 2019 on Guaranteeing Constitutional Order in the
Administration of Justice and Improving the Work of Courts, the resolution of
the Supreme Court will become even more irrelevant. Indeed, the new Act
eliminates recent doubts about the possibility of questioning the status of
judges appointed by the President of the Republic of Poland. It declares
inadmissibility of such actions, in accordance with the jurisprudence of the
Supreme Administrative Court and the Constitutional [Court].
Office of Communication and Promotion
Ministry of Justice.”
- The
Constitutional Court’s case-law
(a) Judgment
of 18 July 2007 (case no. K 25/07)
107. On 18 July 2007 the Constitutional
Court reviewed, on an application from the NCJ, the constitutionality of
two provisions added to the 2001 Act on the Ordinary Courts by the Act of
16 March 2007 amending the Act on the NCJ of 2001, which had introduced
the rule of incompatibilitas for the position of a member of
the NCJ with the position of president or vice-president of an ordinary
court. The first of the impugned provisions (section 25a) stipulated
(1) that a judge elected as member of the NCJ could not be appointed to the post
of president or vice-president of a court, and (2) that the appointment to such
post is terminated on election to the NCJ. The second of the impugned
provisions (section 5) extended the rule included in section 25a to judges
sitting as members of the NCJ during their term of office. The Constitutional
Court held that both provisions were incompatible with Article 187
§ 1 (2) of the Constitution, and that the second of these provisions
was also incompatible with Article 2 of the Constitution.
As regards the constitutional position of the NCJ,
the Constitutional Court held that it was a constitutional collegial State
authority whose functions were related to judicial power. The relevant part of
the judgment read:
“In vesting the Council with competences relating to
the protection of the independence of courts and judges, the Constitution also
introduced the mechanism protecting the independence of the Council.
Article 187 § 1 of the Constitution provides that the composition of
the Council is mixed: it connects representatives of the judiciary (with
compulsory participation of Presidents of the Supreme Court and the Supreme
Administrative Court), representatives of the executive (the Minister of
Justice and a person appointed by the President of the Republic) as well as
four MPs and two senators. The [1997] Constitution introduced – in comparison
to earlier provisions of constitutional rank – constitutional rules concerning
the composition of the Council, specified the term of office of its members and
the manner of their appointment or election. In the composition of the Council
the Constitution gave a significant majority to elected judges of the ordinary,
administrative and military courts and judges of the Supreme Court. The
regulations concerning election of judges to the Council are of constitutional
rank and of particular constitutional significance, since their status de
facto determines the independence of this constitutional organ and the
effectiveness of the Council’s work.”
The Constitutional Court also held that the members
of the NCJ should be judges and elected by judges:
“4. The Constitution regulates directly
in Article 187 § 1 (2) the principle of election of judges to the NCJ,
determining in that way the personal composition of the NCJ. It explicitly
prescribes that judges – elected by judges – could be members of the NCJ,
without stipulating other additional conditions that would have to be met for
them to sit in the NCJ. The election is made from among four groups of judges
mentioned in Article 187 § 1 (2) of the Constitution. The Constitution does not
provide for a removal of the [judicial members of the NCJ],
stipulating their four-year term of office in the NCJ. The election procedure
set out in the [2001] Act on the NCJ ... falls within the boundaries laid down
in Article 187 § 1 (2) of the Constitution, fulfilling the
principle of election of judges by judges. ...”
(b) Judgment
of 20 June 2017 (case no. K 5/17)
108. On 11 April 2017 the Prosecutor
General, who at the same time holds the position of Minister of Justice, asked
the Constitutional Court to examine the compatibility with the Constitution of
several provisions of the Act on the NCJ in force at the material time.
109. On 20 June 2017 the Constitutional
Court gave judgment in the case. It held that the provisions regulating
the procedure for electing members of the NCJ from among judges of the ordinary
courts and of administrative courts[3] were
incompatible with Article 187 § 1 (2) and § 4 in
conjunction with Article 32 of the Constitution. The impugned provisions
introduced an unjustified differentiation with regard to the election of judges
of the respective levels of the ordinary and administrative courts to the NCJ
and did not provide equal opportunities in respect of standing for election to
the NCJ. The Constitutional Court found that the impugned provisions treated
unequally judges of district and regional courts in comparison with judges of
courts of appeal, as well as judges of district courts in comparison with
judges of the regional courts. The same applied to judges of the regional
administrative courts in comparison with judges of the Supreme Administrative
Court.
110. Secondly, the Constitutional Court
held that section 13(3) of the 2011 Act on the NCJ, interpreted in the sense
that the terms of office of members of the NCJ elected from among judges of
ordinary courts was individual in character, was incompatible with
Article 187 § 3 of the Constitution.
111. In its general observations, the
Constitutional Court noted that the NCJ was a constitutional body tasked with
protecting the independence of courts and judges. It also noted that the NCJ
was not a judicial authority, and thus the constitutional standards relevant
for courts and tribunals were not applicable to the NCJ. Nor should the NCJ be
regarded as part of judicial self-governance. The mixed composition of the
Council made it an organ ensuring the balance of – and cooperation between –
the different powers. With regard to the election of judicial members of the
NCJ, the Constitutional Court held, in so far as relevant:
“The Constitutional Court in its current composition
does not agree with the [Constitutional Court’s] position adopted in the
judgment [of 18 July 2007,] no. K 25/07 that the Constitution specifies that [judicial]
members of the NCJ shall be elected by judges. Article 187 § 1 (2) of the
Constitution only stipulates that these persons [judicial members of the NCJ]
are elected from among judges. The Constitution did not specify who should elect
those judges. Thus, the question of who can be elected as member of the NCJ
follows from the Constitution, but it is not specified how judicial members of
the Council are to be elected. These matters were delegated to statutory
regulation. There is no obstacle for election of judges to the NCJ by judges.
However, one cannot agree with the assertion that the right to elect [judicial
members of the NCJ] is vested solely in assemblies of judges. While
Article 187 § 1 (3) of the Constitution clearly indicates that
MPs are elected to the NCJ by Sejm and senators by the Senate,
there are no constitutional guidelines in respect of judicial members of the
NCJ. This means that the Constitution does not determine who may elect judges
to the NCJ. For this reason, it should be noted that this question may be
differently regulated within the limits of legislative discretion.”
The Constitutional Court concluded:
“...The legislator has quite broad freedom in
shaping the NCJ system, as well as the scope of its activities, the mode of
work and the manner of election of its members. However, the legislator’s
competence is not unlimited.
Its limits are determined by:
firstly, the Council’s task, i.e. in acting to
safeguard the independence of courts and independence of judges;
secondly, the constitutionally determined
composition of the Council: while a statute may regulate the manner of election
of Council members, it may not modify its personal component set out in Article
187 § 1 of the Constitution ...”
112. The bench included Judge M.M. as judge
rapporteur. The issue whether a bench of the
Constitutional Court including Judge M.M. was a “tribunal established by law”
was raised in the case of Xero Floor w Polsce sp. z. o.o.
v Poland (no. 4907/18, judgment of 7 May 2021, not final).
(c) Judgment of
25 March 2019 (case no. K 12/18)
113. On 2 November 2018 the NCJ lodged a
request with the Constitutional Court to examine compliance with the
Constitution of the provisions of the 2011 Act on the NCJ as amended by the
2017 Amending Act.
114. On 25 March 2019 the
Constitutional Court gave judgment confirming compliance with Articles 187
§ 1 (2) and § 4, in conjunction with Articles 2, 10 § 1 and 173 and 186 §
1 of the Constitution, of section 9a of the
2011 Act on the NCJ, as amended by the 2017 Amending Act, concerning
the manner of appointment of the NCJ’s judicial members by Sejm.
Secondly, the court held that section 44(1a) of
the 2011 Act on the NCJ, as amended by the 2017 Amending Act, concerning the
procedure for judicial review of individual resolutions of the NCJ on the
selection of judges, refusing to appoint the candidates, was incompatible with
Article 184 of the Polish Constitution.
(d) Judgment of 20 April 2020 (case no. U 2/20)
115. On 24 February 2020 the Prime
Minister (Prezes Rady Ministrów) referred to the Constitutional Court
the question of the compatibility of the Supreme Court’s resolution of 23
January 2020 with several provisions of the Polish Constitution, the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the Convention.
116. On 20 April 2020
the Constitutional Court issued judgment declaring that the Supreme Court’s
resolution of 23 January 2020 was incompatible with Articles 179, Article
144 § 3 (17), Article 183 § 1, Article 45 § 1,
Article 8 § 1, Article 7 and Article 2 of the Constitution,
Articles 2 and 4(3) of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. It held, in particular, that
decisions of the President of Poland on judicial appointments may not be
subject to any type of review, including by the Supreme Court. The judgment was
given by a Constitutional Court’s panel including Judge M.M. It was published
in the Official Gazette on 21 April 2020. The court held (references
omitted), in particular:
“...The four editorial divisions of the Supreme
Court’s resolution, which constitute the entirety of the subject under review,
introduce and regulate a normative novelty (unknown to other legal acts of the
Republic of Poland, in particular the Constitution) consisting in the fact that
ordinary courts, military courts and the Supreme Court may control and restrict
a judge’s right to adjudicate solely on the basis of the fact of his or her
appointment by the President on a motion of the NCJ, whose members, who are
judges, were elected by Sejm, and not by judicial bodies ...
The contested resolution of the Supreme Court is
incompatible with Article 179 of the Constitution because it undermines
the character of that provision as an independent basis for the effective
appointment of a judge by the President on a motion of the NCJ, and thus as an
independent, complete and sufficient legal regulation enabling the exercise by
the President of the powers indicated in that provision.
The contested resolution of the Supreme Court is
incompatible with Article 144 § 3 (17) of the Constitution because
it cannot be reconciled with the essence of the President’s prerogative to
appoint judges within the Republic of Poland. The President’s prerogative is
not subject to review in any manner whatsoever, and therefore, it may not be
subject to any limitation or narrowing of interpretation within the content of
an act of secondary legislation ...”
117. As regards Article 45 § 1 of the
Constitution and Article 6 § 1 of the Convention the Constitutional
Court held, in so far as relevant (references omitted):
“In particular, the contested resolution of the
Supreme Court is incompatible with Article 45 § 1 of the Constitution
and Article 6 § 1 of the Convention because, in its content, it infringes the
standard of independence of a court and of a judge which, according to the
case-law of the CJEU, has two aspects. The first – external – aspect of the
judge’s independence presupposes that the court, in its adjudication, performs
its tasks completely independently, without being subject to any official
hierarchy or subordinated to anyone, and does not receive orders or
instructions from any source whatsoever, such that it is protected from
interference and external pressure that might compromise the independence of
its members (judges) when they examine cases. The content of the impugned
resolution of the Supreme Court granting to some judges the right to decide
that other judges appointed by the President have, de facto, the
status of retired judges ab initio cannot be reconciled with
the standard as outlined above, resulting from all the indicated relevant
standards. As the CJEU points out, the second – internal – aspect of the
independence of a judge - is linked to the concept of impartiality and concerns
an unbiased dissociation from the litigants, and their respective interests, in
relation to a dispute before the court. This factor requires [of a judge] the
observance of objectivity and the absence of any interest in the resolution of
the dispute, apart from the strict application of the law. This aspect excludes
a procedure generally questioning a judge’s right to adjudicate by other judges
and verifying the regularity of the procedure preceding the appointment of a
judge by the President as a basis for a general objection to such a judge’s
right to adjudicate. An unbiased dissociation of a judge from a dispute is
possible only where any conclusions of the court leading to the resolution of a
case are based on respect for the Constitution as a foundation. Such aspect of
the judge’s independence excludes the content of the court’s judgment from
being made dependent on the need to choose between a constitutional provision
and the content of a [law] that is in conflict with the Constitution, but which
– as a result of a statutory regulation – could in all likelihood constitute a
ground for challenging the judgment before a higher court. For that reason, the
content of the impugned resolution of the Supreme Court cannot be reconciled
with Article 45 § 1 of the Constitution and
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.”
(e) Decisions
of 28 January and 21 April 2020 (case no. Kpt 1/20)
118. The Speaker of Sejm referred
a question to the Constitutional Court as to whether there was a “conflict of
competence between Sejm and the Supreme Court and between the
President of Poland and the Supreme Court”.
119. On 28 January 2020 the
Constitutional Court issued an interim decision (postanowienie), whereby
it suspended the enforcement of the Supreme Court’s resolution of
23 January 2020 (see paragraph 89 above) and suspended the
prerogative of the Supreme Court to issue resolutions concerning the
compatibility with national or international law or the case-law of
international courts of the composition of the NCJ, the procedure for
presenting candidates for judicial office to the President of Poland, the
prerogative of the President to appoint judges and the competence to hold
judicial office of a person appointed by the President of Poland upon recommendation
of the NCJ.
120. On 21 April 2020 the
Constitutional Court gave a decision, finally ruling on the matter of the
“conflict of competence”. Both the interim measure and the final ruling were
given by the Constitutional Court sitting in a formation which included Judge
M.M. The Constitutional Court decided to:
“1. Resolve the conflict of competence
between the Supreme Court and Sejm of the Republic of Poland
as follows[4]:
(a) The Supreme Court – also in connection with a
ruling of an international court – has no jurisdiction to make
a ‘law-making interpretation’ (wykładnia prawotwórcza) of
legal provisions, by means of [a resolution]which leads to modification in the
legal situation regarding the organisational structure of the judiciary;
(b) pursuant to Article 10, Article 95(1), Article
176(2), Article 183(2) and Article 187(4) of the Constitution of the
Republic of Poland, the introduction of any modification within the scope
specified in point 1(a) shall be within the exclusive competence of the
legislature.
2. Resolve the conflict of competence
between the Supreme Court and the President of the Republic of Poland as
follows:
(a) under Article 179 in conjunction with
Article 144 § 3 (17) of the Constitution, an appointment of a
judge constitutes the exclusive competence of the President of the Republic of
Poland, which he exercises upon the request of the National Council of the
Judiciary personally, irrevocably and without any participation or interference
of the Supreme Court;
(b) Article 183 of the Constitution
does not provide that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to oversee the
President of the Republic of Poland in his exercise of the competence referred
to in Article 179 in conjunction with Article 144 § 3 (17) of
the Constitution including [the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction] to give a binding
interpretation of legal provisions to specify prerequisites for the President’s
effective exercise of the said competence.”
121. The Constitutional Court held, in so
far as relevant:
“... The Constitution in Article 144 § 3 (17)
defines the prerogative of the President – his personal power to appoint
judges. And Article 179 of the Constitution provides that judges are appointed
by the President, on a motion of the NCJ, for an indefinite period.
The Constitutional Court upholds the view expressed
earlier that ‘judges are appointed by the President, on a motion of the
NCJ, for an indefinite period of time’. The Constitution identifies two
entities involved in the judicial appointment procedure – the President and the
NCJ. The judicial appointment procedure under the Constitution thus involves
cooperation between two bodies, one of which has a direct mandate from the
public, and the other – due to the participation of, inter alia,
MPs and senators - has an indirect mandate ..., although it should be noted
that there are only six MPs and senators in the 25‑member NCJ (four MPs
and two senators). Under Article 144 § 3 (17) of the Constitution,
the power to appoint judges belongs to those official acts of the President
which, in order to be valid, do not require the countersignature of the Prime
Minister (the so-called prerogative). ... By vesting the power to appoint
judges in the President, the Constitution thus adopts a system of judicial
appointment, albeit of a limited nature. Although judicial appointments do not
require countersignature, the constitutional requirement of a motion of the NCJ
significantly restricts the President’s freedom of action in this situation.
The President may not appoint every person who meets the requirements for
election to the judiciary, but only a person whose candidature has been
considered and indicated by the NCJ. ... In the light of the prevailing views
of legal scholars, there is no doubt that, although the President’s freedom of
action is limited to taking a stance on the candidate proposed by the NCJ, the
fact that the competences concerning appointment of judges have been made into
a prerogative emphasises that the President is not legally obliged to grant the
NCJ’s motion. ... The power to appoint judges is, under Article 144
§ 3 (17) of the Constitution, a prerogative of the President, that
is, his personal prerogative, which in order to be valid does not require the
signature of the Prime Minister. As such, it remains within the President’s
exclusive competence and responsibility, although this does not mean that he
may act entirely freely - he is bound by the principles and values expressed in
the Constitution, the observance of which, pursuant to Article 126
§ 2 of the Constitution, he is obliged to ensure. The prerogative
regarding the appointment of judges is specified in Article 179 of the
Constitution. This provision, stipulating that judges shall be appointed by the
President on the motion of the NCJ, for an indefinite period, precisely defines
the competences of both the President and the NCJ. It is for the NCJ to submit
a motion for the appointment of judges (identification of candidates for
specific judicial positions).”
- The Supreme
Administrative Court’s case-law
122. On 6 May 2021 the Supreme
Administrative Court gave judgments in five cases (nos. II GOK 2/18; II GOK
3/18; II GOK 5/18; II GOK 6/18 and
II GOK 7/18),
including the case of A.B. v. the NCJ (no. II GOK 2/18)
in which it held that the NCJ did not offer sufficient guarantees of
independence from the legislative and executive powers and that the President
of Poland’s announcement of vacant positions in the Supreme Court in May 2018
(see paragraph 42 above), as having been done without the Prime
Minister’s countersignature, was contrary to Article 144 § 2 of the
Constitution and had resulted in a deficient procedure for judicial appointments.
All the judgments contain identical reasoning.
123. In particular, the Supreme
Administrative Court considered, in application of the CJEU judgments of 19
November 2019 and 2 March 2021 (see paragraphs 164-167 below),
that the decisive elements justifying the conclusion as to the NCJ’s lack of
independence were as follows:
(a) The current NCJ had been constituted as a result
of the premature termination of the terms of office of former members of the
NCJ.
(b) In contrast to the former legislation under
which fifteen judicial members of the NCJ had been elected by their peers
directly, they were currently elected by Sejm; as a result,
the number of the NCJ’s members directly originating from or appointed by
political authorities was twenty-three, out of twenty-five members; also, there
were no representatives of the Supreme Court or administrative courts, as
required by Article 187 § 2 of the Constitution, and 14 of its
judicial members had come from ordinary courts.
(c) The potential for irregularities that could
adversely affect the process of appointment of certain members of the NCJ; it
was noted that in practice some members had supported their own candidatures,
that some candidates had supported each other, and that there had clearly been
political factors behind their choice, for instance political loyalty to the
legislative power.
(d) The manner in which the current NCJ carried out
its constitutional duty to safeguard the independence of courts and judges; on
this point it was noted that the NCJ’s activity had been in stark contrast to
what would be expected of such a body, as confirmed by the 2018 decision of the
ENCJ, suspending the NCJ’s membership for its non-compliance with the ENCJ rule
of independence from the executive (see also paragraph 175 below).
The Supreme Administrative court accepted – as did
the CJEU in the above-mentioned judgments – that while each element taken in
isolation might not necessarily lead to that conclusion, their combination and
the circumstances in which the NCJ had been constituted raised doubts as to its
independence.
In that regard, the Supreme Administrative Court
stated that it fully and unreservedly shared the Supreme Court’s assessment of
those elements and circumstances in its judgment of 5 December 2019 (see also
paragraph 71 above).
It was further noted that since many members of the
NCJ had recently been promoted to posts of president and vice-president of
courts, the entire body had to be regarded as strictly and institutionally
subordinate to the executive, represented by the Minister of Justice. The
degree of dependence on the executive and legislature was such that it could
not be irrelevant in assessing the ability of the judges selected by it to meet
the objective requirements of independence and impartiality required by Article 47
of the Charter of Fundamental Rights (see paragraph 149 below). Such
composition of the NCJ undermined its ability to perform effectively its
primary function of safeguarding the independence of judges and courts.
124. As to other details of the NCJ’s
activities, the court found that there was no appearance that the NCJ – a body
constitutionally responsible for safeguarding the independence of judges and
courts – had been fulfilling these duties and respecting positions presented by
national and international institutions. In particular, it had not opposed the
actions which did not comply with the legal implications resulting from the
interim order of the CJEU of 8 April 2020 (C-791/19; see
paragraph 169 below).
The actions of the NCJ in the case under
consideration also showed that it had intentionally and directly sought to make
it impossible for the Supreme Administrative Court to carry out judicial review
of the resolution to recommend (and not to recommend) candidates to the Civil
Chamber of the Supreme Court. The NCJ referred the appeal lodged by A.B. on 1
October only on 9 November 2019 while in the meantime it had transmitted
the resolution to the President for him to appoint the recommended candidates.
125. Lastly, as regards the precondition of
the Prime Minister’s countersignature for the 2018 President of Poland’s act of
announcement of vacant positions at the Supreme Court (see
paragraph 26 above), the Supreme Administrative Court agreed with the
interpretation of the Supreme Court given in the judgment of 5 December
2019 and the resolution of 23 January 2020 (see
paragraphs 71 and 89 below), that this act required for its
validity a countersignature of the Prime Minister. It stressed that Article 144
§ 3 of the Constitution did not mention that prerogative among the explicit,
exhaustively enumerated prerogatives of the President that did not require the
countersignature for their validity. Since this provision laid down the
President’s exclusive prerogatives, all other acts being subject to the Prime
Minister’s countersignature, it had to be interpreted strictly. Nor could it be
said that the act of announcement of vacant positions in the Supreme Court
could be derived from the President’s power to appoint judges under
Article 144 § 3 (17) of the Constitution since the exercise of
any derived prerogative not requiring the countersignature must be necessary
for the proper accomplishment of the main prerogative.
Before the entry into force of the 2017 Act on the
Supreme Court, the competence to announce vacant positions in the Supreme Court
belonged to the First President of the Supreme Court, and this in no way
affected the President of Poland’s power to appoint judges to the Supreme
Court. Consequently, a decision to announce vacant positions in the Supreme
Court did not constitute an act which was necessary for the exercise of the
President of Poland’s prerogative to appoint the judges; conversely, it could
constitute an instrument of discretionary power to influence the time when, if
at all, vacant positions in the Supreme Court would be filled.
126. The United Nations (UN) Basic
Principles on the Independence of the Judiciary, adopted by the Seventh UN
Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders held at
Milan from 26 August to 6 September 1985 and endorsed by General
Assembly resolutions 40/32 of 29 November 1985 and 40/146 of 13
December 1985, provide as follows, in so far as relevant:
“10. Persons selected for judicial office
shall be individuals of integrity and ability with appropriate training or
qualifications in law. Any method of judicial selection shall safeguard against
judicial appointments for improper motives.
...
19. All disciplinary, suspension or
removal proceedings shall be determined in accordance with established
standards of judicial conduct.”
127. On 5 April 2018 the UN Special
Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, Mr Diego
García–Sayán, submitted a report on his mission to Poland (UN Human Rights
Council, document A/HRC/38/38/Add.1). The relevant parts of the report’s
conclusions and recommendations read as follows:
“IV. Conclusions
...
74. After having
successfully ‘neutered’ the Constitutional [Court], the Government
has undertaken a far-reaching reform of the judicial system. Between May and
December 2017, the ruling majority has adopted three acts that introduce broad
changes to the composition and functioning of ordinary courts, the Supreme
Court and the National Council of the Judiciary. Each of these acts presents a
number of concerns as to its compliance with international legal standards but,
taken together, their cumulative effect is to place the judiciary under the
control of the executive and legislative branches.
75. The Special Rapporteur warns Polish
authorities that the implementation of this reform, undertaken by the governing
majority in haste and without proper consultation with the opposition, the
judiciary and civil society actors, including the Office of the [Polish
Commissioner for Human Rights], risks hampering the capacity of judicial
authorities to ensure checks and balances and to carry out their essential
function in promoting and protecting human rights and upholding the rule of
law.
V. Recommendations
...
84. The Special Rapporteur recommends
that [the 2017 Act on the Supreme Court] be amended to bring it into line with
the Constitution and international standards relating to the independence of
the judiciary and the separation of powers. ...
(f) Reviewing the vast ratione materiae jurisdiction
of the Extraordinary Chamber and the Disciplinary Chamber in line with the
recommendations of the European Commission, the Venice Commission and
OSCE/ODIHR.
85. The Special Rapporteur recommends
that [the 2017 Amending Act] be amended to bring it into line with the
Constitution and international standards relating to the independence of the
judiciary and the separation of powers. In particular, the Special Rapporteur
recommends:
(a) Removing the provisions concerning the new
appointment procedure for the judicial members of the National Council of the
Judiciary and ensuring that the 15 judicial members of the Council are
elected by their peers. ...”
- The
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)’s Office for
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR)
- Opinion of 5
May 2017
128. The final Opinion on Draft Amendments
to the Act on the National Council of the Judiciary and Certain Other Acts of
Poland (JUD‑POL/305/2017-Final) of 5 May 2017, reads, in so far as
relevant, as follows:
“13. While the OSCE/ODIHR recognizes the
right of every state to reform its judicial system, any judicial reform process
should preserve the independence of the judiciary and the key role of a
judicial council in this context. In this regard, the proposed amendments raise
serious concerns with respect to key democratic principles, in particular the
separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary, as also emphasized
by the UN Human Rights Committee in its latest Concluding Observations on
Poland in November 2016. The changes proposed by the Draft Act could also
affect public trust and confidence in the judiciary, as well as its
legitimacy and credibility. If adopted, the amendments could undermine the very
foundations of a democratic society governed by the rule of law, which OSCE
participating States have committed to respect as a prerequisite for achieving
security, justice and stability....
17. In light of the potentially
negative impact that the Draft Act, if adopted, would have on the independence
of the Judicial Council, and as a consequence of the judiciary in Poland, the
OSCE/ODIHR recommends that the Draft Act be reconsidered in its entirety and
that the legal drafters not pursue its adoption.”
- Opinion of 13
November 2017
129. The 13 November 2017 opinion on
Certain Provisions of the Draft Act on the Supreme Court of Poland (as of
26 September 2017), (JUD‑POL/315/2017), reads, in so far as
relevant:
“2.3 The New Disciplinary Chamber
65. The New Disciplinary Chamber will be
in charge of hearing disciplinary cases against Supreme Court judges and other
legal professionals where this is provided by separate legislation, as well as
complaints concerning overly lengthy proceedings before the Supreme Court
(Article 26 of the Draft Act).
66. This new chamber stands out insofar
as it is somewhat removed from the authority of the First President of the Supreme
Court compared to the other chambers. In a departure from the procedure by
which Presidents of other chambers are chosen, the President of the Republic of
Poland does not have to consult the First President of the Supreme Court when
choosing the President of the Disciplinary Chamber (Article 14
par. 3). Moreover, the President of the Disciplinary Chamber has an array
of special powers that are not granted to other chamber Presidents. These
include budgetary powers of the kind which the First President exercises for
the rest of the Supreme Court (Article 7 pars 2‑3 and 4),
the right to appoint and dismiss chairs of departments within the Disciplinary
Chamber, to be consulted when the President of the Republic of Poland
determines the number of vacancies in the Chamber and to authorise the
additional employment by members of the Chamber (Article 19 par 1),
the institution of disciplinary inquiries against Supreme Court judges
(Article 75 par 1), and the determination of the Chamber’s internal
organisation and internal rules of conduct (Article 95).
67. The First President of the Supreme
Court is furthermore constrained to act “in consultation with” the President of
the Disciplinary Chamber when exercising certain functions, including the
appointment and dismissals of chairs of departments in other chambers and the
selection of lay justices, as well as when ordering the release of a judge
detained in flagrante delicto or on the authority of a disciplinary court
(Article 19 par 2). Pursuant to Article 97 of the Draft Act, the
Disciplinary Chamber will furthermore be supported by its own secretariat
following special rules, making it largely autonomous within the Supreme Court,
and de facto, creating a separate chamber with a special status
within the Supreme Court.
68. It is unclear from the Explanatory
Statement to the Draft Act why such a special autonomous status for this
chamber is needed. While the independence of a body adjudicating on
disciplinary cases against judges need to be ensured, the modalities of
appointment of the President of the Disciplinary Chamber confer on the
President of the Republic a decisive influence, which is even more exacerbated
by the fact that the First President of the Supreme Court is not consulted.
While Article 144 par 3 (23) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland
specifically provides that the President of the Republic of Poland appoints the
Presidents of the Supreme Court, such a prerogative should be of a ceremonial
nature (see par 105 infra). In any case, the conditions and
procedure for appointing the Presidents of the Supreme Court should be open and
transparent to ensure that objective criteria of merit and competence prevail
and that the best candidate is ultimately appointed (see pars 103-104 infra).
The fact that the President of the Republic of Poland has the final say in this
process means that one cannot exclude that political or other considerations
may prevail over criteria for appointment. Moreover, overall, there is a risk
of having a future President of the Disciplinary Chamber, who would be somewhat
beholden towards the appointing authority in a manner that may undermine
judicial independence (see also Sub-Section 4.2 infra regarding
the appointment of presidents of the Supreme Court and related recommendation
in par 105 infra).
69. Moreover, allowing the President of
the Disciplinary Chamber a say when appointing/dismissing chairs of department
in other chambers and during the selection of lay judges seems to go quite far
and also does not appear to be linked in any way to disciplinary matters. In
light of the above, these provisions would open the door for indirect influence
of the President of the Republic, who is part of the executive branch, in these
areas, which should be under the sole responsibility of the First President of
the Supreme Court. The specific status and rules applicable solely to the
Disciplinary Chamber and its President, particularly with regard to the
President of the Republic’s special role, should be reconsidered.”
130. In Annex 1 (dated 30 August
2017) to the above-mentioned opinion on Certain Provisions of the Draft Act on
the Supreme Court of Poland (JUD-POL/313/2017), OSCE/ODIHIR made the following
conclusion:
“60. Given the modalities for appointing
judges to the Disciplinary Chamber, the status of these judges and the great
influence of the Minister of Justice on disciplinary proceedings during the
preliminary phase, the adjudication of disciplinary cases against Supreme Court
judges is not compliant with relevant fair trial requirements set out in
Article 6 par 1 of the ECHR and Article 14 par 1 of the ICCPR. This
deficiency cannot be cured on appeal in light of the composition of the
competent courts of second instance.”
- Council of
Europe
- The European
Charter on the Statute for Judges
131. The relevant extract from the
European Charter on the Statute for Judges of 8-10 July 1998[5] reads
as follows:
“2. SELECTION, RECRUITMENT, INITIAL
TRAINING
2.1. The rules of the statute relating to
the selection and recruitment of judges by an independent body or panel, base
the choice of candidates on their ability to assess freely and impartially the
legal matters which will be referred to them ...
2.2. The statute makes provision for the
conditions which guarantee, by requirements linked to educational
qualifications or previous experience, the ability specifically to discharge
judicial duties.”
132. In its Explanatory Memorandum, the
European Charter on the Statute for Judges provides, among other things, as
follows:
“1.1 The Charter endeavours to define the
content of the statute for judges on the basis of the objectives to be
attained: ensuring the competence, independence and impartiality which all
members of the public are entitled to expect of the courts and judges entrusted
with protecting their rights. The Charter is therefore not an end in itself but
rather a means of guaranteeing that the individuals whose rights are to be
protected by the courts and judges have the requisite safeguards on the
effectiveness of such protection.
These safeguards on individuals’ rights are
ensured by judicial competence, in the sense of ability, independence and
impartiality ...”
- Committee of
Ministers
133. The Recommendation adopted by the
Committee of Ministers on 17 November 2010 (CM/Rec(2010)12) on “Judges:
independence, efficiency and responsibilities” provides, in so far as relevant,
as follows:
“Chapter I – General aspects
Judicial independence and the level at which it
should be safeguarded
...
3. The purpose of independence, as laid
down in Article 6 of the Convention, is to guarantee every person the
fundamental right to have their case decided in a fair trial, on legal grounds
only and without any improper influence.
4. The independence of individual judges
is safeguarded by the independence of the judiciary as a whole. As such, it is
a fundamental aspect of the rule of law.
Chapter VI - Status of the judge
Selection and career
44. Decisions concerning the selection
and career of judges should be based on objective criteria pre‑established
by law or by the competent authorities. Such decisions should be based on
merit, having regard to the qualifications, skills and capacity required to
adjudicate cases by applying the law while respecting human dignity.
...
46. The authority taking decisions on the
selection and career of judges should be independent of the executive and
legislative powers. With a view to guaranteeing its independence, at least half
of the members of the authority should be judges chosen by their peers.
47. However, where the constitutional or
other legal provisions prescribe that the head of state, the government or the
legislative power take decisions concerning the selection and career of judges,
an independent and competent authority drawn in substantial part from the
judiciary (without prejudice to the rules applicable to councils for the judiciary
contained in Chapter IV) should be authorised to make recommendations or
express opinions which the relevant appointing authority follows in practice.
48. The membership of the independent
authorities referred to in paragraphs 46 and 47 should ensure the
widest possible representation. Their procedures should be transparent with
reasons for decisions being made available to applicants on request. An
unsuccessful candidate should have the right to challenge the decision, or at
least the procedure under which the decision was made.”
The Explanatory Memorandum to this recommendation
further provides as follows:
“13. The separation of powers is a
fundamental guarantee of the independence of the judiciary whatever the legal
traditions of the member states.”
134. Recommendation No. R(2000)21 of the
Committee of Ministers to member States on the freedom of exercise of the
profession of lawyer (adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 25 October
2000 at the 727th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies) provides, in so
far as relevant, as follows:
“Principle VI - Disciplinary proceedings
1. Where lawyers do not act in accordance
with their professional standards, set out in codes of conduct drawn up by Bar
associations or other associations of lawyers, appropriate measures should be
taken, including disciplinary proceedings.
2. Bar associations or other
lawyers’ professional associations should be responsible for or be
entitled to participate in the conduct of disciplinary proceedings concerning
lawyers.
3. Disciplinary proceedings should be
conducted with full respect of the Principles and rules laid down in the
European Convention on Human Rights, including the right of the lawyer
concerned to participate in the proceedings and to apply for judicial review of
the decision.
4. The Principle of proportionality
should be respected in determining sanctions for disciplinary offences
committed by lawyers.”
The Explanatory Memorandum to this recommendation
further provides as follows:
“61. In particular, for the purpose of
this Recommendation, lawyers’ rights include, inter alia:
- the right to a fair and public hearing within a
reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law.
This does not preclude lawyers from asking that the hearing be heard in
camera.”
- The Council of
Europe Commissioner for Human Rights
135. The Council of Europe Commissioner for
Human Rights, Ms Dunja Mijatović carried out a visit to Poland from
11 to 15 March 2019. In her report following the visit,
published on 28 June 2019, she stated as follows:
“1.2 CHANGES AFFECTING THE NATIONAL COUNCIL FOR THE
JUDICIARY
14. In March 2018, in a vote boycotted by
the parliamentary opposition, Sejm elected the new judicial
members of the [NCJ], thereby terminating the mandate of the sitting members of
the Council. Thirteen of the newly elected members were judges from district
(first-instance) courts, and one each from a regional court and a regional
administrative court. Three of them had been previously seconded to the
Ministry of Justice, while seven had previously been appointed by the Minister
of Justice as presidents or vice-presidents of ordinary courts (cf. paragraph
40 of section 1.5 below). An informal survey conducted in December 2018
showed that about 3,000 Polish judges considered that the newly
constituted Council was not performing its statutory tasks, while 87% of those
who participated believed the body’s new members should all be made to resign.
In September 2018, the General Assembly of the ENCJ made the unprecedented decision
to suspend the membership of the Poland’s [NCJ] and stripped it of its voting
rights, finding that it no longer fulfilled the requirement of independence
from the executive and the legislature.
...
1.2.1 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
18. The Commissioner recalls that
councils for the judiciary are independent bodies that seek to safeguard the
independence of the judiciary and of individual judges and thereby to promote
the efficient functioning of the judicial system (paragraph 26 of the aforementioned
recommendation of the Committee of Ministers CM/Rec(2010)12). She considers
that the collective and individual independence of the members of such bodies
is directly linked, and complementary to, the independence of the judiciary as
a whole, which is a key pillar of any democracy and essential to the protection
of individual rights and freedoms.
19. The Commissioner considers that
serious concerns remain with regard to the composition and independence of the
newly constituted [NCJ]. She observes that under the new rules, 21 out of the
25 members of the body have been elected by Poland’s legislative and executive
powers; this number includes the body’s 15 judicial members, who have been
elected by Sejm.
20. The Commissioner considers that
entrusting the legislature with the task of electing the judicial members to
the [NCJ] infringes on the independence of this body, which should be the
constitutional guarantor of judicial independence in Poland. She considers that
the selection of members of the judiciary should be a decision process
independent of the executive or the legislature, in order to preserve the
principles of separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary, and
to avoid the risk of undue political influence.
1.3.2 THE SUPREME COURT’S COMPOSITION AND NEW
CHAMBERS
25. The new legislation referred to in
paragraph 22 above created two new special chambers of the Supreme Court: a
Disciplinary Chamber, to adjudicate cases of judicial misconduct, and a Chamber
of Extraordinary [Review] and Public Affairs, tasked with hearing cases
concerning the validity of general elections or disputes regarding television
and radio licensing....
26. Despite being nominally positioned
within the organisational structure of the Supreme Court, the Disciplinary
Chamber, unlike that Court’s other chambers, is virtually exempt from the
oversight of the Supreme Court’s First President. It notably has a separate
chancellery and budget; moreover, the earnings of judges sitting on the
Disciplinary Chamber are 40% higher than those of their fellow judges in other
chambers of the Supreme Court....
29. The Commissioner was informed that
similarly to the newly composed [NCJ], many of the newly appointed members of
the Disciplinary Chamber were former prosecutors or persons with links to the
Minister of Justice (Prosecutor-General). Apparently, some of the new
appointees have experienced a very rapid career progression, made possible by
new rules governing judicial promotions; one had reportedly been a district court
judge merely three years prior to his appointment to the Supreme Court....
52. In tandem with the sweeping changes
described in the previous sections, government officials in Poland have openly
assailed the judiciary in order to justify the reforms being undertaken. In a
speech delivered in July 2017, the former Prime Minister called Poland’s
judiciary the ‘judicial corporation’, claiming that ‘in everybody’s
immediate surrounding there is someone who has been injured by the judicial
system’. In an op-ed published in the Washington Examiner in December 2017, the
current Prime Minister argued that the Polish judiciary was a legacy of
Communist system, characterised by ‘nepotism and corruption’; that judges
demanded ‘[b]ribes (...) in some of the most lucrative-looking cases’; and
that the courts generally worked to benefit the wealthy and the influential.
The Prime Minister later made similar statements in other contexts, including
in a speech given at a US university in April 2019. Other members of the
ruling party called judges ‘a caste’ or ‘a group of cronies’.
The current head of the political cabinet in the chancellery of the Prime
Minister publicly implied that former judge-members of the National Council of
the Judiciary ‘were hiding gold in their gardens and it is unclear where
the money came from’. In support of the government’s reform of the judiciary,
in September 2017 the government-controlled ‘Polish National
Foundation’ initiated a two‑month campaign called ‘Fair
Courts’. The campaign’s cost, estimated to amount to EUR 2.8 million, was
cosponsored by a dozen or so of the largest state-owned companies. Using large
black-and-white billboards, television commercials and a website, the campaign
conveyed a negative image of judges, labelling them as ‘a special caste’,
and portraying them as incompetent or indulging in unseemly or illegal
behaviour, such as drunkenness, corruption, or petty theft ...
1.6.1 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
61. The Commissioner regrets that the
reform of the judiciary was accompanied by a publicly-financed campaign to
discredit judges, as well as by a series of negative statements regarding the
Polish judiciary made by high ranking Polish officials. She recalls that
members of the executive and the legislature have a duty to avoid criticism of
the courts, judges and judgments that would undermine the independence of or
public confidence in the judiciary, in accordance with paragraph 18 of the
Committee of Ministers’ recommendation CM/Rec(2010)12. In view of the
highly stigmatising and harmful effect of statements such as the ones quoted
above (in paragraph 52), the Commissioner urges the Polish authorities to
exercise responsibility and lead by example in their public discourse, rather
than using their powerful platform to tarnish the judiciary as a whole or to
unduly attack the reputation of individual judges.”
- Parliamentary
Assembly of the Council of Europe
(a) Resolution
2188 (2017)
136. On 11 October 2017 the
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) adopted Resolution 2188
(2017) entitled “New threats to the rule of law in the Council of Europe Member
States”. The Polish authorities were called upon to refrain from conducting any
reform which would put at risk respect for the rule of law, and in particular
the independence of the judiciary, and, in this context, to refrain from
amending the 2011 Act on the National Council of the Judiciary in a way that
would modify the procedure for appointing judges to the Council and would
establish political control over the appointment process for judicial members.
(b) Resolution
2316 (2020)
137. On 28 January 2020 PACE decided to open
its monitoring procedure in respect of Poland, which is the only member State
of the Council of Europe, among those belonging to the European Union,
currently undergoing that procedure. In its Resolution 2316 (2020) of
the same date entitled “The functioning of democratic institutions in
Poland”, the Assembly stated:
“7. The Assembly lauds the assistance
given by the Council of Europe to ensure that the reform of the justice system
in Poland is developed and implemented in line with European norms and rule of
law principles in order to meet their stated objectives. However, it notes that
numerous recommendations of the European Commission for Democracy through Law
(Venice Commission) and other bodies of the Council of Europe have not been
implemented or addressed by the authorities. The Assembly is convinced that
many of the shortcomings in the current judicial system, especially with regard
to the independence of the judiciary, could have been addressed or prevented by
the implementation of these recommendations. The Assembly therefore calls upon
the authorities to revisit the total reform package for the judiciary and amend
the relevant legislation and practice in line with Council of Europe
recommendations, in particular with regard to:
...
7.2. the reform of the National Council
of the Judiciary, the Assembly expresses its concern about the fact that,
counter to European rule of law standards, the 15 judges who are members of the
National Council of the Judiciary are no longer elected by their peers but by
the Polish Parliament. This runs counter to the principle of separation of
powers and the independence of the judiciary. As a result, the National Council
of the Judiciary can no longer be seen as an independent self-governing body of
the judiciary. The Assembly therefore urges the authorities to reinstate the
direct election, by their peers, of the judges who are members of the National
Council of the Judiciary; ...
7.4. the reform of the Supreme Court...
The composition and manner of appointment of the members of the disciplinary
and extraordinary appeals chambers of the Supreme Court, which include lay
members, in combination with the extensive powers of these two chambers and the
fact that their members were elected by the new National Council of the
Judiciary, raise questions about their independence and their vulnerability to
politicisation and abuse. This needs to be addressed urgently.”
(c) Resolution 2359
(2021)
138. On 26 January 2021 PACE adopted
Resolution 2359 (2021) entitled “Judges in Poland and in the Republic
of Moldova must remain independent”. The Assembly called on the Polish
authorities to:
14.2. review the changes made to the
functioning of the Constitutional [Court] and the ordinary justice system in
the light of Council of Europe standards relating to the rule of law, democracy
and human rights; following the findings of the Venice Commission included in
its Opinion No. 977/2020 of 22 June 2020 concerning in particular the
amendments to the Law on the Ordinary Courts introduced since 2017, it would be
advisable to:
14.2.1. revert to the previous system of
electing judicial members of the National Council of the Judiciary or adopt a
reform of the justice system which would effectively ensure its autonomy from
the political power;
14.2.2. review the composition, internal
structure and powers of the Disciplinary Chamber and the Extraordinary [Review]
and Public Affairs Chamber of the Supreme Court;
14.2.3. review the procedure for the
election of the First President of the Supreme Court;
14.2.4. reinstate the powers of the
assemblies of judges with respect to the appointment, promotion and dismissal
of judges,
14.3. refrain from taking any legislative
or administrative measures or other initiatives which might pose a risk to the
rule of law and, in particular, to the independence of the judiciary;
14.4. co-operate fully with Council of
Europe organs and bodies, including the Venice Commission, and with the
institutions of the European Union, on issues related to justice reform;
14.5. institute a constructive and
sustainable dialogue on justice reform with all stakeholders, including
opposition parties, representatives of the judiciary, bar associations, civil
society and academic experts.”
- The Venice
Commission
(a) Report
on Judicial Appointments
139. In its Report on Judicial Appointments
(CDL-AD(2007)028), adopted at its 70th Plenary Session (16-17 March 2007), the
European Commission for Democracy Through Law (“Venice Commission”) held as
follows (footnotes omitted):
“3. International standards in this
respect are more in favour of the extensive depolitisation of the [judicial
appointment] process. However no single non-political ‘model’ of
appointment system exists, which could ideally comply with the principle of the
separation of powers and secure full independence of the judiciary....
5. In some older democracies, systems
exist in which the executive power has a strong influence on judicial
appointments. Such systems may work well in practice and allow for an
independent judiciary because the executive is restrained by legal culture and
traditions, which have grown over a long time.
6. New democracies, however, did not yet
have a chance to develop these traditions, which can prevent abuse. Therefore,
at least in new democracies explicit constitutional provisions are needed as a
safeguard to prevent political abuse by other state powers in the appointment
of judges.
7. In Europe, methods of appointment vary
greatly according to different countries and their legal systems;
furthermore they can differ within the same legal system according to the type
of judges to be appointed....”
Direct appointment system
13. In the direct appointment system the
appointing body can be the Head of State. This is the case in Albania, upon the
proposal of the High Council of Justice; in Armenia, based on the
recommendation of the Judicial Council; in the Czech Republic; in Georgia, upon
the proposal of the High Council of Justice; in Greece, after prior decision of
the Supreme Judicial Council; in Ireland; in Italy upon the proposal of the
High Council of the Judiciary; in Lithuania, upon the recommendations submitted
by the “special institution of judges provided by law”; in Malta, upon the
recommendation of the Prime Minister; in Moldova, upon proposal submitted by
the Superior Council of Magistrates; in the Netherlands at the recommendation
of the court concerned through the Council for the Judiciary; in Poland on the
motion of the National Council of the Judiciary in Romania based on the
proposals of the Superior Council of Magistracy; in the Russian Federation
judges of ordinary federal courts are appointed by the President upon the
nomination of the Chairman of the Supreme Court and of the Chairman of the
Higher Arbitration Court respectively - candidates are normally selected on the
basis of a recommendation by qualification boards; in Slovakia on the basis of
a proposal of the Judiciary Council; in Ukraine, upon the proposal of the High
Council of Justice.
14. In assessing this traditional method,
a distinction needs to be made between parliamentary systems where the
president (or monarch) has more formal powers and (semi-) presidential systems.
In the former system the President is more likely to be withdrawn from party
politics and therefore his or her influence constitutes less of a danger for
judicial independence. What matters most is the extent to which the head of
state is free in deciding on the appointment. It should be ensured that the
main role in the process is given to an independent body – the judicial
council. The proposals from this council may be rejected only exceptionally,
and the President would not be allowed to appoint a candidate not included on
the list submitted by it. As long as the President is bound by a proposal made
by an independent judicial council (see below), the appointment by the
President does not appear to be problematic.”
(b) Opinion
on the Draft [2017 Amending Act], on the Draft [2017 Act on the Supreme Court]
proposed by the President of Poland and on the Act on the Organisation of
Ordinary Courts
140. The Opinion on the Draft [2017 Amending
Act], on the Draft [2017 Act on the Supreme Court] proposed by the President of
Poland, and on the Act on the Organisation of Ordinary Courts adopted by the
Venice Commission at its 113th Plenary Session on 11 December 2017
(Opinion No. CDL-AD(2017)031), read, in so far as relevant, as
follows:
“17. In the past decades many new European
democracies created judicial councils – compound bodies with functions
regarding the appointment, training, promotion and discipline of judges. The
main function of such a body is to ensure the accountability of the judiciary,
while preserving its independence. The exact composition of the judicial
councils varies, but it is widely accepted that at least half of the council
members should be judges elected by their peers. The Venice Commission recalls
its position expressed in the Rule of Law Checklist, in the Report of the
Judicial Appointments and in the Report on the Independence of the Judicial
System (Part I: The Independence of Judges) to the effect that “a
substantial element or a majority of the members of the Judicial Council should
be elected by the Judiciary itself”....
A. The Draft Act on the National Council
of the Judiciary
...
1. New method of election of 15 judicial
members of the NCJ
...
24. [The draft 2017 Amending Act] is at
odds with the European standards (as far as those countries which have a
judicial council are concerned), since the 15 judicial members are not elected
by their peers, but receive their mandates from Parliament. Given that six
other members of the NCJ are parliamentarians, and four others are ex
officio members or appointed by the President of the Republic (see
Article 187 § 1 of the Constitution), the proposed reform will lead
to a NCJ dominated by political nominees. Even if several ‘minority
candidates’ are elected, their election by Parliament will inevitably lead
to more political influence on the composition of the NCJ and this will also
have immediate influence on the work of this body, which will become more
political in its approach ...
B. The Draft Act on the Supreme Court
...
1. Creation of new chambers
...
36. In principle, the Venice Commission
sees no difficulty with the division of chambers with specialised jurisdiction
within a supreme court. However, in the case of Poland, the newly created Extraordinary
[Review] and Public Affairs Chamber (hereinafter – the ‘Extraordinary
Chamber’) and Disciplinary Chamber are worth particular mention. These two
chambers will have special powers which put them over and above the other
chambers. They will also include lay members who will be selected by the Senate
and appointed on the benches on a case-by-case basis by the First President of
the SC.
37. The Extraordinary Chamber will
be de facto above other chambers because it will have the
power to review any final and legally binding judgment issued by
the ‘ordinary’ chambers (Articles 25 and 86). In addition, this
chamber will be entrusted with the examination of politically sensitive cases
(electoral disputes, validation of elections and referendums, etc.), and will
examine other disputes between citizens and the State.
38. The Disciplinary Chamber will also be
given special status in the sense that it will have jurisdiction over
disciplinary cases of judges of ‘ordinary’ chambers
(Article 26), and will deal with the cases of excessive length of
proceedings in other chambers of the SC. It will also be competent to deal with
other disciplinary cases which may fall within the jurisdiction of the SC. That
being said, the Venice Commission sees a greater justification for the creation
of a special disciplinary chamber entrusted with the competency to deal with
disciplinary cases of the SC judges, by comparison with the creation of the
Extraordinary Chamber...
40. The Draft Act proposes to create new
chambers, which will be headed by largely autonomous office-holders. The heads
of those two new chambers will be appointed directly by the President of the
Republic under special rules, and will have a comparable legitimacy with the
First President. In respect of the Disciplinary Chamber the First President
will have very few powers, which weakens his role within the SC, foreseen by
the Constitution. Furthermore, by virtue of their special competencies, the two
chambers will be de facto superior to other, “ordinary” chambers
of the SC. Establishing such hierarchy within the SC is problematic. It creates
“courts within the court” which would need a clear legal basis in the
Constitution, since the Constitution only provides for one SC, its decision
being final.
...
6. Cumulative
effect of the proposed amendments
89. The proposed reform, if implemented,
will not only threaten the independence of the judges of the Supreme Court, but
also create a serious risk for the legal certainty and enable the President of
the Republic to determine the composition of the chamber dealing with the
politically particularly sensitive electoral cases. While the Memorandum speaks
of the ‘de-communization’ of the Polish judicial system, some
elements of the reform have a striking resemblance with the institutions which
existed in the Soviet Union and its satellites ...
92. These two chambers [the Disciplinary
Chamber and the Extraordinary Chamber] will have a special status: while
notionally they are a part of the SC, in reality they are above all other
chambers. Hence, there is a risk that the whole judicial system will be
dominated by these new judges, elected with the decisive influence of the
ruling majority. Moreover, their powers will extend even back in time, since
the “extraordinary control” powers will give the Extraordinary Chamber the
possibility to revive any old case decided up to twenty years ago ...
95. In sum, the two Draft Acts put the
judiciary under direct control of the parliamentary majority and of the
President of the Republic. This is contrary to the very idea of separation of
powers, proclaimed by Article 10 of the Polish Constitution, and of the
judicial independence, guaranteed by Article 173 thereof. Both principles form
also an integral part of the constitutional heritage of all European states
governed by the rule of law. The Venice Commission, therefore, urges the Polish
authorities to subject the two Draft Acts to a deep and comprehensive revision.
IV. Conclusions
130. Several key aspects of the reform
raise particular concern and call for the following recommendations:
A. The Presidential Draft Act on the
National Council of the Judiciary
- The election of the 15 judicial members of the
National Council of the Judiciary (the NCJ) by Parliament, in conjunction with
the immediate replacement of the currently sitting members, will lead to a far
reaching politicisation of this body. The Venice Commission recommends that,
instead, judicial members of the NCJ should be elected by their peers, as in
the current Act.
B. The Presidential Draft Act on the
Supreme Court
- The creation of two new chambers within the
Supreme Court (Disciplinary Chamber and Extraordinary Chamber), composed of
newly appointed judges, and entrusted with special powers, puts theses chambers
above all others and is ill‑advised. The compliance of this model with
the Constitution must be checked; in any event, lay members should not
participate in the proceedings before the Supreme Court;
- The proposed system of the extraordinary review of
final judgments is dangerous for the stability of the Polish legal order. It is
in addition problematic that this mechanism is retroactive and permits the
reopening of cases decided long before its enactment (as from 1997);
- The competency for the electoral disputes should
not be entrusted to the newly created Extraordinary Chamber; ...
131. The Venice Commission stresses that
the combination of the changes proposed by the three documents
under consideration, and of the 2016 Act on Public Prosecutor’s Office
amplifies the negative effect of each of them to the extent that it puts at
serious risks the independence of all parts of the judiciary in Poland.”
(c) Joint
Urgent Opinion of the Venice Commission and the Directorate General of Human
Rights and Rule of Law (DGI) of the Council of Europe
141. The Joint Urgent Opinion of the
Venice Commission and the Directorate General of Human Rights and Rule of Law
(DGI) of the Council of Europe on Amendments to the Law on the Ordinary Courts,
the [2017 Act on the Supreme Court], and some other laws adopted on
16 January 2020 and endorsed by the Venice Commission on 18 June 2020
by written procedure replacing the 123rd Plenary Session
(Opinion No. 977/2020), reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:
“10. The simultaneous and drastic
reduction of the involvement of judges in the work of the [NCJ], filling the
new chambers of the Supreme Court with newly appointed judges, mass replacement
of court presidents, combined with the important increase of the powers of the
President of the Republic and of the Minister of Justice/Prosecutor General –
and this was the result of the 2017 reform – was alarming and led to the
conclusion that the 2017 reform significantly reduced the independence of the
Polish judiciary vis-à-vis the Government and the ruling majority in Parliament
...
61. Other solutions have to be found. In
order to avoid further deepening of the crisis, the Venice Commission invites
the Polish legislator to seriously consider the implementation of the main
recommendations contained in the 2017 Opinion of the Venice Commission, namely:
• to return to the election of the 15 judicial
members of the National Council of the Judiciary (the NCJ) not by Parliament
but by their peers;
• to significantly revise the composition and
internal structure of the two newly created ‘super-chambers’, and reduce
their powers, in order to transform them into normal chambers of the Supreme
Court;
• to return to the pre-2017 method of election of
candidates to the position of the First President of the Supreme Court, or to
develop a new model where each candidate proposed to the President of the
Republic enjoys support of a significant part of the Supreme Court judges;
• to restore the powers of the judicial community in
the questions of appointments, promotions, and dismissal of judges; to ensure
that court presidents cannot be appointed.”
(a) The 2007 Opinion
142. In Opinion no. 10 (2007) of 23
November 2007 on “the Council for the Judiciary at the service of society” the
Consultative Council of European Judges (“CCJE”) made the following relevant
observations:
“15. The composition of the Council for
the Judiciary shall be such as to guarantee its independence and to enable it
to carry out its functions effectively.
17. When the Council for the Judiciary is
composed solely of judges, the CCJE is of the opinion that these should be
judges elected by their peers.
18. When there is a mixed composition
(judges and non judges), the CCJE considers that, in order to prevent any
manipulation or undue pressure, a substantial majority of the members should be
judges elected by their peers....
III. C. 1. Selection of judge members
25. In order to guarantee the
independence of the authority responsible for the selection and career of
judges, there should be rules ensuring that the judge members are selected by
the judiciary.
26. The selection can be done through
election or, for a limited number of members (such as the presidents of Supreme
Court or Courts of appeal), ex officio.
27. Without imposing a specific election
method, the CCJE considers that judges sitting on the Council for the Judiciary
should be elected by their peers following methods guaranteeing the widest
representation of the judiciary at all levels.
28. Although the roles and tasks of
professional associations of judges and of the Council for the Judiciary
differ, it is independence of the judiciary that underpins the interests of
both. Sometimes professional organisations are in the best position
to contribute to discussions about judicial policy. In many states, however,
the great majority of judges are not members of associations. The participation
of both categories of judges (members and non-members of associations) in a pluralist
formation of the Council for the Judiciary would be more representative of the
courts. Therefore, judges’ associations must be allowed to put forward
judge candidates (or a list of candidates) for election, and the same
arrangement should be available to judges who are not members of such
associations. It is for states to design an appropriate electoral system
including these arrangements.”
(b) Magna
Carta of Judges
143. The Magna Carta of
Judges (Fundamental Principles) was adopted by the CCJE in November 2010. The
relevant paragraphs read as follows:
“Rule of law and justice
1. The judiciary is one of the three
powers of any democratic state. Its mission is to guarantee the very existence
of the Rule of Law and, thus, to ensure the proper application of the law in an
impartial, just, fair and efficient manner.
Judicial Independence
2. Judicial independence and impartiality
are essential prerequisites for the operation of justice.
3. Judicial independence shall be
statutory, functional and financial. It shall be guaranteed with regard to the
other powers of the State, to those seeking justice, other judges and society
in general, by means of national rules at the highest level. The State and each
judge are responsible for promoting and protecting judicial independence.
4. Judicial independence shall be
guaranteed in respect of judicial activities and in particular in respect of
recruitment.
Guarantees of independence
5. Decisions on selection, nomination and
career shall be based on objective criteria and taken by the body in charge of
guaranteeing independence....
Body in charge of guaranteeing independence
13. To ensure independence of judges,
each State shall create a Council for the Judiciary or another specific body,
itself independent from legislative and executive powers, endowed with broad
competences for all questions concerning their status as well as the
organisation, the functioning and the image of judicial institutions. The
Council shall be composed either of judges exclusively or of a substantial
majority of judges elected by their peers. The Council for the Judiciary shall
be accountable for its activities and decisions.”
(c) The
2017 Opinion
144. In its 12 October 2017 “Opinion of the
CCJE Bureau following the request of the Polish National Council of the
Judiciary to provide an opinion with respect to the Draft Act of September 2017
presented by the President of Poland amending the Act on the Polish National
Council of the Judiciary and certain other acts[6]”
(CCJE-BU(2017)9REV), the CCJE stated among other things as follows:
“11. Thus, the most significant concerns
caused by the adopted and later vetoed act on the Council related to:
- the selection methods for judge members of the
Council;
- the pre-term removal of the judges currently
sitting as members of the Council;
- the structure of the Council.
12. Out of these concerns, the only
significant change in the present draft presented by the President of Poland is
the requirement for a majority of 3/5 in Sejm for electing
15 judge members of the Council. However, this does not change in any way
the fundamental concern of transferring the power to appoint members of the
Council from the judiciary to the legislature, resulting in a severe risk of
politicised judge members as a consequence of a politicised election procedure.
This risk may be said to be even greater with the new draft, since it provides
that if a 3/5 majority cannot be reached, those judges having received the
largest number of votes will be elected.
15. In addition, the CCJE Bureau recalls
that the OSCE/ODIHR adopted its Final Opinion on 5 May 2017 on the previous
draft, underlining that “the proposed amendments would mean, in brief, that the
legislature, rather than the judiciary would appoint the fifteen judge
representatives to the Judicial Council and that legislative and executive
powers would be allowed to exercise decisive influence over the process of
selecting judges. This would jeopardize the independence of a body whose main
purpose is to guarantee judicial independence in Poland
F. Conclusions
20. The Bureau of the CCJE, which
represents the CCJE members who are serving judges from all Council of Europe
member States, reiterates once again that the Draft Act would be a major step
back as regards judicial independence in Poland. It is also worrying in terms
of the message it sends about the value of judges to society, their place in
the constitutional order and their ability to provide a key public function in
a meaningful way.
21. In order to fulfil European standards
on judicial independence, the judge members of the National Council of the
Judiciary of Poland should continue to be chosen by the judiciary. Moreover,
the pre-term removal of the judges currently sitting as members of the Council
is not in accordance with European standards and it endangers basic safeguards
for judicial independence.
22. The Bureau of the CCJE is deeply
concerned by the implications of the Draft Act for the principle of the
separation of powers, as well as that of the independence of the judiciary, as
it effectively means transferring the power to appoint members of the Polish
National Council of the Judiciary from the judiciary to the legislature. The
CCJE Bureau recommends that the Draft Act be withdrawn and that the existing
law remain in force. Alternatively, any new draft proposals should be fully in
line with the standards of the Council of Europe regarding the independence of
the judiciary.”
(d) The
2020 Report
145. In its “Report on judicial
independence and impartiality in the Council of Europe member States (2019
edition)” of 30 March 2020 (9 CCJE-BU(2020)3) the CCJE made the following
observations, among other things:
“17. The ECtHR and the CCJE have
recognised the importance of institutions and procedures guaranteeing the
independent appointment of judges. The CCJE has recommended that every decision
relating to a judge’s appointment, career and disciplinary action be regulated
by law, based on objective criteria and be either taken by an independent
authority or subject to guarantees, for example judicial review, to ensure that
it is not taken other than on the basis of such criteria. Political
considerations should be inadmissible irrespective of whether they are made
within Councils for the Judiciary, the executive, or the legislature”.
146. In the light of the judicial reform of
2016-2018 in Poland, GRECO, Group of States against Corruption, decided at its
78th Plenary meeting (4‑8 December 2017) to apply its ad-hoc procedure
to Poland.
(a) Rule
34 Report of June 2018
147. As a result, GRECO adopted addendum to
the Fourth Round Evaluation Report on Poland (Rule 34) at its 80th Plenary
Meeting (Strasbourg, 18-22 June 2018). It addressed the following
recommendations to Poland. Firstly, to amend the provisions on the election of
judges to the NCJ, to ensure that at least half of the members of the NCJ are
judges elected by their peers. Secondly to reconsider the establishment of the
Chamber of Extraordinary Review and Public Affairs and Disciplinary Chamber at
the Supreme Court and to reduce the involvement of the executive in the
internal organisation of the Supreme Court. In respect of the structural
changes in the Supreme Court and creation of two new Chambers, GRECO stated:
“31. These structural reforms have been
subject to extensive criticism in broad consensus by the international
community, including bodies such as the Venice Commission, the Consultative
Council of European Judges (CCJE), OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and
Human Rights (ODIHR) and the European Commission. For example, concerns have
been raised that the procedure of extraordinary appeals is ‘dangerous for
the stability of the Polish legal order’ and additionally problematic due
to its retroactivity, permitting the reopening of cases determined long before
the enactment of the LSC, which is not limited to newly established facts.
Furthermore, the establishment of the special chambers for extraordinary
appeals and for disciplinary matters has been criticised for creating a
hierarchy within the court , in that these two chambers have been granted special
status and may be seen as superior to the other ‘ordinary chambers’: the
extraordinary appeals chamber may examine decisions taken by the ‘ordinary
chambers’ of the SC, the disciplinary chamber having jurisdiction over
disciplinary cases of judges sitting in the other chambers as well as a
separate budget (and, in addition, judges of the disciplinary chamber receive a
40% higher salary). Moreover, the use of lay judges at the SC, which has been
introduced as a way of bringing in a ‘social factor’ into the system,
according to the Polish authorities, has also been criticised, partly for being
alien to other judicial systems in Europe at the level of supreme courts, but
also due to the unsuitability of lay persons for determining significant cases
involving legal complexities. The fact that they are elected by the
legislature, which has the potential of compromising their independence, is a
particular concern in this respect.”
(b) Rule 34 Report of December 2019
148. At its 84th Plenary Meeting (Strasbourg,
2‑6 December 2019, GrecoRC4(2019)23) GRECO adopted a Second Addendum
to the Second Compliance Report including Follow-up to the Addendum to the
Fourth Round Evaluation Report (Rule 34) of June 2018. The report was published
on 16 December 2019. It concluded that “nothing ha[d] been done to amend
the provisions on the elections of members of the National Council of the
Judiciary, which in its current composition [did] not meet Council of Europe
standards, to reduce the involvement of the executive in the internal
organisation of the Supreme Court [and] to amend the disciplinary procedures
applicable to Supreme Court judges”.
- European Union
- European Union
law
(a) The
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union
149. Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union (“the Charter”), reads, in so far as
relevant:
“Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by
the law of the Union are violated has the right to an effective remedy before a
tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in this Article.
Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing
within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal previously
established by law.”
(b) Treaty
on European Union
150. Article
2 of the Treaty on European Union (“TEU”) provides:
“The Union is founded on the values of respect for
human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for
human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These
values are ordinary to the Member States in a society in which pluralism,
non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women
and men prevail.”
Article 19(1) TEU reads as follows:
“1. The Court of Justice of the European
Union shall include the Court of Justice, the General Court and specialised
courts. It shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of the
Treaties the law is observed.
Member States shall provide remedies sufficient to
ensure effective legal protection in the fields covered by Union law.”
(c) Consolidated
version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
151. Article 267 of the Consolidated version
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”) provides:
“The Court of Justice of the European Union shall
have jurisdiction to give preliminary rulings concerning:
(a) the interpretation of the Treaties;
(b) the validity and interpretation of
acts of the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the Union;
Where such a question is raised before any court or
tribunal of a Member State, that court or tribunal may, if it considers that a
decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request
the Court to give a ruling thereon.
Where any such question is raised in a case pending
before a court or tribunal of a Member State against whose decisions there is
no judicial remedy under national law, that court or tribunal shall bring the
matter before the Court.
If such a question is raised in a case pending
before a court or tribunal of a Member State with regard to a person in
custody, the Court of Justice of the European Union shall act with the minimum
of delay.”
(d) Council
Directive 2000/78/EC
152. Article 9 (1) of the Council
Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework
for equal treatment in employment and occupation (Official Journal L 303, p.
16) concerns the “defence of rights” and reads:
“Member States shall ensure that judicial and/or
administrative procedures ... for the enforcement of obligations under this
Directive are available to all persons who consider themselves wronged by
failure to apply the principle of equal treatment to them, even after the
relationship in which the discrimination is alleged to have occurred has
ended.”
(a) Initiation of
the rule of law framework
153. On 13 January 2016 the European
Commission (“the Commission”) decided to examine the situation in Poland under
the Rule of Law Framework. The exchanges between the Commission and the Polish
Government were unable to resolve the concerns of the Commission. The Rule of
Law Framework provided guidance for a dialogue between the Commission and the
member State concerned to prevent the escalation of systemic threats to the
rule of law.
154. On 27 July and 21 December 2016 the
Commission adopted two recommendations regarding the rule of law in Poland,
concentrating on issues pertaining to the Constitutional Court. In particular,
the Commission found that there was a systemic threat to the rule of law in
Poland, and recommended that the Polish authorities take appropriate action to
address this threat as a matter of urgency. The Commission
recommended, inter alia, that the Polish authorities: (a) implement
fully the judgments of the Constitutional Court of 3 and 9 December 2015 which
required that the three judges who had been lawfully nominated in October 2015
by the previous legislature be permitted to take up their judicial duties as
judges of the Constitutional Court, and that the three judges nominated by the
new legislature in the absence of a valid legal basis not be permitted to take
up their judicial duties without being validly elected; and (b) publish and
implement fully the judgments of the Constitutional Court of 9 March 2016,
and ensure that the publication of future judgments was automatic and did not
depend on any decision of the executive or legislative powers.
(b) Rule
of Law Recommendation (EU) 2017/1520 (third recommendation)
155. On 26 July 2017
the Commission adopted a third Recommendation
regarding the Rule of Law in Poland, which complemented its two
earlier recommendations. The concerns of the Commission related to the lack of
an independent and legitimate constitutional review, and the new legislation
relating to the Polish judiciary, which would structurally undermine the
independence of the judiciary in Poland and would have an immediate and
concrete impact on the independent functioning of the judiciary as a
whole. In its third recommendation, the Commission considered that the
situation whereby there was a systemic threat to the rule of law in Poland, as
presented in its two earlier recommendations, had seriously deteriorated. The
Commission reiterated that, notwithstanding the fact that there was a diversity
of justice systems in Europe, ordinary European standards had been established
on safeguarding judicial independence. The Commission observed – with great
concern – that following the entry into force of the new laws referred to
above, the Polish judicial system would no longer be compatible with European
standards in this regard.
(c) Rule of Law Recommendation (EU) 2018/103 (fourth
recommendation)
156. On 20 December 2017 the Commission
adopted a fourth Recommendation regarding the rule of law in Poland finding
that the concerns raised in earlier recommendations had not been addressed and
the situation of systemic threat to the rule of law had seriously deteriorated
further. In particular, it stated that “the new laws raised serious concerns as
regards their compatibility with the Polish Constitution as underlined by a
number of opinions, in particular from the Supreme Court, the [NCJ] and the
Polish Commissioner for Human Rights”. However, as explained in the Rule of Law
Recommendation of 26 July 2017, an effective constitutional review of these
laws was no longer possible. The Commission stated:
“31. Also, the new regime for appointing
judges-members of the [NCJ] raises serious concerns. Well established European
standards, in particular the 2010 Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers
of the Council of Europe, stipulate that ‘not less than half the members
of [Councils for the Judiciary] should be judges chosen by their peers from all
levels of the judiciary and with respect for pluralism inside the judiciary. It
is up to the Member States to organise their justice systems, including whether
or not to establish a Council for the Judiciary. However, where such a Council
has been established, as it is the case in Poland, its independence must be
guaranteed in line with European standards. 32. Until the adoption of the law
on the [NCJ], the Polish system was fully in line with these standards since
the [NCJ] was composed of a majority of judges chosen by judges. Articles 1(1)
and 7 of the law amending the law on the [NCJ] would radically change this
regime by providing that the 15 judges-members of the [NCJ] will be appointed,
and can be re-appointed, by Sejm. In addition, there is no
guarantee that under the new law Sejm will appoint
judges-members of the Council endorsed by the judiciary, as candidates to these
posts can be presented not only by groups of 25 judges, but also by groups of
at least 2 000 citizens. Furthermore, the final list of candidates to
which Sejm will have to give its approval en bloc is
pre-established by a committee of Sejm. The new rules on
appointment of judges-members of the [NCJ] significantly increase the influence
of the Parliament over the Council and adversely affect its independence in
contradiction with the European standards. The fact that the judges-members
will be appointed by Sejm with a three fifths majority does
not alleviate this concern, as judges-members will still not be chosen by their
peers. In addition, in case such a three fifths majority is not reached,
judges-members of the Council will be appointed by Sejm with
absolute majority of votes.
33. This situation raises concerns from
the point of view of the independence of the judiciary. For example, a district
court judge who has to deliver a judgment in a politically sensitive case,
while the judge is at the same time applying for a promotion to become a
regional court judge, may be inclined to follow the position favoured by the
political majority in order not to put his/her chances to obtain the promotion
into jeopardy. Even if this risk does not materialise, the new regime does not
provide for sufficient guarantees to secure the appearance of independence
which is crucial to maintain the confidence which tribunals in a democratic
society must inspire in the public. Also, assistant judges will have
to be assessed by a politically influenced [NCJ] prior to their appointment as
judge.
34. The Venice Commission concludes that
the election of the 15 judicial members of the National Council of the
Judiciary by Parliament, in conjunction with the immediate replacement of the
currently sitting members, will lead to a far-reaching politicisation
of this body. The Venice Commission recommends that, instead, judicial members
of the [NCJ] should be elected by their peers, as in the current Act. It
also observed that the law weakens the independence of the Council with regard
to the majority in Parliament and contributes to a weakening of the
independence of justice as a whole....”
“3. FINDING OF A SYSTEMIC THREAT TO THE
RULE OF LAW
38. Consequently, the Commission
considers that the situation of a systemic threat to the rule of law
in Poland as presented in its Recommendations of 27 July 2016,
21 December 2016, and 26 July 2017 has seriously deteriorated further.
39. The Commission underlines that
whatever the model of the justice system chosen, the rule of law requires to
safeguard the independence of the judiciary, separation of powers and legal
certainty. It is up to the Member States to organise their justice
systems, including whether or not to establish a Council for the Judiciary the
role of which is to safeguard judicial independence. However, where such a
Council has been established by a Member State, as it is the case in Poland
where the Polish Constitution has entrusted explicitly the [NCJ] with the task
of safeguarding judicial independence, the independence of such Council must be
guaranteed in line with European standards. It is with great concern that the
Commission observes that as a consequence of the new laws referred to above,
the legal regime in Poland would no longer comply with these requirements.”
(d) Reasoned
Proposal in Accordance with Article 7(1) TEU Regarding the Rule of Law
in Poland
157. On 20 December 2017 the Commission
launched the procedure under Article 7(1) TEU. This was the first time the
procedure had been used. The Commission submitted a Reasoned Proposal
(COM/2017/0360) to the Council of the European Union, inviting it to
determine that there was a clear risk of a serious breach by the Republic of Poland
of the rule of law, which was one of the values referred to in Article 2
TEU, and to address appropriate recommendations to Poland in this regard. Its
relevant parts read as follows:
“(135). The law modifies the internal
structure of the Supreme Court, supplementing it with two new chambers. A new
chamber of extraordinary control and public matters will assess cases brought
under the new extraordinary appeal procedure. It appears that this new chamber
will be composed in majority of new judges and will ascertain the validity of
general and local elections and examining electoral disputes, including
electoral disputes in European Parliament elections. In addition, a new
autonomous disciplinary chamber composed solely of new judges will be tasked
with reviewing in the first and second instance disciplinary cases against
Supreme Court judges. These two new largely autonomous chambers composed with
new judges raise concerns as regards the separation of powers. As noted by the
Venice Commission, while both chambers are part of the Supreme Court, in
practice they are above all other chambers, creating a risk that the whole
judicial system will be dominated by these chambers which are composed of new
judges elected with a decisive influence of the ruling majority. Also, the
Venice Commission underlines that the law will make the judicial review of
electoral disputes particularly vulnerable to political influence, creating a
serious risk for the functioning of Polish democracy ...”
5. Finding a clear risk of a serious
breach of the values referred to in Article 2 TEU
...
(172). The Commission is of the opinion
that the situation described in the previous sections represents a clear risk
of a serious breach by the Republic of Poland of the rule of law referred to in
Article 2 TEU. The Commission comes to this finding after having considered the
facts set out above.
(173). The Commission observes that
within a period of two years more than 13 consecutive laws have been
adopted affecting the entire structure of the justice system in Poland: the
Constitutional [Court], the Supreme Court, the ordinary courts, the [NCJ], the
prosecution service and the National School of Judiciary. The ordinary pattern
of all these legislative changes is that the executive or legislative powers
have been systematically enabled to interfere significantly with the
composition, the powers, the administration and the functioning of these
authorities and bodies. The legislative changes and their combined effects put
at serious risk the independence of the judiciary and the separation of powers
in Poland which are key components of the rule of law. The Commission also
observes that such intense legislative activity has been conducted without
proper consultation of all the stakeholders concerned, without a spirit of
loyal cooperation required between state authorities and without consideration
for the opinions from a wide range of European and international
organisations.”
158. The procedure under Article 7(1) TEU
is still under consideration before the Council of the European Union.
- The European
Parliament
(a) The
2017 Resolution
159. On 15 November 2017 the European
Parliament adopted a resolution on the situation of the rule of law and
democracy in Poland (2017/2931(RSP)). The resolution reiterated that the
independence of the judiciary was enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter and
Article 6 of the Convention, and was an essential requirement of the democratic
principle of the separation of powers, which was also reflected in Article 10
of the Polish Constitution. It expressed deep concern at the redrafted
legislation relating to the Polish judiciary, in particular, its potential to
undermine structurally judicial independence and weaken the rule of law in
Poland. The Polish Parliament and the Government were urged to implement fully
all recommendations of the Commission and the Venice Commission, and to refrain
from conducting any reform which would put at risk respect for the rule of law,
and in particular the independence of the judiciary. In this respect it called
for postponement of the adoption of any laws until a proper assessment had been
made by the Commission and the Venice Commission.
(b) The
2020 Resolution
160. The European Parliament’s resolution of
17 September 2020 on the proposal for a Council decision on the determination
of a clear risk of a serious breach of the rule of law by the Republic of
Poland (2017/0360R(NLE)), in so far as relevant, reads as follows:
“The composition and functioning of the Disciplinary
Chamber and Extraordinary Chamber of the Supreme Court
[The European Parliament]
20. Recalls that, in 2018, two new
chambers within the Supreme Court were created, namely the Disciplinary Chamber
and the Extraordinary Chamber, which were staffed with newly appointed judges
selected by the new National Council of the Judiciary and entrusted with
special powers – including the power of the Extraordinary Chamber to quash
final judgments taken by lower courts or by the Supreme Court itself by way of
extraordinary review, and the power of the Disciplinary Chamber to discipline
other judges of the Supreme Court and of ordinary courts, creating de
facto a ‘Supreme Court within the Supreme Court’;
21. Recalls that, in its ruling of 19
November 2019, the Court of Justice, answering a request for a preliminary
ruling by the Supreme Court (Labour and Social Security Chamber, hereinafter
the ‘Labour Chamber’) concerning the Disciplinary Chamber, ruled that
national courts have a duty to disregard provisions of national law which
reserve jurisdiction to hear a case where Union law may be applied to a body
that does not meet the requirements of independence and impartiality;
22. Notes that the referring Supreme
Court (Labour Chamber) subsequently concluded in its judgment of 5 December
2019 that the Disciplinary Chamber does not fulfil the requirements of an
independent and impartial tribunal within the meaning of Polish and Union law,
and that the Supreme Court (Civil, Criminal and Labour Chambers) adopted a
resolution on 23 January 2020 reiterating that the Disciplinary Chamber is not
a court due to its lack of independence and therefore its judgments cannot be
considered to be judgments given by a duly appointed court; notes with grave
concern that the Polish authorities have declared that those decisions are of
no legal significance when it comes to the continuing functioning of the
Disciplinary Chamber and the new National Council of the Judiciary, and that
the Constitutional [Court] declared the Supreme Court resolution
unconstitutional on 20 April 2020, creating a dangerous judiciary duality in
Poland in open violation of the primacy of Union law and in particular of
Article 19(1) TEU as interpreted by the Court of Justice in that it
prevents the effectiveness and application of the Court of Justice’s ruling of
19 November 2019 by the Polish courts;
23. Notes the order of the Court of
Justice of 8 April 2020 instructing Poland to immediately suspend the
application of the national provisions on the powers of the Disciplinary
Chamber and calls on the Polish authorities to swiftly implement the order;
calls on the Polish authorities to fully comply with the order and calls on the
Commission to submit an additional request to the Court of Justice seeking that
payment of a fine be ordered in the event of persisting non-compliance; calls
on the Commission to urgently start infringement proceedings in relation to the
national provisions on the powers of the Extraordinary Chamber, since its
composition suffers from the same flaws as the Disciplinary Chamber;
The composition and functioning of the new National
Council of the Judiciary
24. Recalls that it is up to the Member
States to establish a council for the judiciary, but that, where such council
is established, its independence must be guaranteed in line with European
standards and the Member State’s constitution; recalls that, following the
reform of the National Council of the Judiciary, which is the body responsible
for safeguarding the independence of the courts and judges in accordance with
Article 186(1) of the Polish Constitution, by means of the Act of 8
December 2017 amending the Act on the National Council of the Judiciary and
certain other acts, the judicial community in Poland was deprived of the power
to delegate representatives to the National Council of the Judiciary, and hence
its influence on recruitment and promotion of judges; recalls that before the
reform, 15 out of 25 members of the National Council of the Judiciary were
judges elected by their peers, while since the 2017 reform, those judges are
elected by the Polish parliament; strongly regrets that, taken in conjunction
with the premature termination in early 2018 of the mandates of all the members
appointed under the old rules, this measure led to a far-reaching
politicisation of the National Council of the Judiciary;
25. Recalls that the Supreme Court,
implementing the criteria set out by the Court of Justice in its judgment of 19
November 2019, found in its judgment of 5 December 2019 and in its
decisions of 15 January 2020, as well as in its resolution of 23 January
2020, that the decisive role of the new National Council of the Judiciary in
the selection of the judges of the newly created Disciplinary Chamber
undermines the latter’s independence and impartiality; is concerned about the
legal status of the judges appointed or promoted by the new National Council of
the Judiciary in its current composition and about the impact their
participation in adjudicating may have on the validity and legality of
proceedings;
26. Recalls that the European Network of
Councils for the Judiciary suspended the new National Council of the Judiciary
on 17 September 2018 because it no longer fulfilled the requirements of being
independent of the executive and legislature and initiated the expulsion
procedure in April 2020; ...
67. Calls on the Council to resume the
formal hearings - the last of which was held as long ago as December 2018 - as
soon as possible and to include in those hearings all the latest and major
negative developments in the areas of rule of law, democracy and fundamental
rights; urges the Council to finally act under the Article 7(1) TEU
procedure by finding that there is a clear risk of a serious breach by the
Republic of Poland of the values referred to in Article 2 TEU, in the light of
overwhelming evidence thereof as displayed in this resolution and in so many
reports of international and European organisations, the case law of the Court
of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights and reports by civil society
organisations; strongly recommends that the Council address concrete
recommendations to Poland, as provided for in Article 7(1) TEU, as a
follow‑up to the hearings, and that it indicate deadlines for the
implementation of those recommendations; calls furthermore on the Council to
commit to assessing the implementation of these recommendations in a timely
manner; calls on the Council to keep Parliament regularly informed and closely
involved and to work in a transparent manner, to allow for meaningful
participation and oversight by all European institutions and bodies and by
civil society organisations; ...”
- Court of
Justice of the European Union
(a) Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union
(Grand Chamber) in the case of Commission v. Poland of 24 June
2019 (Case C-619/18)
161. On
24 June 2019 the Grand Chamber of the Court of Justice of the European Union
(“CJEU”) delivered its judgment in the case of Commission
v. Poland, which mainly concerned the lowering of the retirement age
for Supreme Court judges to 65 and which applied to judges of the court
appointed before the date on which the relevant law had entered into force. The
CJEU held, in so far as relevant, as follows:
“111. In that
connection, the fact that an organ of the State such as the President of the
Republic is entrusted with the power to decide whether or not to grant any such
extension is admittedly not sufficient in itself to conclude that that principle
has been undermined. However, it is important to ensure that the substantive
conditions and detailed procedural rules governing the adoption of such
decisions are such that they cannot give rise to reasonable doubts, in the
minds of individuals, as to the imperviousness of the judges concerned to
external factors and as to their neutrality with respect to the interests
before them....
115. In the second place, with regard to
the fact that the New Law on the Supreme Court provides that the National
Council of the Judiciary is required to deliver an opinion to the President of
the Republic before the latter adopts his or her decision, it is admittedly
true that the intervention of such a body, in the context of a procedure for
extending the period during which a judge carries out his or her duties beyond
the normal retirement age, may, in principle, be such as to contribute to
making that procedure more objective.
116. However, that is only the case in so
far as certain conditions are satisfied, in particular in so far as that body
is itself independent of the legislative and executive authorities and of the
authority to which it is required to deliver its opinion, and in so far as such
an opinion is delivered on the basis of criteria which are both objective and relevant
and is properly reasoned, such as to be appropriate for the purposes of
providing objective information upon which that authority can take its
decision.”
(b) Judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union (Grand
Chamber) of 19 November 2019 (A.K. and Others, Independence of
the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court; Joined Cases C‑585/18, C‑624/18,
C‑625/18)
162. In August and September 2018, the
Labour and Social Security Chamber of the Supreme Court made three requests to
the CJEU for preliminary rulings in three cases pending before it. The requests
mainly concerned the question whether the newly established Disciplinary
Chamber of the Supreme Court of Poland satisfied, in the light of the
circumstances in which it was formed and its members appointed, the
requirements of independence and impartiality required under Article 47 of
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union. The questions read as
follows:
“In Case C‑585/18, the questions referred are worded as follows:
‘(1) On a proper construction of the
third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU, read in conjunction with
Article 19(1) and Article 2 TEU and Article 47 of the [Charter],
is a newly created chamber of a court of last instance of a Member State which
has jurisdiction to hear an action by a national court judge and which must be
composed exclusively of judges selected by a national body tasked with safeguarding
the independence of the courts (the [NCJ]), which, having regard to the
systemic model for the way in which it is formed and the way in which it
operates, is not guaranteed to be independent from the legislative and
executive authorities, an independent court or tribunal within the meaning of
EU law?
(2) If the answer to the first question
is negative, should the third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU, read in
conjunction with Article 19(1) and Article 2 TEU and Article 47
of the [Charter of Fundamental Rights], be interpreted as meaning that a
chamber of a court of last instance of a Member State which does not have
jurisdiction in the case but meets the requirements of EU law for a court and
is seized of an appeal in a case falling within the scope of EU law should
disregard the provisions of national legislation which preclude it from having
jurisdiction in that case?’
52. In
Cases C‑624/18 and C‑625/18, the questions referred were worded as follows:
‘(1) Should Article 47 of the
[Charter], read in conjunction with Article 9(1) of [Directive 2000/78], be interpreted as meaning that, where an appeal
is brought before a court of last instance in a Member State against an alleged
infringement of the prohibition of discrimination on the ground of age in
respect of a judge of that court, together with a motion for granting security
in respect of the reported claim, that court — in order to protect the
rights arising from EU law by ordering an interim measure provided for under
national law — must refuse to apply national provisions which confer
jurisdiction, in the case in which the appeal has been lodged, on a chamber of
that court which is not operational by reason of a failure to appoint judges to
be its members?
(2) In the event that judges are
appointed to adjudicate within the chamber with jurisdiction under
national law to hear and determine the action brought, on a proper construction
of the third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU, read in conjunction with
Article 19(1) and Article 2 TEU and Article 47 of the [Charter],
is a newly created chamber of a court of last instance of a Member State which
has jurisdiction to hear the case of a national court judge at first or second
instance and which is composed exclusively of judges selected by a national
body tasked with safeguarding the independence of the courts, namely the [NCJ],
which, having regard to the systemic model for the way in which it is formed
and the way in which it operates, is not guaranteed to be independent from the legislative
and executive authorities, an independent court or tribunal within the meaning
of EU law?
(3) If the answer to the second question
is negative, should the third paragraph of Article 267 TFEU, read in
conjunction with Article 19(1) and Article 2 TEU and Article 47
of the [Charter], be interpreted as meaning that a chamber of a court of last
instance of a Member State which does not have jurisdiction in the case but
meets the requirements of EU law for a court seized with an appeal in an EU
case should disregard the provisions of national legislation which preclude it
from having jurisdiction in that case?”
163. On 27 June 2019 Advocate General
Tanchev delivered his opinion in which he stated, among other things:
“130. In the light of the above considerations,
I am of the view that the Disciplinary Chamber forming the subject of the main
proceedings does not satisfy the requirements of independence set out in
Article 47 of the Charter.
131. I observe that the NCJ is a body
whose mission is to safeguard the independence of courts and judges under the
Polish constitution, and its functions include the selection of judges of the
Supreme Court, including the Disciplinary Chamber, for appointment by the
President of the Republic (see points 16 and 19 of this Opinion). Thus,
the NCJ must be free of influence from the legislative and executive
authorities in order to duly perform its tasks.
132. Yet, the manner of appointment of
the members of the NCJ itself discloses deficiencies which appear likely to
compromise its independence from the legislative and executive authorities.
First, this is based on the fact that, according to Article 9a of the Law
on the NCJ (see point 22 of this Opinion), the 15 judicial members of
the NCJ are no longer appointed by the judges, but instead by Sejm.
This means that the NCJ is composed of a majority of 23 of 25 members
coming from the legislative and executive authorities.
133. Moreover, according to
Article 11a(2) of the Law on the NCJ, candidates for the judicial members
of the NCJ can be proposed by groups of at least 2,000 Polish citizens or
25 judges. Pursuant to Article 11d of that law, the election of those
members to the NCJ is carried out by Sejm by a majority of 3/5
of the votes cast in the presence of at least half of the deputies entitled to
vote (see points 24 and 25 of this Opinion).
134. Accordingly, it may be considered
that the manner of appointment of the NCJ members entails influence of the
legislative authorities over the NCJ, and it cannot be discounted that Sejm may
choose candidates with little or no support from judges, with the result that
the judicial community’s opinion may have insufficient weight in the process of
the election of the NCJ members. Irrespective of the alleged aims of
enhancing the democratic legitimacy and the representativeness of the NCJ, this
arrangement is apt to adversely affect the independence of the NCJ.
135. It should also be borne in mind that
the changes to the manner of appointment of the judicial members of the NCJ
were accompanied by the premature termination of the mandates of the members of
the NCJ. It has not been disputed that the Law on the NCJ provides for early
termination of the judicial members of the NCJ at the moment of the election of
the new members (see points 22 and 26 of this Opinion). Notwithstanding
the purported aim to unify the terms of office of the NCJ membership, the
immediate replacement of the currently sitting members of the NCJ in tandem
with the new regime for appointment of the NCJ may be considered to further
impair the NCJ’s independence from the legislative and executive authorities.”
164. On 19 November 2019 the CJEU delivered
a preliminary ruling in Joined Cases C‑585/18, C-624/18, C-625/18. Recalling that the
interpretation of Article 47 of the Charter was borne out by the case-law of
the European Court of Human Rights on Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, the
Court of Justice reiterated the following principles, considered relevant in
this context. It held among many other things as follows:
“133. ... As far as concerns the
circumstances in which the members of the Disciplinary Chamber were appointed,
the Court points out, as a preliminary remark, that the mere fact that those
judges were appointed by the President of the Republic does not give rise to a
relationship of subordination of the former to the latter or to doubts as to
the former’s impartiality, if, once appointed, they are free from influence or
pressure when carrying out their role (see, to that effect, judgment of
31 January 2013, D. and A., C‑175/11, EU:C:2013:45,
paragraph 99, and ECtHR, 28 June 1984, Campbell and Fell
v. United Kingdom, CE:ECHR:1984:0628JUD000781977, § 79; 2 June
2005, Zolotas v. Greece, CE:ECHR:2005:0602JUD003824002
§§ 24 and 25; 9 November 2006, Sacilor Lormines
v. France, CE:ECHR:2006:1109JUD006541101, § 67; and
18 October 2018, Thiam v. France,
CE:ECHR:2018:1018JUD008001812, § 80 and the case-law cited).
134. However, it is still necessary to
ensure that the substantive conditions and detailed procedural rules governing
the adoption of appointment decisions are such that they cannot give rise to
reasonable doubts, in the minds of individuals, as to the imperviousness of the
judges concerned to external factors and as to their neutrality with respect to
the interests before them, once appointed as judges (see, by analogy, judgment
of 24 June 2019, Commission v Poland (Independence of
the Supreme Court), C‑619/18, EU:C:2019:531, paragraph 111).
136. In the present cases, it should be
made clear that Article 30 of the New Law on the Supreme Court sets out all the
conditions which must be satisfied by an individual in order for that
individual to be appointed as a judge of that court. Furthermore, under
Article 179 of the Constitution and Article 29 of the New Law on the
Supreme Court, the judges of the Disciplinary Chamber are, as is the case for
judges who are to sit in the other chambers of the referring court, appointed
by the President of the Republic on a proposal of the [NCJ], that is to say the
body empowered under Article 186 of the Constitution to ensure the
independence of the courts and of the judiciary.
137. The participation of such a body, in
the context of a process for the appointment of judges, may, in principle, be
such as to contribute to making that process more objective (see, by analogy,
judgment of 24 June 2019, Commission v. Poland
(Independence of the Supreme Court), C‑619/18, EU:C:2019:531, paragraph 115; see also, to
that effect, ECtHR, 18 October 2018, Thiam v. France,
CE:ECHR:2018:1018JUD008001812, §§ 81 and 82). In particular, the fact of
subjecting the very possibility for the President of the Republic to appoint a
judge to the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court) to the existence of a
favourable opinion of the [NCJ] is capable of objectively circumscribing the
President of the Republic’s discretion in exercising the powers of his office.
138. However, that is only the case
provided, inter alia, that that body is itself sufficiently
independent of the legislature and executive and of the authority to which it
is required to deliver such an appointment proposal (see, by analogy, judgment
of 24 June 2019, Commission v Poland
(Independence of the Supreme Court), C‑619/18, EU:C:2019:531, paragraph 116).
139. The degree of independence enjoyed
by the [NCJ] in respect of the legislature and the executive in exercising the
responsibilities attributed to it under national legislation, as the body
empowered, under Article 186 of the Constitution, to ensure the
independence of the courts and of the judiciary, may become relevant when
ascertaining whether the judges which it selects will be capable of meeting the
requirements of independence and impartiality arising from Article 47 of
the Charter.
140. It is for the referring court to
ascertain whether or not the [NCJ] offers sufficient guarantees of independence
in relation to the legislature and the executive, having regard to all of the
relevant points of law and fact relating both to the circumstances in which the
members of that body are appointed and the way in which that body actually
exercises its role.
141. The referring court has pointed to a
series of elements which, in its view, call into question the independence of
the [NCJ].
142. In that regard, although one or
other of the factors thus pointed to by the referring court may be such as to
escape criticism per se and may fall, in that case, within the competence of,
and choices made by, the Member States, when taken together, in addition to the
circumstances in which those choices were made, they may, by contrast, throw
doubt on the independence of a body involved in the procedure for the
appointment of judges, despite the fact that, when those factors are taken
individually, that conclusion is not inevitable.
143. Subject to those reservations, among
the factors pointed to by the referring court which it shall be incumbent on
that court, as necessary, to establish, the following circumstances may be
relevant for the purposes of such an overall assessment: first, the [NCJ], as
newly composed, was formed by reducing the ongoing four-year term in office of
the members of that body at that time; second, whereas the 15 members of the
[NCJ] elected among members of the judiciary were previously elected by their
peers, those judges are now elected by a branch of the legislature among
candidates capable of being proposed inter alia by groups of
2,000 citizens or 25 judges, such a reform leading to appointments
bringing the number of members of the [NCJ] directly originating from or
elected by the political authorities to 23 of the 25 members of that body;
third, the potential for irregularities which could adversely affect the
process for the appointment of certain members of the newly formed [NCJ].
144. For the purposes of that overall
assessment, the referring court is also justified in taking into account the
way in which that body exercises its constitutional responsibilities of
ensuring the independence of the courts and of the judiciary and its various
powers, in particular if it does so in a way which is capable of calling into
question its independence in relation to the legislature and the executive.
145. Furthermore, in the light of the
fact that, as is clear from the case file before the Court, the decisions of
the President of the Republic appointing judges to the Sąd Najwyższy
(Supreme Court) are not amenable to judicial review, it is for the referring
court to ascertain whether the terms of the definition, in Article 44(1)
and (1a) of the Law on the [NCJ], of the scope of the action which may be
brought challenging a resolution of the [NCJ], including its decisions concerning
proposals for appointment to the post of judge of that court, allows an
effective judicial review to be conducted of such resolutions, covering, at the
very least, an examination of whether there was no ultra vires or
improper exercise of authority, error of law or manifest error of assessment
(see, to that effect, ECtHR, 18 October 2018, Thiam v. France,
CE:ECHR:2018:1018JUD008001812, §§ 25 and 81).
146. Notwithstanding the assessment of
the circumstances in which the new judges of the Disciplinary Chamber were
appointed and the role of the [NCJ] in that regard, the referring court may,
for the purposes of ascertaining whether that chamber and its members meet the
requirements of independence and impartiality arising from Article 47 of
the Charter, also wish to take into consideration various other features that
more directly characterise that chamber.
147. That applies, first, to the fact
referred to by the referring court that this court has been granted exclusive
jurisdiction, under Article 27(1) of the New Law on the Supreme Court, to
rule on cases of the employment, social Security and retirement of judges of
the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court), which previously fell within the
jurisdiction of the ordinary courts.
148. Although that fact is not conclusive
per se, it should, however, be borne in mind, as regards, in particular, cases
relating to the retiring of judges of the Sąd Najwyższy
(Supreme Court) such as those in the main proceedings, that the assignment of
those cases to the Disciplinary Chamber took place in conjunction with the
adoption, which was highly contentious, of the provisions of the New Law on the
Supreme Court which lowered the retirement age of the judges of the Sąd
Najwyższy (Supreme Court), applied that measure to judges currently
serving in that court and empowered the President of the Republic with
discretion to extend the exercise of active judicial service of the judges of
the referring court beyond the new retirement age set by that law.
149. It must be borne in mind, in that
regard, that, in its judgment of 24 June 2019, Commission v. Poland
(Independence of the Supreme Court) (C‑619/18, EU:C:2019:531), the Court found that, as a result
of adopting those measures, the Republic of Poland had undermined the
irremovability and independence of the judges of the Sąd Najwyższy
(Supreme Court) and failed to fulfil its obligations under the second
subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU.
150. Second, in that context, the fact
must also be highlighted, as it was by the referring court, that, under
Article 131 of the New Law on the Supreme Court, the Disciplinary Chamber
must be constituted solely of newly appointed judges, thereby excluding judges
already serving in the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court).
151. Third, it should be made clear that,
although established as a chamber of the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme
Court), the Disciplinary Chamber appears, by contrast to the other chambers of
that court, and as is clear inter alia from Article 20 of
the New Law on the Supreme Court, to enjoy a particularly high degree of
autonomy within the referring court.
171. In the light of all of the foregoing
considerations, the answer to the second and third questions referred in Cases
C‑624/18 and C‑625/18 is:
Article 47 of the Charter and Article 9(1) of
Directive 2000/78[7] must be
interpreted as precluding cases concerning the application of EU law from
falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of a court which is not an
independent and impartial tribunal, within the meaning of the former provision.
That is the case where the objective circumstances in which that court was
formed, its characteristics and the means by which its members have been
appointed are capable of giving rise to legitimate doubts, in the minds of
subjects of the law, as to the imperviousness of that court to external
factors, in particular, as to the direct or indirect influence of the
legislature and the executive and its neutrality with respect to the interests
before it and, thus, may lead to that court not being seen to be independent or
impartial with the consequence of prejudicing the trust which justice in a
democratic society must inspire in subjects of the law.
It is for the referring court to determine, in the
light of all the relevant factors established before it, whether that applies
to a court such as the Disciplinary Chamber of the Sąd Najwyższy
(Supreme Court). If that is the case, the principle of the primacy of EU law
must be interpreted as requiring the referring court to disapply the provision
of national law which reserves jurisdiction to hear and rule on the cases in
the main proceedings to the abovementioned chamber, so that those cases may be
examined by a court which meets the abovementioned requirements of independence
and impartiality and which, were it not for that provision, would have
jurisdiction in the relevant field.”
(c) Judgment
of the Court of Justice of the European Union (Grand Chamber) of 2
March 2021 (C‑824/18)
165. In a request of 21 November 2018,
supplemented on 26 June 2019, the Supreme Administrative Court applied to
the CJEU for a preliminary ruling in cases involving persons who had applied
for a position of judge at the Supreme Court, Civil and Criminal Chambers, but
had not obtained a recommendation of the NCJ, which proposed other candidates
instead. The first of the referred cases concerned appellant A.B., who had not
been recommended to the Civil Chamber of the Supreme Court and who appealed
against NCJ resolution no. 330/2018 to the Supreme Administrative Court. In
that case the Supreme Administrative Court decided to stay the enforcement of
the impugned resolution of NCJ (see paragraphs 38-45 and
122-125 above).
166. On 17 December 2020 Advocate
General Tanchev delivered his opinion, which he concluded by the
following proposal for the interpretation of the Article 19(1) TEU in
conjunction with Article 267 TFEU (see
paragraphs 150 and 151 above):
“V. Conclusion
...
1. In view of the context and
constellation of other elements present in Poland, as pointed out by the
referring court (inter alia: (a) the Polish legislature amending the
national legal framework in order to make infringement actions and preliminary
references before the Court become devoid of purpose; (b) that in spite of the
fact that the referring court had suspended the [NCJ] resolutions at issue, the
President of the Republic proceeded anyway to appoint to the position of judge
of the Supreme Court concerned eight new judges proposed by the [NCJ] in the
resolutions at issue here; and (c) the Polish legislature, in passing the
Law of 26 April 2019, ignored rulings from the Constitutional Court which
make clear that there should be judicial review of [NCJ] resolutions such as
those in the main proceedings), Article 267 TFEU should be interpreted as
precluding a national law such as the Law of 26 April 2019 in that that
law decreed that proceedings such as those before the referring court should be
discontinued by operation of law while at the same time excluding any transfer
of the review of the appeals to another national court or the bringing again of
the appeals before another national court;
- the above arising in a context where the national
court originally having jurisdiction in those cases has referred questions to
the Court of Justice for a preliminary ruling following the successful
initiation of the procedure for reviewing the [NCJ] resolutions, undermines the
right of access to a court also in so far as, in the individual case pending
before the court (originally) having jurisdiction to hear and determine it, it
then denies that court both the possibility of successfully initiating
preliminary ruling proceedings before the Court of Justice and the right to
wait for a ruling from the Court, thereby undermining the EU principle of
sincere cooperation.
The removal of the (right to a) judicial remedy
which was until then open in a case such as the one in the main proceedings
and, in particular, the application of such a removal to litigants who –
much as the applicants in the main proceedings – have already introduced
such an action constitutes (in view of the context and constellation of the
other elements pointed out by the referring court underlying that elimination)
a measure of a nature which contributes to – indeed reinforces – the
absence of the appearance of independence and impartiality on the part of the
judges effectively appointed within the court concerned as well as the court
itself. Such an absence of the appearance of independence and impartiality
violates the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU.”
167. On 2 March 2021 the CJEU delivered a
preliminary ruling. The CJEU noted that under the rules amended in July 2018 it
was provided that unless all the participants in a procedure for appointment to
a position as judge at the Supreme Court challenged the relevant resolution of
the NCJ, that resolution became final. In 2019 the rules were changed again,
and it became impossible to lodge appeals against decisions of the NCJ
concerning the recommendation or non-recommendation of candidates for
appointment to judicial positions of the Supreme Court. Moreover, that reform
declared such still pending appeals to be discontinued by operation of
law, de facto depriving the Supreme Administrative Court of
its jurisdiction on such matters. The court ruled:
“Where amendments are made to the national legal
system which, first, deprive a national court of its jurisdiction to rule in
the first and last instance on appeals lodged by candidates for positions as
judges at a court such as the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court, Poland)
against decisions of a body such as the Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa (National
Council of the Judiciary, Poland) not to put forward their application, but to
put forward that of other candidates to the President of the Republic of Poland
for appointment to such positions, which, secondly, declare such appeals to be
discontinued by operation of law while they are still pending, ruling out the
possibility of their being continued or lodged again, and which, thirdly, in so
doing, deprive such a national court of the possibility of obtaining an answer
to the questions that it has referred to the Court for a preliminary ruling:
...
– the second subparagraph of Article
19(1) TEU must be interpreted as precluding such amendments where it is
apparent – a matter which it is for the referring court to assess on the
basis of all the relevant factors – that those amendments are capable of
giving rise to legitimate doubts, in the minds of subjects of the law, as to
the imperviousness of the judges appointed, by the President of the Republic of
Poland, on the basis of those decisions of the Krajowa Rada Sądownictwa
(National Council of the Judiciary), to external factors, in particular, to the
direct or indirect influence of the legislature and the executive, and as to
their neutrality with respect to the interests before them and, thus, may lead
to those judges not being seen to be independent or impartial with the
consequence of prejudicing the trust which justice in a democratic society governed
by the rule of law must inspire in subjects of the law.
Where it is proved that those articles have been
infringed, the principle of primacy of EU law must be interpreted as requiring
the referring court to disapply the amendments at issue, whether they are of a
legislative or constitutional origin, and, consequently, to continue to assume
the jurisdiction previously vested in it to hear disputes referred to it before
those amendments were made.”
(d) Pending
cases before the Court of Justice of the European Union
(i) Case
C-791/19
168. The Commission brough proceedings
against Poland for failing to fulfil its obligations under the second
subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU and the second and third paragraphs of
Article 267 TFEU on account of national measures establishing the new
disciplinary regime for the judges of the Supreme Court and the ordinary courts
instituted by legislation adopted in 2017. In particular the Commission
contended that the Republic of Poland has infringed the second subparagraph of
Article 19(1) TEU on four grounds regarding: first, the treatment of the
content of judicial decisions as a disciplinary offence; second, the lack of
independence and impartiality of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court,
third, the discretionary power of the President of that Chamber to designate
the competent court, which prevents disciplinary cases from being decided by a
court established by law; and, fourth, the failure to guarantee the examination
of disciplinary cases within a reasonable time and the rights of the defence of
accused judges.
The Commission also claimed that Poland had
infringed the second and third paragraphs of Article 267 TFEU because the
right of national courts to make a reference for a preliminary ruling was
limited by the possible initiation of disciplinary proceedings against judges
who exercised that right.
169. On 8 April 2020 the CJEU (Grand
Chamber) issued an interim order in a case
initiated by the Commission and concerning disciplinary proceedings against judges
pending before the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court. The interim order
stated (translated from French):
“The Republic of Poland is required, immediately and
until the delivery of the judgment bringing to an end the proceedings in Case
C-791/19,
- to suspend the application of the provisions of
Article 3(5), Article 27 and Article 73(1) of the [Act on the Supreme
Court of 8 December 2017], as amended, constituting the basis for the
jurisdiction of the [Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court] to decide, both
at first instance and on appeal, in disciplinary cases relating to judges;
- to refrain from transferring cases pending before
the [Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court] to a judicial formation that
does not meet the requirements of independence defined, inter alia,
in the judgment of 19 November 2019, A. K. and others
(Independence of the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court) (C‑585/18, C-624/18 and C-625/18, EU:C:2019:982); and
- to communicate to the European Commission, no
later than one month after the notification of the Court’s order ordering the
requested interim measures, all the measures it has adopted in order to comply fully
with that order.”
170. On 6 May 2021 Advocate General Tanchev
delivered his opinion in which he considered the complaints raised by the
Commission to be well founded. With respect to the CJEU judgment of
19 November 2019 in the joined cases (see paragraph 164 above)
the Advocate General stated:
“95...Indeed, in my view, the judgment in A. K.
and Others provides strong support for finding that, on the basis of
the combination of elements invoked by the Commission and which were examined
in that judgment, the Disciplinary Chamber does not meet the requirements of
independence and impartiality under the second subparagraph of
Article 19(1) TEU. As I concluded in my Opinion in that case, the
mandates of the previous [NCJ] members were prematurely terminated and the
changes to the method of appointment of the judicial members means that 23 out
of 25 [NCJ] members come from the legislative and executive authorities
which, taken together, disclose deficiencies that compromise the [NCJ’s]
independence (See Opinion in A.K. and Others (points 131
to 137).”
The opinion concluded with a following proposal to
the CJEU:
“(1) declare that by allowing, pursuant
to Article 107(1) of the Law on the ordinary courts and Article 97(1) and (3)
of the Law on the Supreme Court, the content of judicial decisions to be
treated as a disciplinary offence; by failing to guarantee, pursuant to
Articles 3(5), 27 and 73(1) of the Law on the Supreme Court and Article 9a
of the Law on the [NCJ], the independence and impartiality of the Disciplinary
Chamber; by granting, pursuant to Articles 110(3) and 114(7) of the
Law on the ordinary courts, the President of the Disciplinary Chamber the power
to designate the competent disciplinary court of first instance in cases
concerning ordinary court judges; by granting, pursuant to Article 112b of the
Law on the ordinary courts, the Minister for Justice the power to appoint a
Disciplinary Officer of the Minister for Justice and by providing, pursuant to
Article 113a of the Law on the ordinary courts, that activities related to the
appointment of ex officio defence counsel and that counsel’s
taking up of the defence do not have a suspensive effect on the course of the
proceedings and, pursuant to Article 115a(3) of the Law on the ordinary courts,
that the disciplinary court is to conduct the proceedings despite the justified
absence of the notified accused or his or her defence counsel, the Republic of
Poland has failed to fulfil its obligations under the second subparagraph of
Article 19(1) TEU;
(2) declare that, by allowing the right
of national courts to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to be limited
by the possibility of the initiation of disciplinary proceedings, the Republic
of Poland has failed to fulfil its obligations under the second and third
paragraphs of Article 267 TFEU;”
The date for the delivery of judgment in the case
was set for 15 July 2021.
(ii) Case
C-508/19 M.F. v J.M.
171. On 3 July 2019 the Supreme Court
lodged with the CJEU a request for a preliminary ruling concerning the process
of judicial appointments to the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court. The
domestic proceedings concerned a District Court judge, M.F., against whom, on
17 January 2019, disciplinary proceedings were instituted. In those proceedings
it was alleged that her conduct resulted in overly lengthy proceedings and that
she had failed to draw up written grounds for her judgments in a timely manner.
On 28 January 2019, J.M., acting as a judge of the Supreme Court
performing the duties of the President of the Supreme Court who directed the
work of the Disciplinary Chamber, issued an order rendering the disciplinary
court competent to hear her case at first instance. M.F. brought an action
for a declaratory judgment together with an application for an injunction
against J.M., seeking to establish that the latter was not a judge of the
Supreme Court because he had not been appointed to the position of judge of the
Supreme Court in the Disciplinary Chamber. According to the claimant his
appointment on 20 September 2018 was ineffective because he had been
appointed: (i) after the selection procedure had been conducted by the NCJ on
the basis of an announcement of the President of the Republic of Poland, of
29 June 2018, which had been signed by the President without the
countersignature of the Prime Minister; (ii) after the resolution of the NCJ
which contained the motion to appoint J.M. to the position of Supreme Court
judge in the Disciplinary Chamber had been appealed against to the Supreme
Administrative Court on 17 September 2018 by one of the participants in
the selection procedure, and before that court had ruled on the appeal. By
order of 6 May 2019, the First President of the Supreme Court designated
the Labour and Social Security Chamber to hear the case; the latter decided to
stay the proceedings and refer questions to the CJEU for a preliminary ruling.
172. On 15 April 2021 Advocate General
Tanchev delivered his opinion, in which he observed as follows:
“22. I consider (as does the [Polish Commissioner
for Human Rights]) that the connecting factors between the action in the main
proceedings and the EU law provisions raised in the questions referred relate
to the fact that a national judge (M.F.) who may rule on the application or
interpretation of EU law is asking that she is afforded, in the context of a
disciplinary action levelled against her, the benefit of the effective judicial
protection guaranteed by Article 19(1) TEU in the light of Article 47 of
the Charter. Such protection implies an obligation for the Member States
to ‘provide the necessary guarantees in order to prevent any risk of that
disciplinary regime being used as a system of political control of the content
of judicial decisions’, (3) which means that M.F. has a right to be judged by
an independent and impartial court established by law. That also means that the
tribunal called upon to rule on her disciplinary procedure cannot be appointed
by a judge whose own appointment breached the very same provision of EU law
even though he himself gives rulings relating to the application or
interpretation of EU law...
26. Indeed, it follows from the order for
reference that there were numerous potentially flagrant breaches of the law
applicable to judicial appointments in the appointment procedure in respect of
J.M.: (i) the procedure was opened without the ministerial countersignature
required under the Constitution, which it is claimed renders the procedure void
ab initio; (ii) it involved the new [NCJ] whose members were appointed under a
new legislative process, which is unconstitutional and does not guarantee
independence; (iii) there were diverse deliberate impediments to the
preliminary judicial review of the act of appointment, as: (a) the [NCJ]
deliberately failed to forward the action brought against its resolution to the
Supreme Administrative Court, at the same time as it sent it to the President
of the Republic, before the deadline to do so before that court expired; (b)
the President of the Republic appointed the judges proposed in that resolution
before the judicial review of that resolution was closed and without waiting
for the answer of the Court of Justice to the questions referred to it in case
C‑824/18, concerning the conformity of the modalities of that control
with EU law. Therefore, the President of the Republic committed a potentially
flagrant breach of fundamental norms of national law...
34. Unlike the Commission, I consider
that this is an extension of the answer given to the first question and, as
follows from my Opinion and from the judgment in A.B. and Others, an
executive authority of a Member State is required to refrain from delivering a
document of appointment to the position of judge until a national court, taking
into account the judgment given by the Court of Justice on the reference for a
preliminary ruling, has ruled on the compatibility of national law with EU law
with respect to the procedure for appointing members of a new organisational
unit in the court of final instance of that Member State. Failure to do so
would be an infringement of the principle of effective judicial protection,
since at the very least it creates a serious risk that judicial authorities
which do not meet EU standards will be established, even if only temporarily. I
agree with the [Polish Commissioner for Human Rights] that it would also
potentially infringe Articles 4(3) TEU and 267 TFEU, as the President
of the Republic would limit the effet utile of the preliminary
ruling procedure and would circumvent the binding character of the decisions of
the Court.
35. National courts should have a remedy
to treat as a qualified breach of the principle of effective judicial
protection any actions taken by the authorities of a Member State following a
request for a preliminary ruling made by a national court where the purpose or
effect of such actions might be to nullify or limit the principle of the
retroactive (ex tunc) effect of preliminary rulings given by the Court.
36. What is important in the context of
the present case, and as was pointed out by the referring court, is that the
delivery of the document of appointment to the position of judge in the
Disciplinary Chamber may constitute an intentional infringement of the
principle of effective judicial protection. Moreover, this was, it seems,
accompanied by the conviction, stemming from previous national case-law, that
the appointment to the position of judge of the Supreme Court is irreversible.
As follows from the answer to the first question, that conviction is wrong.
37. In addition, I agree with the
referring court that a person appointed to the position of judge of the Supreme
Court in such circumstances may well remain dependent on how the authorities
involved in his appointment assess his judicial activity during the period in
which he performs his judicial mandate. The referring court states that in its
view such dependence exists, especially on the executive, that is, the
President of the Republic....
39. ...The referring court must, in that
respect, assess the manifest and deliberate character of that breach as well as
the gravity of the breach and must take into account the fact that J.M. was
appointed despite a prior appeal to the competent national court against the
resolution of the [NCJ], which included a motion for the appointment of that
person to the position of judge and which was still pending at the relevant
time...
53. ... In view of the fact that the
review of the validity of J.M. (the defendant judge’s) appointment cannot be
carried out in any other national procedure and that the only possibility to
examine that status as judge is in the context of a disciplinary procedure
exposing M.F. (the applicant judge) to sanctions which is not compliant with
the requirements of the principle of effective judicial protection, the
referring court should be able to rule that that appointment did not exist in
law even where national law does not authorise it to do so.
54. In that respect, I consider (as does
the [Polish Commissioner for Human Rights]) that the national authorities may
not take refuge behind arguments based on legal certainty and irremovability of
judges. Those arguments are just a smokescreen and do not detract from the
intention to disregard or breach the principles of the rule of law. It must be
recalled that law does not arise from injustice (ex iniuria ius non oritur).
If a person was appointed to such an important institution in the legal system
of a Member State as is the Supreme Court of that State in a procedure which
violated the principle of effective judicial protection, then he or she cannot
be protected by the principles of legal certainty and irremovability of
judges.”
(iii) Case
C-487/19 W.Ż.
173. On 26 June 2019 the Civil Chamber of
the Supreme Court lodged a request with the CJEU for a preliminary ruling. The
case originated in proceedings brought by Judge W.Ż. seeking the
withdrawal of judges of the Chamber of Extraordinary Review and Public Affairs
of the Supreme Court. On 8 March 2019 the Chamber of Extraordinary Review and
Public Affairs, sitting as a single Judge, A.S., dismissed the appeal lodged by
W.Ż. against a resolution of the NCJ discontinuing the proceedings
concerning his transfer from the second-instance to a first-instance division
of a Regional Court. W.Ż. was a member and spokesperson of the former NCJ
and has publicly criticised the judicial reforms in Poland carried out by the
ruling party.
174. On 15 April 2021 Advocate General
Tanchev delivered his opinion, in which he observed as follows:
“39. The referring court has already
established that in the appointment procedure by which A.S. was appointed as a
judge of the Supreme Court there were flagrant and deliberate breaches of
Polish laws relating to judicial appointments. ...
(1) First limb of the question referred:
appointment of judges before the Supreme Administrative Court gave a ruling in
the pending action attacking [NCJ] resolution No 331/2018
50. The
salient point here is whether the fact that there was an ongoing judicial
review of [NCJ] resolutions (adopted in the course of the Supreme
Court appointment procedure) has (or should have) suspensory effect...
57. In
making its assessment the national court will need to have regard to the
guidance provided here and in the judgment A.B. and Others and
to any other relevant circumstances of which it may become aware, taking
account, where appropriate, of the reasons and specific objectives alleged
before it in order to justify the measures concerned. In addition, the court
will need to assess whether national provisions, such as those contained in
Article 44(1a) to (4) of the [2011 Act on the NCJ as amended by the
2017 Amending Act], are such as to give rise to legitimate doubts, in the minds
of subjects of the law, as to the imperviousness of the judges appointed on the
basis of the [NCJ] resolutions to external factors and, in
particular, to the direct or indirect influence of the Polish legislature and
executive, and as to their neutrality with respect to any interests before them
and, thus, may lead to those judges not being seen to be independent or
impartial with the consequence of prejudicing the trust which justice in a
democratic society governed by the rule of law must inspire in subjects of the
law. ...
60. As the [Polish Commissioner for Human
Rights] rightly submitted, in accordance with the second subparagraph of
Article 19(1) TEU and Article 47 of the Charter, the appointment process
must not give rise to reasonable doubts, in the minds of the subjects of the
law, as to the imperviousness of the judges concerned to external factors, once
the interested parties are appointed as judges. Therefore, given the key role
played by the [NCJ] in the judicial appointment process and the absence of
legal review of the decisions of the President of the Republic appointing a
judge, it is necessary that effective legal review exists for the judicial
candidates. That is particularly the case where, as in this instance, the
State, by way of its conduct, is interfering in the process of appointing
judges in a manner which risks compromising the future independence of those
judges. The required legal review should: (a) happen before the appointment, as
the judge is thus protected a posteriori by the principle of
irremovability; (b) cover at least an ultra vires or improper
exercise of authority, error of law or manifest error of assessment; and (c)
allow clarification of all the aspects of the appointment procedure, including
the requirements under EU law, if appropriate, by submitting questions to the
Court inter alia concerning the requirements stemming from the
principle of effective judicial protection. ...
63. As a consequence, the act of
appointment as judge of the Supreme Court adopted by the President of the
Republic before the Supreme Administrative Court ruled definitively on the
action brought against Resolution No 331/2018 of the [NCJ] constitutes a
flagrant breach of national rules governing the procedure for the appointment
of judges to the Supreme Court, when those rules are interpreted in conformity
with applicable EU law (in particular, the second subparagraph of
Article 19(1) TEU).
(2) Second limb of the question referred:
appointment to the post of judge of the Supreme Court despite the order of the
Supreme Administrative Court suspending the execution of the [NCJ] resolution proposing the appointment of
candidates
64. It
will ultimately be for the referring court to assess this point on the basis of
all the relevant elements, but to my mind the irregularity committed during the
appointment of the judge of the CECPA (22) in question (judge A.S.) stems a fortiori from
the fact that he was appointed within the Supreme Court and within that chamber
despite the decision of the Supreme Administrative Court ordering that the
execution of [NCJ] resolution No 331/2018 be stayed.§ 65.
Therefore, I agree with the referring court and also W.Ż., the [Polish
Commissioner for Human Rights] and the Commission that the deliberate and
intentional infringement by the executive branch of a judicial decision, in
particular a decision of the Supreme Administrative Court ordering interim
measures (that is, the order of 27 September 2018) – manifestly with the
aim of ensuring that the government has an influence on judicial appointments –
demonstrates a lack of respect for the principle of the rule of law and
constitutes per se an infringement by the executive branch of ‘fundamental
rules forming an integral part of the establishment and functioning of that
judicial system’ within the meaning of paragraph 75 of judgment of 26
March 2020, Review Simpson and HG v Council and Commission (C‑542/18 RX‑II and C‑543/18 RX‑II, EU:C:2020:232) (‘the judgment in
Simpson and HG’). ...
77. In Ástráðsson
v. Iceland, the Grand Chamber of the ECtHR – largely upholding
the chamber ruling of 12 March 2019 – ruled that, given the potential
implications of finding a breach and the important interests at stake, the
right to a ‘tribunal established by law’ should not be construed too
broadly such that any irregularity in a judicial appointment procedure would
risk compromising that right. The ECtHR thus formulated a three-step test to
determine whether irregularities in a judicial appointment procedure were of
such gravity as to entail a violation of the right to a tribunal established by
law: step 1, whether there has been a manifest breach of domestic law
(§§ 244 and 245 of that judgment); step 2, whether breaches of
domestic law pertained to any fundamental rule of the judicial appointment
procedure (§§ 246 and 247); and step 3, whether the alleged
violations of the right to a ‘tribunal established by law’ were
effectively reviewed and remedied by the domestic courts (§§ 248 to 252).
78. The
above principles apply not only in the case of infringements of provisions
governing specifically the appointment procedure stricto sensu,
but, as the present case shows, they must also apply in the case of disregard
of judicial control introduced in relation to previous acts of appointment
having a constitutive character vis-à-vis that appointment (such
as [NCJ] resolution No 331/2018 here).
79. As
the Commission pointed out, in relation to the rules of appointment of judges,
it is not surprising that both the ECtHR (in the judgment of 1 December
2020 Ástráðsson v. Iceland, § 247) and the Court (in the
judgment in Simpson and HG, paragraph 75) make a direct link
between the requirement that a tribunal must be established by law and the
principle of judicial independence in the sense that it is necessary to examine
whether an irregularity committed during the appointment of
judges ‘create[s] a real risk that other branches of the State, in
particular the executive, could exercise undue discretion undermining the
integrity of the outcome of the appointment process and thus give rise to a
reasonable doubt in the minds of individuals as to the independence and the
impartiality of the judge or judges concerned’ (Simpson and HG,
paragraph 75). ...
84. As far as the
requirement ‘established by law’ is concerned, as pointed out by the
[Polish Commissioner for Human Rights], the strict respect of appointment rules
is necessary, as it gives the appointed judge the feeling that he or she
obtained the position purely on the basis of their qualifications and objective
criteria and at the end of a reliable procedure, avoiding the creation of any
relation of dependence between the judge and the authorities intervening in
that appointment. In the present case, the referring court established, in a
convincing manner, on the one hand, that the effective legal review of the
judicial appointment process constitutes a requirement flowing from the
constitutional principles relating to the independence of the judiciary and to
the subjective rights of access to a public function and to a court or tribunal
and, on the other hand, that the appointment of the judge concerned arose in
breach of that effective legal review and of the judicial decision having
suspended the enforceability of [NCJ] resolution No 331/2018. ...
87. The manifest and deliberate character
of the violation of the order of the Supreme Administrative Court staying the
execution of [NCJ] Resolution No 331/2018, committed by such an important
State authority as the President of the Republic, empowered to deliver the act
of appointment to the post of judge of the Supreme Court, is indicative of a
flagrant breach of the rules of national law governing the appointment
procedure for judges.
88. In relation to the criterion of
gravity, to my mind, given the general context of the contentious judicial
reforms in Poland, the gravity of the breaches in the present case is more
serious than the irregularities at issue in Ástráðsson v. Iceland.
89. In
any event, the very fact that the President of the Republic paid no heed to the
final decision of the Supreme Administrative Court – that is, the
administrative court of final instance – ordering interim measures and
staying the execution of [NCJ] Resolution No 331/2018 until that
court rules on the main action pending before it, indicates the gravity of the
breach that was committed.
90. The
Court has already made clear that the respect by competent national authorities
of a Member State of interim measures ordered by national courts
constitutes ‘an essential component of the rule of law, a value enshrined
in Article 2 TEU and on which the European Union is founded.’
(c) Effects on the act of appointment of
A.S. to the post of judge of the Supreme Court and/or on the order of
8 March 2019 in the light of the principles of legal certainty
and of irremovability of judges
91. In
order to provide the referring court with an interpretation of EU law which may
be useful to it in assessing the effects of one or other of its
provisions, it is necessary also to examine the effects of the
finding that A.S. sitting in a single-judge formation may not constitute a
tribunal established by law. ...
105. In other words, in the present case,
a potential infringement in the case in the main proceedings of the requirement
for a tribunal to be previously established by law does not imply that the act
of appointment of judge A.S. – the judge who gave the order of inadmissibility
– is invalid per se.
106. For the reasons set out above, I
propose that the Court should answer the question referred for a preliminary
ruling by the Sąd Najwyższy (Supreme Court, Poland) as follows:
The right to a tribunal established by law, affirmed
by the second subparagraph of Article 19(1) TEU, read in the light of
Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, must be
interpreted in the sense that a court such as the court composed of a single
person of the Chamber of Extraordinary Review and Public Affairs of the Supreme
Court (Poland) does not meet the requirements to constitute such a tribunal
established by law in a situation where the judge concerned was appointed to
that position in flagrant breach of the laws of the Member State applicable to
judicial appointments to the Supreme Court, which is a matter for the referring
court to establish. The referring court must, in that respect, assess the
manifest and deliberate character of that breach as well as the gravity of the
breach and must take into account the fact that the above appointment was made:
(i) despite a prior appeal to the competent national court against the
resolution of the National Council of the Judiciary, which included a motion
for the appointment of that person to the position of judge and which was still
pending at the relevant time; and/or (ii) despite the fact that the
implementation of that resolution had been stayed in accordance with national
law and those proceedings before the competent national court had not been
concluded before the delivery of the appointment letter.”
- European
Network of Councils for the Judiciary
175. On 16 August 2018 the European Network
of Councils for the Judiciary (ENCJ) adopted its “Position Paper of the Board
of the ENCJ on the membership of the [NCJ] of Poland” and formulated a proposal
to suspend the NCJ’s membership. Accordingly, on 17 September 2018, the
Extraordinary General Assembly of the ENCJ decided to suspend the membership of
the Polish NCJ (see paragraph 15 above). The relevant parts of the
Position Paper read as follows:
“The present law concerning the [NCJ] came into
effect in January 2018. The essence of the reform is that the judicial members
of the [NCJ] are no longer elected by their peers but are instead appointed by
Parliament. Judges may be appointed by Parliament if they are supported by 25
judges or a group of 2000 citizens. The Board considers that this is a
departure from the ENCJ standard that judges in a council should be elected by
their peers. Although, non-compliance with this standard does not automatically
imply that a council is not independent from the executive, in the case of the
Polish Council the Board finds so many additional circumstances that it has
reached the conclusion that the [NCJ] is no longer independent from the
executive. These circumstances include the following:
- The law on the [NCJ] is part of an overall reform
to strengthen the position of the executive, infringing very seriously the
independence of the judiciary;
- The reasons given for these reforms are not
convincing to the Board;
- It is not clear to the Board whether, and if so,
in what way the reforms should and will contribute to the official goals of the
government on the subject of the alleged corruption, inefficiency and communist
influence;
- The reforms are not the fruit of the required
involvement of the judiciary in the formation and implementation of plans for
reform;
- The term of office of four of the sitting
[NCJ]-members has been shortened;
- In the selection process of a judicial member of
the [NCJ] the lists of supportive judges are not made public, and so it cannot
be checked whether the list consists primarily of judges seconded to the
Ministry of Justice, or of the same 25 judges for every candidate; The judicial
members of the [NCJ] have not published the list of supporting judges
themselves, but they have instead provided the ENCJ only with a list showing
the number of judges they were supported by;
- The associations of judges informed the Board that
four of the present judicial members were until shortly before their election
as member of the [NCJ] seconded to the Ministry of Justice; They also informed
the Board that five of the members of the [NCJ] were appointed president of a
court by the Minister of Justice shortly before their election as members of
the [NCJ], using a law mentioned in paragraph 4.3;
- Thirdly, they informed the Board that a majority
of the members of the [NCJ] (14 out of 25) are either a member of the Law
and Justice Party, a member of the government or are chosen by Parliament on
the recommendation of the Law and Justice Party. The [NCJ] decides by simple
majority;
- The judicial members of the [NCJ] support all the
justice reforms from the government, although they admit that the majority of
the judges are of the opinion that the reforms are in violation of the
Constitution and are infringing the independence of the judiciary;
- Several members of the [NCJ] expressed the opinion
that judges who publicly speak out against the reforms and/or speak out in
defence of the independence of the judiciary should be disciplined because of
unlawful political activity;
- The [NCJ] does not speak out on behalf of the
judges who defend the independence of the judiciary. For example: the judges in
Krakow were publicly called criminals by the Prime Minister of Poland, and the
[NCJ] did not object to it. The same goes for the [NCJ]’s attitude concerning
the position of the First President of the Supreme Court;
- A large portion of the 10,000 Polish judges
believe that the [NCJ] is politicised.
In short: The Board considers that the [NCJ] is no
longer the guardian of the independence of the judiciary in Poland. It seems
instead to be an instrument of the executive.
6. Conclusion
The Board considers that the [NCJ] does not comply
with the statutory rule of the ENCJ that a member should be independent from
the executive.
The Board believes that the [NCJ] is no longer an
institution which is independent of the executive and, accordingly, which
guarantees the final responsibility for the support of the judiciary in the
independent delivery of justice.
Moreover, the Board feels that actions of the [NCJ]
or the lack thereof, as set out in paragraph 5, are constituting a breach
of the aims and objectives of the network, in particular the aim of improvement
of cooperation between and good mutual understanding amongst Councils for the
Judiciary of the EU and Candidate Member States in accordance with article 3 of
the Statutes.
7. Proposal of the Board
In the circumstances, the Board proposes to the
General Assembly, convening in Bucharest on the 17th September 2018, that the
membership of the [NCJ] be suspended.
With this measure, the ENCJ sends a clear message to
the Polish government and the Polish judges that the ENCJ considers that the
[NCJ] is no longer independent from the executive.
By suspension – and not expulsion - the ENCJ also
intends to express an open mind for the possibility for improvement on the
topic of judicial independence in Poland. In this way it can continue to
monitor the situation concerning the Rule of Law in Poland, for instance as to
the disciplinary actions against judges who oppose the reforms.
The Board sincerely hopes that the time will come
when the suspension can be lifted, but that will only be when the principle of
judicial independence is properly respected in Poland.”
176. On 27 May 2020 the Executive Board
of the ENCJ adopted a “Position Paper of the board of the ENCJ on the
membership of the [NCJ] (expulsion)”. In that paper the Board set out the
reasons for its proposal to the General Assembly to expel the NCJ from the
network. No decision has yet been taken on that proposal. The relevant parts of
the paper read as follows:
“... the Executive Board is of the opinion that the
situation has not improved from 17 September 2018 until now, but has
deteriorated on several issues.
First. The relations between the [NCJ] and the
Minister of Justice are even closer than suspected in the position paper of 16
August 2018. At the meeting of November 2019 the [NCJ] did not criticize the
government at all. After enormous pressure, the lists of judges who supported
the present members of the [NCJ] as candidates (a minimum of 25 supporting
judges was required to be appointed), show support by a narrow group of judges
associated with the Minister of Justice, including 50 judges seconded to the
ministry. One candidate was appointed without the required minimum of 25
signatures from judges.
Secondly. The [NCJ] openly supports the Executive
and Legislature in its attacks on the independence of the Judiciary, especially
by means of disciplinary actions. The answers of the [NCJ] in the letter of 13
March 2020 on these points strengthen the Executive Board in its opinion. In
the answer to question 1, the [NCJ] acknowledges that 49 judges supporting the
appointment of members of the [NCJ] were seconded to the Ministry of Justice,
and thus cannot be viewed as independent from the ministry for the purposes of
the ENCJ. In the answer to question 2, the [NCJ] acknowledges that many
signatures of judges supporting the candidacy of member N. had been withdrawn
before the election, thus casting doubt on the validity of his election, yet he
continues to fulfil the role of a validly elected member of the council. In the
answer to question 3, the [NCJ] only reiterates that it is not its task to
monitor the declarations of the Minister of Justice and does not deny that the
Minister of Justice has said in the Senate that he proposed judges to be
appointed in the [NCJ] who, in his opinion, were ready to cooperate in the reform
of the Judiciary. This amounts to a failure to promote the independence of the
council and its members from the executive. In the answer to question 4, the
[NCJ] argues that the members of the [NCJ] are not the representatives of
judges, which is incompatible with the ENCJ Budapest Declaration 2008 that
judicial members of a council must act as the representatives of the entire
judiciary. The letter of 20 May 2020 makes no convincing argument against the
conclusion that the [NCJ] does not fulfil the requirement of being independent
of the executive.
On the basis of both its actions and its responses
the Executive Board concludes that the [NCJ] is still not independent of the
Executive and the Legislature.
...
10. Conclusion of
the Executive Board
First. The Board considers that the [NCJ] does not
comply with the statutory rule of the ENCJ that a member should be independent
from the executive.
Second. The Board considers that the [NCJ] is in
blatant violation of the ENCJ rule to safeguard the independence of the
Judiciary, to defend the Judiciary, as well as individual judges, in a manner
consistent with its role as guarantor, in the face of any measures which
threaten to compromise the core values of independence and autonomy.
Third. The Board considers that the [NCJ] undermines
the application of EU Law as to the independence of judges and tribunals, and
thus its effectiveness. In doing so, it acts against the interests of the
European Area of freedom, security and justice, and the values it stands for....
“11. Proposal of the Executive Board
In the circumstances, the Board proposes to the
General Assembly, convening as soon as possible as the Covid-19 pandemic allows
it, that the [NCJ] be expelled as a member of the network.
With this measure, the ENCJ sends a clear message to
the Polish government and the Polish judges that the ENCJ considers that the
[NCJ] is no longer a member of the European family of Members and Observers who
believe in, and support the European Area of freedom, security and justice, and
the values it stands for.
The ENCJ wants to make absolutely clear that it
remains very much committed to the independence of the Polish Judiciary, our
Colleague European Union Judges, and that it will continue to cooperate with
all the judicial associations in order to defend and restore the independence
of the Polish judiciary as soon as possible. Once a Council of the Judiciary in
Poland again believes in and acts in support of the values of the ENCJ, the
ENCJ will be happy to welcome any such Council back as a member.”
THE LAW
- PRELIMINARY
REMARKS
177. The present case belongs to a
group of thirty-eight applications against Poland, lodged in 2018-2021,
concerning various aspects of the reorganisation of the Polish judicial system
initiated in 2017 (see also paragraphs 1-125 above). As of the date
of adoption of the present judgment the Court has given notice of twenty-two
applications to the Polish Government, in accordance with Rule 54 § 2 (b). The
Chamber of the First Section of the Court has also decided that all the current
and future applications belonging to that group be given priority, pursuant to
Rule 41.
In most cases (twenty apart from the present one),
the applicants’ complaints either relate to the issue of whether the newly
established chambers of the Supreme Court, in particular the Disciplinary
Chamber, have attributes required of a “tribunal established by law” within the
meaning of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention or to the questions linked with
the jurisdiction of the Disciplinary Chamber in disciplinary proceedings
concerning judges, prosecutors and members of the legal profession. Some cases
also concern allegations that judicial formations including judges of the
ordinary courts appointed by the President of Poland following a recommendation
from the “new” NCJ, as composed by virtue of the 2017 Amending Act, fail
to meet the requirements of a “tribunal established by law.
There are also two cases concerning a premature
termination of the term of office of judicial members of the “old” NCJ under
the 2017 Amending Act and allegations of a breach of Article 6
§ 1 of the Convention on account of the lack of access to a court to
contest their dismissal from the “old” NCJ, in breach of Article 6 of the
Convention. One of those cases – Grzęda v. Poland (no. 43572/18) – is currently pending before the Grand Chamber
of the Court.
Having regard to the variety of legal and factual
issues arising in the above group of cases, the Court would emphasise at the
outset that its task in the present case is not to consider the legitimacy of
the reorganisation of the Polish judiciary as a whole but to assess the
circumstances relevant for the process of appointment of judges to the
Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court following the entry into force of the
2017 Act on the Supreme Court establishing that Chamber (see paragraphs 66‑69 above
and paragraph 178 below).
- MATERIAL BEFORE
THE COURT
178. The Court further notes
that it is a matter of common knowledge that the reorganisation of the
judiciary in Poland initiated by the Government in 2017 and implemented by the
successive amending laws (see paragraphs 8-25 above) has, since then,
been the subject not only of intense public debate in Poland and at European
level but also of numerous proceedings before the Polish courts and the CJEU,
of other actions before the European Union’s institutions, including the
procedure under Article 7(1) TEU before the European Commission, of
European Parliament resolutions, of the PACE monitoring procedure and its
resolutions, and of various reports of the Council of Europe’s bodies, the UN,
the OSCE/ODIHR and the ENCJ (see paragraphs 126-176 above). In view of
the foregoing, the Court in its examination of the case will take into account
the submissions of the parties and the third-party interveners and evidence
produced by them in support of their arguments, and will also take judicial
notice of the material available in the public domain, as summarised above and
in so far as relevant for the determination of the applicant’s complaints
alleging a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in that she did
not have her case heard by an impartial and independent tribunal established by
law.
- ALLEGED VIOLATION
OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION AS REGARDS THE RIGHT TO A TRIBUNAL
ESTABLISHED BY LAW
179. The applicant complained under Article
6 § 1 of the Convention that the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court,
which had dealt with her case, had not been a “tribunal established by law”
within the meaning of that provision. The applicant relied on Article 6 § 1 of
the Convention, which, in its relevant part, reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations
or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and
public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial
tribunal established by law...”
- Admissibility
- Applicability
of Article 6 § 1
(a) The
parties’ submissions
180. The Government did not dispute the
applicability of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention under its civil head
to the disciplinary proceedings in the applicant’s case.
181. The applicant submitted that Article
6 § 1 of the Convention applied to her case under its criminal head. She noted
that the disciplinary proceedings had first been conducted by the disciplinary
bodies of the Bar Association. The penalty imposed by them had been of a
punitive character and consisted of the suspension of her right to practise as
a barrister for a period of three years. The severity of the sanction by itself
had brought the offence into the criminal sphere. Moreover, the Polish Code of
Criminal Procedure had been applicable to those proceedings as they concerned a
violation of the Code of Ethics of Barristers.
(b) The
Court’s assessment
182. The Court notes that the Government
have not raised an objection of incompatibility ratione materiae with
the provisions of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. However, the
parties disagreed as to whether this Article applied to the case under its
civil or criminal head.
183. It is the Court’s well-established
case-law that disciplinary proceedings in which the right to continue to
exercise a profession is at stake give rise to “contestations”
(disputes) over civil rights within the meaning of Article 6 § 1 (see for
instance, Philis v. Greece (no. 2),
27 June 1997, § 45, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997‑IV,
and Vilho Eskelinen and Others v. Finland [GC], no. 63235/00, §
62, ECHR 2007-II). This principle has been applied with regard to
proceedings conducted before various professional disciplinary bodies and in
particular as regards judges in Baka v. Hungary [GC],
no. 20261/12, §§ 104-105, 23 June 2016, prosecutors in Polyakh
and Others v. Ukraine, nos. 58812/15 and 4 others, § 160,
17 October 2019, and practising lawyers in Malek v. Austria,
no. 60553/00, § 39, 12 June 2003, and Helmut Blum
v. Austria, no. 33060/10, § 60, 5 April 2016.
184. The applicant in the present case is
a practising lawyer, a barrister, who was temporarily suspended from her duties
as a consequence of the disciplinary proceedings. The Court sees no reason to
depart from its case-law cited above. It considers that there is no basis for
finding that the disciplinary proceedings against the applicant concerned the
determination of a criminal charge against her within the meaning of Article 6
of the Convention as submitted by the applicant (see Ramos Nunes de Carvalho e Sá
v. Portugal [GC], nos. 55391/13 and 2 others, § 127,
6 November 2018, and Müller-Hartburg v. Austria,
no. 47195/06, § 49, 19 February 2013).
185. Accordingly, Article 6 § 1
of the Convention under its civil head applies to
the impugned proceedings before the Disciplinary Chamber of the
Supreme Court.
- Conclusion as
to admissibility
186. The Court notes that the application
is neither manifestly ill‑founded nor inadmissible on any other of the
grounds listed in Article 35 of the Convention. It must therefore be
declared admissible.
- Merits
- Submissions
before the Court
(a) The
parties
(i) The
applicant
187. The applicant submitted that her
case had not been heard by an impartial and independent “tribunal established
by law” and that this constituted a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention. Firstly, the judges who had dealt with
her case had been selected on a political basis and had not been independent or
impartial. Secondly, the entire Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme
Court was of a political character, as shown by its activity against the judges
who had opposed the reforms of the judicial system.
188. The
applicant stated that, in accordance with the Court’s case-law, in particular
the judgment in Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson ([GC], no. 26374/18, 1 December 2020), a court must always be
“established by law”. In the light of this requirement the Court was called
upon to examine whether the domestic law had been complied with. In the present
case the long series of irregularities which had resulted in the conclusion
that the panel of judges of the Disciplinary Chamber which examined her case
had not been a “tribunal established by law” had started with the structural
changes to the NCJ. Contrary to the Constitution, which held that Sejm should
only select four members of the NCJ, the 2017 Amending Act entrusted Sejm with the election of
fifteen additional members, from among judges, who had so far been elected by
their peers. As a result, the legislative and executive branches of power had
granted themselves a quasi-monopoly to appoint the members of the NCJ
in that they were to appoint twenty-three out of twenty-five members. This
amounted to a breach of the Constitutional principle of separation of powers
and ran counter to the previous case-law of the Constitutional Court from 2007.
As a result, the NCJ had lost the ability to contribute to making the judicial
appointment process objective. The applicant drew the Court’s attention to
other cases pending before the Court concerning the termination of the terms of
office of previous members of the NCJ (Grzęda v. Poland, no. 43572/18) and the Disciplinary Chamber’s rulings against
judges who had criticised the “reforms of the judiciary” (Tuleya
v. Poland, no. 21181/19). These cases showed that the activity of the
Disciplinary Chamber was strongly politicised.
189. The process of appointment of Supreme
Court judges had not been transparent or independent, and was in breach of
domestic law, including the Constitution, in that the President had announced
vacancies at the Supreme Court without the countersignature of the Prime
Minister contrary to Article 144 § 2 of the Constitution. The
selection process carried out by the NCJ had been superficial and did not offer
guarantees of the independence or impartiality of the candidates selected. For
instance, only 216 candidates had applied for forty-four announced positions.
The NCJ had carried out a short, chaotic, and superficial examination of
applications and individual interviews had taken a dozen minutes per candidate.
As a result, only those candidates who had been supported by the authorities,
and connected to them, had been selected.
190. The applicant pointed to the particular
status of the Disciplinary Chamber as a newly established chamber of the
Supreme Court. The real objective behind its creation had been to increase the
total number of judges sitting in the Supreme Court from 83 to 120 and to
suppress any judicial opposition to radical and far-reaching changes in the
Polish legal system implemented by the current government. The Disciplinary
Chamber had been granted a budget which was separate from that of the other
chambers and had an independent Statute. The applicant further stated that the
CJEU had given several judgments and, in particular, an interim ruling of
8 April 2020 ordering the suspension of relevant provisions governing the
activity of the Disciplinary Chamber in the disciplinary proceedings concerning
judges. Pursuant to the CJEU judgment of 19 November 2019, the Polish
Supreme Court had delivered the judgment of 5 December 2019 and the
resolution of the joined Chambers of 23 January 2020. The conclusions of
both rulings of the Supreme Court were of great relevance to the case at hand.
191. Lastly, the applicant argued that
comparisons between single elements of constitutional and legal systems in
Europe, as relied on by the Government to justify the choices of the Polish
legislator, might be misleading. While every member State could apply different
procedures, a broader context should nevertheless be taken into consideration
to assess the fulfilment of the requirement of independence and impartiality of
a court, established by law, as guaranteed by the Convention. Notwithstanding
the margin of appreciation afforded to the States in applying and implementing
the Convention, no State should have a right to violate its Constitution for
political benefit. The applicant concluded that the domestic law had been
breached in the instant case and stressed the importance to the present case of
the Court’s case-law on the principles of the rule of law and the separation of
powers.
(ii) The
Government
192. The Government submitted that the
court which dealt with the applicant’s case had been a “tribunal established by
law” as required by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. In particular,
there had been no manifest breach of domestic law in the process of appointment
of judges to the Supreme Court. The Government considered that in the light of
the Grand Chamber judgment in Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson (cited
above, §§ 216 and 247) the impugned violations of the domestic law
must be manifest”, i.e., must be of a fundamental nature and must form an
integral part of the judges’ appointment process.
193. Under the second element of the test
developed in the Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson judgment,
the key question was whether there was a real risk that the other organs of
government, in particular the executive, had exercised undue discretion
undermining the integrity of the appointment process to an extent not envisaged
by the domestic rules in force at the material time. However, in the present
case, there had been no violation of the ability of the judiciary to perform
their duties free of undue interference and thereby to preserve the rule of law
and the separation of powers. According to the Government, it was thus
unnecessary to carry out the third step of the test as set out in the Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson judgment
(cited above) related to the examination of whether the violations had
effectively been reviewed.
194. They stressed that all judges in
Poland, including those sitting in the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme
Court, were appointed by the President, upon a proposal of the NCJ, for an
indefinite period of time. The President was not bound by the recommendation of
the NCJ in that he could decide not to appoint a person indicated by it. However,
the President could not appoint a person who was not recommended by the NCJ.
The mere fact that the judges were appointed by an executive body, the
President, did not give rise to a relationship of subordination of the former
to the latter or to doubts as to the former’s impartiality if once appointed
they were free from influence or pressure when carrying out their role. In that
respect the Government pointed to the judgment of the CJEU of 19 November
2019, which had confirmed this principle.
195. The Government referred to systems
of judicial appointments in Europe and concluded that the Polish approach did
not differ from other countries. The fact that the judges were appointed by the
executive seemed to be a rule in European States. They considered that in
Europe the participation of representatives of judicial authorities in the
procedure for appointment of judges, particularly those of the Supreme Court,
was limited or not foreseen at all. In Poland, however, the judiciary
participated in the procedure to a rather broad extent. The risk of excessive
influence of the executive on the process of appointment of judges had thus
been reduced.
196. Furthermore, the Convention did not
imply an obligation to apply a specific mode of appointment of judges to the
highest courts of the Contracting States. The Convention did not require the
appointment of judicial councils or their participation in the procedure for
appointment of judges. Moreover, the Convention did not require the States to
comply with any theoretical constitutional concepts regarding the permissible
limits of the powers’ interactions. A certain interaction between the
three branches of government was not only inevitable but also necessary to the
extent that the respective powers did not unduly encroach upon one another’s
functions and competencies. The Contracting States should thus be “afforded a
certain margin of appreciation in connection [with] these issues since the
domestic authorities [were] in principle better placed [than] the Court to
assess how the interests of justice and the rule of law – with all its
conflicting components – would be best served”.
197. The Government emphasised that
amendments made to the method of electing members of the NCJ and terminations
of service established prior to this amendment had been proportionate, since
they were aimed at adjusting the election to the relevant provisions of the
Constitution, as interpreted by the Constitutional Court in judgment
no. K 5/17.
The amendments had fallen within the ambit of the legislator’s margin of
appreciation, limited only by the constitutional provisions pertaining to the
NCJ. As a matter of fact, Article 187 § 1 (2) of the Constitution provided
for an election of the judicial members of the NCJ from among judges. The
Constitution did not determine, however, who would elect these judges or how
they would be elected. Consequently, it could be seen from the relevant provisions
of the Constitution who could be elected as a judicial NCJ member, yet there
was no mention of any modalities of the election of judges to the NCJ. In
accordance with Article 187 § 4 of the Constitution these modalities
were to be regulated by statute. Elections by representatives of the judiciary
had not been annulled, yet the position that assemblies of judges were the only
competent electoral bodies was unsubstantiated on the ground of the
Constitution. Whereas Article 187 § 1 (3) of the
Constitution clearly stipulated that the MPs sitting on the NCJ be elected
by Sejm and that senators sitting on it be elected by the
Senate, the Constitution did not contain any precise provision with reference
to the judicial members of the NCJ.
198. According to the Government, this meant
that the Constitution did not provide for any particular way of electing judges
to the NCJ. Such a manner of regulation of this matter had been chosen by the
constitutional lawmaker consciously, with a view to setting it out at the level
of a statute. It was therefore legitimate that this question should be
regulated within the limits of the legislator’s margin of appreciation. In this
respect, the Constitution laid down a certain minimum number of fundamental
safeguards. They also noted that after the amendments had entered into force,
the NCJ would be elected by Sejm by a qualified majority of
three-fifths of the votes, in the presence of at least half of those entitled
to vote, which made this election the result of a cross-party agreement between
various groups represented in Sejm and thus ensured high
democratic legitimacy for the members of that body. The high qualified majority
required for the election of the members of the NCJ who were judges
distinguished the way in which they were elected from members who were MPs. In
the latter case, the election was by a simple majority.
199. The Government stressed that
although the Court could examine both the formal aspect of the existence of law
and the issues related to the process of appointment of judges within the
domestic legal system, it had limited power to interpret domestic law.
Moreover, the Court was limited by the principle of subsidiarity, which allowed
the High Contracting States to decide which measures to take to ensure the
rights and freedoms of individuals and to implement the Convention guarantees.
200. According to the Government, the reform
of the NCJ and Supreme Court had been carried out in accordance with the
Constitution and national legislation. In particular, the changes to the method
of electing the judicial members of the NCJ sought to implement the
Constitutional Court’s judgment of 20 June 2017 (K 5/17);
see paragraph 109 above), which had held that both the individual
nature of the term of office of the NCJ’s judicial members and the manner of
their appointment were unconstitutional. The Constitutional Court also found
that the previous system had led to a differentiation in the voting power
between judges of different levels of jurisdiction, which had meant that the
votes cast had not been equal but had carried different weight depending on the
court’s level. The Government disagreed with the applicant’s allegation that
the new members of the NCJ had been associated with the authorities and
maintained that the new system had strengthened the transparency of the
election of the members of the NCJ and had enabled a public debate on the
nominated candidates. The new system allowing the candidates to be presented by
a group of citizens or other judges ensured greater representativeness of the
NCJ and better reflected the structure of the Polish judiciary.
201. The Government reiterated that even
in its judgment of 19 November 2019 (nos. C-585/18, C-624/18, C-625/18)
the CJEU had not challenged the legitimacy of the NCJ or the Disciplinary
Chamber of the Supreme Court. It had merely pointed out that the national court
could assess, in an individual case, whether the national authority – competent
under national law – was an independent and impartial tribunal within the
meaning of Article 47 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Thereby, the CJEU
had confirmed that it respected the areas reserved for the member States. Although
it observed in its ruling that any political factor involved in the appointment
of judges might give rise to doubts and trigger an assessment of whether the
court was an independent court, it also pointed out that it was only a set of
factors that could lead to a final conclusion ruling out the existence of the
attributes of independence and impartiality. In this context, it was also worth
mentioning the CJEU judgment of 24 June 2019 (no. C-619/18), concerning
the independence of the Supreme Court, in which the CJEU had emphasised the
principle of the irremovability of judges. Therefore, the interpretation of the
judgment of 19 November 2019, leading to the conclusion that it was
permissible to deprive judges and the competent court of their right to adjudicate,
was unacceptable. Such an interpretation would be contrary to the fundamental
principle of the European Union – the principle of the irremovability of
judges.
202. The Government stressed that there had
been no manifest violation of domestic law in the process of the appointment of
judges to the Supreme Court. Any doubts regarding the Disciplinary Chamber of
the Supreme Court arising in view of the Supreme Court’s resolution of
23 January 2020 had been removed by the judgment of the Constitutional
Court of 20 April 2020 (U 2/20; see paragraphs 115-117 above).
203. Finally, according to the Government,
the President had not breached the Constitution when announcing vacancies at
the Supreme Court as such decision was one of his constitutional prerogatives
and had not necessitated the countersignature of the Prime Minister.
(b) The
third-party interveners
(i) The
Commissioner for Human Rights of the Republic of Poland
204. The Commissioner for Human Rights of
the Republic of Poland (“the Commissioner”), stressed that the case disclosed
systemic and intentional irregularities. It was of paramount importance to the
domestic judicial system since it concerned doubts relating to the composition
of the top judicial body, which exercised a supervisory function over all
ordinary courts in Poland. The rulings of the Supreme Court were not subject to
review by another judicial body which, subject to meeting Convention standards,
could resolve doubts and remedy deficiencies.
205. The Commissioner submitted that persons
appointed to the Supreme Court since 2018 had been appointed in flagrant
violation of domestic law. The deficiencies in the appointment of the Supreme
Court judges since 2018 were due in particular to the participation of the NCJ
– a body created and appointed in a manner manifestly incompatible with the
national law. In order to assess whether the NCJ met the necessary
requirements, the Commissioner looked at the following elements:
(a) the legislative procedure and nature of changes introduced by the 2017
Amending Act; (b) the election process of the members of the NCJ;
(c) activities of the new NCJ after its creation.
206. With respect to point (a) above, the
Commissioner stressed that the election of fifteen judges, previously elected
by other judges, had been entrusted to Sejm contrary to their
constitutional role and the previous case-law of the Constitutional Court
(judgment of 18 July 2007, K 25/07, see paragraph 107 above). In consequence,
the legislative and executive branches now elected twenty-three out of
twenty-five members of the NCJ, which granted them excessive influence over the
process of appointments to the Supreme Court. At the same time the
constitutionally protected four-year term of office of members of the NCJ had
been prematurely terminated. The Commissioner also pointed to a general boycott
of the elections to the new NCJ by the judges as a result of which out of a
total of 10,000 Polish judges eligible, only eighteen candidates had applied
for fifteen positions. Moreover, the transparency of the process had been
heavily compromised by the authorities as they had refused to disclose the lists
of support for the candidates in spite of the binding ruling of the Supreme
Administrative Court ordering their disclosure (judgment of 28/06/2019, I
OSK 5282/18).
207. The Commissioner further submitted that
the members of the NCJ included persons with strong links to the executive:
judges seconded to the Ministry of Justice and those recently appointed by the
Minister of Justice to the posts of president and vice-president of the courts.
The Supreme Court in its resolution of 23 January 2020 had established
that Judge M.N. had been elected to the NCJ in breach of the 2017 Amending Act
as he had not obtained the required number of signatures to support his candidature.
The NCJ had not intervened in cases of judges prosecuted in politically
motivated disciplinary or criminal proceedings. The NCJ had taken actions aimed
at legitimising its own status by applying to the Constitutional Court to
confirm the constitutionality of the 2017 Amending Act. As a result, the
Commissioner concluded that the NCJ no longer fulfilled its constitutional role
as guardian of judicial independence.
208. The process of appointment of judges to
the Supreme Court was also flawed and amounted to a flagrant breach of the
regulations and principles of domestic law and European standards. The
Commissioner took the view that the act announcing the vacancies at the Supreme
Court issued by the President had not been valid as it had not been countersigned
by the Prime Minister, as required by the Constitution. The competition for
posts of judge had been boycotted by the whole legal profession in Poland as
only 216 candidates had applied for forty-four positions. The NCJ had
carried out a rudimentary selection process based mostly on the material
presented by the candidates themselves and spending a dozen minutes per
interviewed candidate. As a result, the NCJ had recommended only
those candidates who were associated with the authorities and had their
support. Moreover, the resolutions of the NCJ recommending some candidates for
posts at the Supreme Court had been appealed against by rejected candidates.
Although the Supreme Administrative Court had suspended the execution of a
number of such resolutions, the President had gone ahead and had given letters
of appointment to the candidates recommended by the NCJ and they had accepted
them. The right to appeal against the NCJ resolutions, allowed at the beginning
of the competition, had been entirely excluded by an amendment that had entered
into force during the process of selection of the Supreme Court judges.
209. The Commissioner concluded that the
irregularities disclosed above should be assessed in the light of a cumulative
formula and should lead to a conclusion that the Supreme Court had not been
properly established. The challenges against the new members of the NCJ and
newly appointed judges of the Supreme Court showed that the infringements had
been committed intentionally in order to ensure that the political authorities
had a dominant influence on the appointments of judges.
210. Lastly, the Commissioner submitted
that the principle of legal certainty and the guarantee of irremovability of
judges could not reward the intentional and systemic violation of the law by
national authorities. The systemic dimension of the changes introduced in
Polish law encompassed the entire justice system; for instance the
Constitutional Court no longer fulfilled its role and was used to legitimise
actions that were incompatible with the Constitution. The Commissioner proposed
to differentiate the consequences of the refusal to recognise the status of
unlawfully appointed Supreme Court judges in order to protect the legal
security of private parties to the relevant proceedings. At the same time the
Commissioner considered that no protection should be afforded to the bodies
unlawfully established or to persons lacking the attributes of a judge.
(ii) International
Commission of Jurists
211. The International Commission of
Jurists (“the ICJ”) stressed that judicial councils played an important role in
the self-governance, independence, and impartiality of the judiciary in many
European countries. An independent judiciary, operating within the system that
respected the separation of powers was an essential element of the rule of law
and a necessary condition for effective protection of human rights. The ICJ
referred to the Magna Carta of Judges which clearly stated that councils for
the judiciary had to be independent of legislative and executive bodies and
composed in a substantial majority of judges elected by their peers. Those
principles had been reiterated by other international authorities, for instance
in the Universal Charter of the Judge and by the UN Special Rapporteur on the
Independence of judges and lawyers, in his annual report of 2 May 2018.
The international standards on the independence of the judiciary enshrined the
principle that the political powers – legislative and executive – should not be
responsible for, or otherwise interfere with, the appointment, functioning, or
removal of members of judicial councils. Moreover, the substantive conditions
and detailed procedural rules governing the appointment decisions should not
give rise to doubts as to the imperviousness of the judges concerned and their
neutrality, as reiterated by the CJEU in the judgment of 19 November 2019
(see paragraph 164 above).
212. The intervener submitted that since
2015 the Government of Poland had adopted and implemented a series of
legislative and policy measures that had severely undermined the independence
of the judiciary. The authorities had politicised the process of appointments
to the NCJ following the 2017 Amending Act, which had given Parliament the
power to appoint fifteen judicial members although the Constitution expressly
gave Parliament the power to appoint only six lay members. Six judges out of
fifteen appointed to the NCJ by Parliament on 5 March 2018 had been in the past
six months appointed as president or vice-president of a court by the Minister
of Justice. Moreover, the terms of office of all former members of the NCJ had
been terminated, and this had raised concerns about compliance with the
Constitution and had further impaired the NCJ’s independence from legislative
and executive authorities.
213. The ICJ drew the Court’s attention
to an amendment to the Act on Organisation of Ordinary Courts, which
had also entered into force in August 2017. It had allowed the Minister of
Justice to dismiss and appoint the presidents and vice presidents of ordinary
courts. Within the first six months of its application the Minister of Justice
had dismissed and re-appointed over 130 presidents or vice-presidents of courts
in Poland, which amounted to replacing 18% of posts of this type in the entire
country.
214. In respect of the Disciplinary
Chamber of the Supreme Court, the intervener submitted that it was composed
exclusively of judges elected upon the recommendation of the new NCJ. The
President of the Disciplinary Chamber had been appointed by the President of
Poland in February 2019. The new Chamber was empowered to adjudicate in
disciplinary proceedings against judges, including the power to reopen any
closed disciplinary proceedings. These proceedings had to be initiated by the
NCJ and could result in removal from the office of judge.
215. The intervener concluded that a
court might not be considered independent if “the body that had appointed its
members lacked guarantees of independence from the executive and legislative
powers”. It followed that a “court composed by judges appointed by a
non-independent body or in [a] non-independent procedure [would] not be capable
of constituting an independent and impartial tribunal” as required by the
Convention.
- The Court’s
assessment
(a) General
principles
216. In its recent judgment in Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson (cited above,
§ 218) the Grand Chamber of the Court clarified the scope of, and
meaning to be given to, the concept of a “tribunal established by law”. The Court
reiterated that the purpose of the requirement that the “tribunal” be
“established by law” was to ensure “that the judicial organisation in a
democratic society [did] not depend on the discretion of the executive, but
that it [was] regulated by law emanating from Parliament” (ibid., § 214
with further references). The Court analysed the individual components of that
concept and considered how they should be interpreted so as to best reflect its
purpose and, ultimately, ensure that the protection it offered was truly
effective.
217. As regards the notion of a
“tribunal”, in addition to the requirements stemming from the Court’s settled
case-law, it was also inherent in its very notion that a “tribunal” be composed
of judges selected on the basis of merit – that is, judges who fulfilled the
requirements of technical competence and moral integrity. The Court noted
that the higher a tribunal was placed in the judicial hierarchy, the more
demanding the applicable selection criteria should be (ibid., §§ 220‑222).
218. As regards the term “established”,
the Court referred to the purpose of that requirement, which was to protect the
judiciary against unlawful external influence, in particular from the
executive, but also from the legislature or from within the judiciary
itself. In this connection, it found that the process of appointing judges
necessarily constituted an inherent element of the concept “established by law”
and that it called for strict scrutiny. Breaches of the law regulating the
judicial appointment process might render the participation of the relevant
judge in the examination of a case “irregular” (ibid., §§ 226‑227).
219. As regards the phrase “by law”, the
Court clarified that the third component also meant a “tribunal established in
accordance with the law”. It observed that the relevant domestic law on
judicial appointments should be couched in unequivocal terms, to the extent
possible, so as not to allow arbitrary interferences in the appointment process
(ibid., §§ 229-230).
220. Subsequently, the Court examined the
interaction between the requirement that there be a “tribunal established by
law” and the conditions of independence and impartiality. It noted that
although the right to a “tribunal established by law” was a stand‑alone
right under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, a very close
interrelationship had been formulated in the Court’s case-law between that
specific right and the guarantees of “independence” and “impartiality”. The
institutional requirements of Article 6 § 1 shared the ordinary
purpose of upholding the fundamental principles of the rule of law and the
separation of powers. The Court found that the examination under the “tribunal
established by law” requirement had to systematically enquire whether the
alleged irregularity in a given case was of such gravity as to undermine the
aforementioned fundamental principles and to compromise the independence of the
court in question (ibid., §§ 231‑234).
221. In order to assess whether the
irregularities in a given judicial appointment procedure were of such gravity
as to entail a violation of the right to a tribunal established by law, and
whether the balance between the competing principles had been struck by State
authorities, the Court developed a threshold test made up of three criteria,
taken cumulatively (ibid., § 243).
222. In the first place, there must, in
principle, be a manifest breach of the domestic law, in the sense
that the breach must be objectively and genuinely identifiable. However, the
absence of such a breach does not rule out the possibility of a violation of
the right to a tribunal established by law, since a procedure that is seemingly
in compliance with the domestic rules may nevertheless produce results that are
incompatible with the object and purpose of that right. If this is the case,
the Court must pursue its examination under the second and third limbs of the
test set out below, as applicable, in order to determine whether the results of
the application of the relevant domestic rules were compatible with the
specific requirements of the right to a “tribunal established by law” within
the meaning of the Convention (ibid., §§ 244‑245).
223. Secondly, the breach in question must
be assessed in the light of the object and purpose of the requirement of a “tribunal
established by law”, namely to ensure the ability of the judiciary to perform
its duties free of undue interference and thereby to preserve the rule of law
and the separation of powers. Accordingly, breaches of a purely technical
nature that have no bearing on the legitimacy of the appointment process must
be considered to fall below the relevant threshold. To the contrary, breaches
that wholly disregard the most fundamental rules in the appointment or breaches
that may otherwise undermine the purpose and effect of the “established by law”
requirement must be considered to be in violation of that requirement
(ibid., § 246).
224. Thirdly, the review conducted by
national courts, if any, as to the legal consequences – in terms of an
individual’s Convention rights – of a breach of a domestic rule on judicial
appointments plays a significant role in determining whether such a breach
amounted to a violation of the right to a “tribunal established by law”, and
thus forms part of the test itself. The assessment by the national courts
of the legal effects of such a breach must be carried out on the basis of the
relevant Convention case-law and the principles derived therefrom (ibid.,
§§ 248 and 250).
(b) Application of
the principles to the present case
225. In the present
case the alleged violation of the right to a “tribunal established by law”
concerns the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court, constituted following
the recent reorganisation of the Polish judicial system. In particular, the
applicant alleged that the judges of that Chamber were appointed by the
President of Poland upon the NCJ’s recommendation in manifest breach of the
domestic law and the principles of the rule of law, separation of powers and independence
of the judiciary.
226. Accordingly, the Court will examine
whether the fact that the applicant’s case was heard by the Disciplinary
Chamber of the Supreme Court – a court to which all the sitting judges were
appointed in the impugned procedure – gave rise to a violation of the
applicant’s right to a “tribunal established by law”. It will do so in the
light of the three-step test formulated by the Court in the case of Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson (ibid., § 243).
(ii) Whether there
was a manifest breach of the domestic law
227. Under the first element of the test the
Court has to determine whether the relevant domestic law was contravened in the
procedure for the appointment of judges to the Disciplinary Chamber of the
Supreme Court.
The parties disagreed on that issue. In support of
their arguments they relied on contradictory views expressed, on the one hand,
by the Supreme Court and, on the other, by the Constitutional Court in their
respective rulings given in 2017-2020.
228. The applicant heavily relied on the
Supreme Court’s conclusions in the judgment of 5 December 2019 and its
interpretative resolution of 23 January 2020, stressing that that court
had clearly established a fundamental breach of domestic and international law
and the principles of the rule of law, separation of powers and independence of
the judiciary in the process of appointment of judges to the Disciplinary
Chamber.
In particular, the applicant maintained that the
domestic law had been breached, first, as a result of the change in the manner
of electing judicial members of the NCJ under the 2017 Amending Act, which had
stripped this body of independence from the legislative and executive powers.
As a result, the NCJ’s involvement in the selection of candidates to sit as judges
of the Supreme Court and its recommendations of selected persons presented to
the President had compromised the procedure for judicial appointments. She also
asserted that, as the Supreme Court had held, the domestic law had been
breached for a second time by the President of Poland on account of his
announcement of vacant positions in the Supreme Court without the Prime
Minister’s countersignature, thus rendering invalid ab initio his appointment
of the candidates previously presented by the NCJ (see paragraphs 188-189 above).
229. The Government, for their part,
asserted that the reform of the NCJ and the Supreme Court had been carried out
in accordance with the Constitution and national legislation. They stressed
that the modification of the legal provisions governing the organisation of the
NCJ, granting Sejm the power to elect the NCJ’s judicial
members, had been introduced by the 2017 Amending Act in order to implement the
Constitutional Court’s judgment of 20 June 2017 (K 5/17; see paragraphs
108-111 above), holding that both the individual character of the term of
office of the NCJ’s judicial members and the manner of their election under the
2011 Act on the NCJ were unconstitutional.
Furthermore, in their view, the President’s
announcement of the vacant positions at the Supreme Court was not of such a
nature as to require a countersignature by the Prime Minister for it to be
valid (see paragraph 203 above).
As regards the Supreme Court’s resolution of 23
January 2020, the Government took the view that its findings and conclusions
could not be taken into account in the Court’s assessment because, in their
words, it had been “removed” by the Constitutional Court’s judgment of
20 April 2020 (U 2/20; see paragraphs 115-117 and 202 above),
holding that the resolution was inconsistent with several constitutional
provisions.
230. Being confronted with two fundamentally
opposite views of the Polish highest courts as to whether or not there was a
manifest breach of the domestic law, the Court would emphasise, as it has done
on many previous occasions, that it will normally cede to the national
courts’ interpretation of whether there was a manifest breach, objectively
and genuinely identifiable as such, of the domestic law, unless the
national court’s findings can be regarded as arbitrary or manifestly
unreasonable (see Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson, cited
above, § 244, with further references to the Court’s case-law.
However, once a breach of the relevant domestic
rules has been established, the assessment by the national courts of the legal
effects of such breach must be carried out on the basis of the relevant
Convention case-law and the principles derived therefrom. Where the national
courts have duly assessed the facts and the complaints in the light of the Convention
standards, have adequately weighed in the balance the competing interests at
stake and have drawn the necessary conclusions, the Court would need strong
reasons to substitute its own assessment for that of the national courts.
Accordingly, while the national courts have discretion in determining how to
strike the relevant balance, they are nevertheless required to comply with
their obligations deriving from the Convention when they are undertaking that
balancing exercise (ibid. § 251, with further references to the
Court’s case-law).
231. The Court’s task in the present case is
therefore not to resolve the existing conflict of opinions as to the
application and interpretation of the domestic law or to substitute itself for
the national courts in their assessment of the applicable provisions, but to
review, in the light of the above principles, whether the Polish courts in
their respective rulings struck the requisite balance between the various
interests at stake and whether, in carrying out that exercise and reaching
their conclusions, they paid due regard to, and respect for, the Convention
standards required of a “tribunal established by law”.
232. As regards
the domestic legal provisions applicable to the judicial appointment procedure,
it is common ground that they are set out in the Constitution, the 2011
Act on the NCJ as amended by 2017 Amending Act, and the 2017 Act
on the Supreme Court. Pursuant
to these provisions read as a whole, judges are appointed to all levels and
types of courts, including the Supreme Court, by the President of Poland
following a recommendation of the NCJ – a recommendation which the NCJ issues
after a competitive selection procedure in which it evaluates and nominates the
candidates. The NCJ’s proposal of candidates to the President of Poland is a
condition sine qua non for any judicial appointment (see
Article 179 of the Constitution at paragraph 59 above). The President
may not appoint a judge who has not been so recommended but, at the same time,
as submitted by the Government, he is free not to appoint a recommended judge.
233. The NCJ itself is a constitutional
body whose main role, in accordance with Article 186 § 1 of the Constitution,
is to safeguard the independence of courts and judges. The composition of the
NCJ is determined by Article 187 § 1 of the Constitution, which provides that
the NCJ is composed as follows: (1) the First President of the Supreme Court,
the Minister of Justice, the President of the Supreme Administrative Court and
an individual appointed by the President of the Republic; (2) fifteen judges
elected from among the judges of the Supreme Court, ordinary courts,
administrative courts and military courts; and (3) four members elected
by Sejm from among its Deputies and two members elected by the
Senate from among its Senators. Pursuant to Article 187 § 4 of
the Constitution, the organisational structure, scope of activity and the NCJ’s
working procedures, as well as the manner of choosing its members, are
specified by statute (see paragraph 59 above).
234. As noted above, the applicant’s
primary argument is that the first manifest breach of the domestic law
originated in the 2017 Amending Act, which had changed the manner of electing
the fifteen judicial members of the NCJ, who were henceforth to be elected
by Sejm and not, as previously, by their peers, and which had
resulted in that body no longer being independent from the legislative and
executive powers.
235. By way of a preliminary remark, the
Court would observe that the impugned law is part and parcel of the legislation
on the reorganisation of the Polish judiciary initiated by the government in
2017 and, as such, must be seen not in isolation but in the context of
coordinated amendments to Polish law effected for that purpose and having
regard to the fact that those amendments and their impact on the Polish
judicial system have drawn the attention and prompted the concern of numerous
international organisations and bodies, and have become the subject of several
sets of proceedings before the CJEU (see also
paragraphs 177-178 above).
236. According to the Government, the
2017 Amending Act was introduced in order to implement the Constitutional
Court’s judgment of 20 June 2017, which had found that the provisions
governing the procedure for electing members of the NCJ from among the judges
of the ordinary courts and administrative courts were incompatible with
Article 187 § 1 (2) in conjunction with Article 2 of the
Constitution, the latter provision enshrining the rule of law principle (see
paragraphs 109 and 197 above).
Under the previous regulation, the judicial members
of the NCJ were elected by judges, a rule which – until the said judgment of
20 June 2017 – had been firmly established in the Polish legal order and
confirmed in unequivocal terms by the Constitutional Court in its judgment of
18 July 2007 (see paragraph 107 above). The Government, in line
with the Constitutional Court’s position in the June 2017 judgment, argued that
the previous model had been replaced by a “more democratic” one and that that
change had been prompted by the need to remove the hitherto existing – in their
view unjustified – difference of treatment with regard to the election of
judges at various court levels, which had discriminated against judges sitting
in lower courts as it had not provided them with equal opportunities of
standing for election (see paragraph 200 above).
237. The Court accepts that the aim
pursued and the general reasons given for the new model of election of judicial
members to the NCJ could prima facie be considered legitimate. However, this
justification alone cannot be seen as sufficient to substantiate the
Constitutional Court’s complete reversal of its previous case-law without being
based, as emphasised above, on a duly conducted assessment, weighing in the
balance the competing interests at stake, as required under the Convention (see
paragraph 230 above).
238. In this connection, the Court
observes that, apart from its statement of dissent that “the Constitutional
Court in its current composition does not agree with the [Constitutional
Court’s] position in the judgment [of 18 July 2007] that the Constitution
specifies that [judicial] members of the NCJ shall be elected by judges”, the
Constitutional Court did not engage substantively with legal arguments
contained in the earlier ruling. While it is true that the judgment was given
after the composition of the Constitutional Court had changed following the
December 2015 election of five new judges (for factual details see the information
on the election process in Xero Flor w
Polsce sp. z o.o. v. Poland, no. 4907/18, §§ 8-35, 7 May
2021 (not yet final); see also paragraph 112 above), this by
itself could not serve as a ground for creating a new and divergent
interpretation of the Constitution. Nor should it be an obstacle for the
Constitutional Court judges to give convincing reasons – or explain specific
legal considerations – for their departure from the final judgment, universally
binding in its application, given by their predecessors, a judgment which had
been in force for the previous ten years (see also Article 190 of the Polish
Constitution cited in paragraph 59 above).
239. The purported aim to be achieved by
means of the new interpretation of the Constitution, radically changing the
existing election model, was to ensure that all the judges would have equal
opportunities to stand for election to the NCJ. However, the Court has been
unable to detect any attempt on the part of the Constitutional Court to explain
in its judgment why and how the new election model would better serve the
interests of the judiciary and equal opportunities or whether, and if so how,
it would impact upon the NCJ’s primary constitutional obligation of
safeguarding the independence of courts and judges, as laid down in
Article 186 § 1 of the Constitution. Likewise, in the
Constitutional Court’s assessment no consideration appears to have been given
to the Convention case-law or the fundamental Convention principles of the rule
of law, separation of powers and independence of the judiciary, principles
which are also enshrined in the Polish Constitution and were obviously relevant
in the context of the new interpretation.
Furthermore, as demonstrated by subsequent
developments, both at domestic and international level, the Constitutional
Court appears to be isolated in its perception and assessment of the necessity
and legitimacy of the change in the procedure for election of the judicial
members of the NCJ.
240. To begin with,
already at the early stage, the bill, which was to become the 2017 Amending
Act, proposing that the judicial members of the NCJ be elected by Sejm,
raised serious concerns as to its compliance with the European standards and
its impact on the independence of this body and the Polish judiciary as a
whole.
241. On 11 October 2017, PACE, in its
resolution entitled “New threats to the rule of law in the Council of Europe
States”, called on the Polish authorities to refrain from amending the 2011 Act
on the NCJ in a manner that would modify the procedure for election of its
judicial members and would establish political control over that procedure (see
paragraph 136 above).
242. The OSCE/ODIHR and the Venice
Commission in their opinions issued, respectively, on 5 May 2017 and 11 December
2017 spoke with one voice when assessing the consequences of the contemplated
amendments.
The OSCE/ODIHR said that “the proposed amendments
raise[d] serious concerns with respect to key democratic principles, in
particular the separation of powers and the independence of [the] judiciary”;
that “the changes proposed ... could also affect the public trust in the
judiciary, as well as its legitimacy and credibility” and that “if adopted, the
amendments could undermine the very foundations of a democratic society
governed by the rule of law”. It recommended that the proposed amending law “be
reconsidered in its entirety and that the legal drafters ... not pursue its
adoption” (see paragraph 128 above).
The Venice Commission, for its part, stated that
while the exact composition of judicial councils varied, it was widely accepted
– as regards the States which had such a council – that at least half of the
council members should be judges elected by their peers. It further emphasised
that “the 2017 Amending Act was at odds with the European standards since
the fifteen judicial members were not elected by their
peers, but received their mandates from Parliament”. It also took the view
that the proposed reform would lead to the NCJ being dominated by political
nominees, “[g]iven that six other members of the NCJ [were] parliamentarians,
and four others ex officio members or appointed by the
President of the Republic”. It recommended that judicial members should be
elected by their peers, as in the 2011 Act on the NCJ (see
paragraph 140 above).
243. The CCJE, in its opinion of 12
October 2017, shared the above views, referring to a “fundamental concern of
transferring the power to appoint members of the [NCJ] from the judiciary to
the legislature, resulting in a severe risk of politicised judge members as a
consequence of a politicised election procedure”. It considered that the
judicial members of the NCJ should continue to be elected by the judiciary and
that the proposed amendment was a “major step back as regards judicial
independence in Poland”, adding that it was “deeply concerned” by the
implications of the amendment for the principles of the separation of powers
and the independence of the judiciary (see paragraph 144 above).
244. Further international reports that
followed the Act’s entry into force concurred with that assessment.
The UN Special Rapporteur on the Independence of
Judges and Lawyers, in his report of 5 April 2018 following his mission to
Poland, noted that the reorganisation of the Polish judicial system had been
“undertaken by the governing majority in haste and without proper consultation
with the opposition, the judiciary and civil society actors” and recommended
that the 2017 Amending Act be “amended to bring it into line with the Constitution
and international standards relating to the independence of the judiciary and
separation of powers” by removing the provisions concerning the new election
procedure and ensuring that the fifteen judicial members of the NCJ were
elected by their peers (see paragraph 127 above).
The Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights,
in her report published on 28 June 2019 in the wake of her visit to Poland,
expressed serious concerns regarding the composition and independence of the
newly created NCJ and considered that entrusting the legislature with the task
of electing its members undermined its independence (see
paragraph 135 above).
GRECO, in its two successive reports of June 2018
and December 2019, recommended that Poland amend the 2017 Amending Act to
ensure that at least half of its members were judges elected by their peers
(see paragraphs 147-148 above).
245. On 17 September 2018 the Extraordinary
General Assembly of the ENCJ suspended the NCJ’s membership in that
organisation for non-compliance with the NCJ’s statutory rule that a member
should be independent from the executive, believing that the NCJ no longer
guaranteed its “final responsibility for the support of [the] judiciary in the
independent delivery of justice”. The 2020 ENCJ Executive Board proposal for
expulsion of the NCJ from the organisation on the grounds that, among other
things, it undermined the application of EU law on the independence of judges
and its effectiveness and acted against the interests of the European Area of
freedom, security and justice, and the values it stood for (see
paragraphs 175-176 above).
246. At the same time, the European Union
institutions noted, with similarly grave concern, legislative changes affecting
the organisation and structure of the Supreme Court which had been introduced
in tandem with the 2017 Amending Act by means of the 2017 Act on the Supreme
Court and comprised various modifications, such as lowering the retirement age
of the judges currently sitting in the court, removing the power of the First
President of the Supreme Court to announce vacant positions in the court and
creating two new chambers – the Disciplinary Chamber and that of Extraordinary
Review, which, in contrast to all other chambers, were not subordinate to the
First President of the Supreme Court and were given considerable autonomy, a
separate, independent budget and structure, and, last but not least, an
increased salary. In a unanimous assessment of the European Union institutions,
the reorganisation of the Polish judicial system has been seen as creating a
“clear risk of a serious breach of the values referred to in Article 2 of TEU”
by Poland and a “systemic threat” to the rule of law in Poland, in particular
the principle of the independence of the judiciary (see paragraphs 153‑160 above).
247. As in the case of the 2017 Amending
Act, the Venice Commission raised its concerns about the 2017 Act on the
Supreme Court and the Disciplinary Chamber already before the Act’s entry into
force, in its report adopted on 11 December 2017. It considered that the
proposed creation of new chambers – the Disciplinary Chamber and the Chamber of
Extraordinary Review and Public Affairs “[would] not only threaten the
independence of the judges of the Supreme Court, but also create a serious risk
for the legal certainty”. In sum, considering the cumulative effect of the
amendments proposed under both Acts, the Venice Commission concluded that they
would put the judiciary under direct control of the parliamentary majority and
of the President of Poland, contrary to the very idea of the separation of
powers and judicial independence laid down in
Articles 10 and 173 of the Polish Constitution (see
paragraph 140 above). Similar views were expressed subsequently, after
the Act entered into force, by PACE and the Council of Europe’s Commissioner
for Human Rights (see paragraphs 135 and 137-138 above).
248. At domestic level, the same concerns
and serious doubts as to whether the Disciplinary Chamber, given the
involvement of the NCJ in the appointment procedure for the judges and the
characteristics of this body, gave rise to the requests to the CJEU from the
Supreme Court’s Chamber of Labour and Social Security for a preliminary ruling
in three cases. The requests were made in August and September 2018 (see
paragraphs 46 and 71 above).
249. On 19 November 2019 the CJEU, after
obtaining an opinion from Advocate General Tanchev concluding that the
Disciplinary Chamber did not satisfy the requirements of independence set out
in Article 47 of the Charter, and recalling that the interpretation of Article
47 was borne out by the Court’s case-law under Article 6 § 1, delivered a
preliminary ruling reiterating the elements that were relevant for the
referring court in its own assessment (see paragraph 164 above). The
indications formulated by the CJEU can be summarised as follows:
(1) While the mere fact that the
Disciplinary Chamber’s judges were appointed by the President of Poland did not
give rise to a relationship of subordination of the former to the latter or to
doubts as to the former’s impartiality if, once appointed, they were free from
influence and pressure when carrying their role, it was still necessary to
ensure that the substantive conditions and detailed procedural rules governing
the adoption of appointment decisions were such that they could not give rise
to reasonable doubt, in the minds of individuals, as to the imperviousness of
the judges concerned to external factors and as to their neutrality with
respect to the interest before them.
(2) The participation of a body such as
the NCJ, empowered under Article 186 of the Constitution to ensure the
independence of the courts and the judiciary in the context of judicial
appointments might, as such, contribute to making that process more objective;
in particular, the fact of subjecting, to a favourable opinion of the NCJ, the
very possibility for the President of Poland to appoint a judge to the Supreme
Court could be seen as being capable of objectively circumscribing the
President’s discretion. However, this would be the case only where that body
itself was sufficiently independent from the legislature and the executive and
from the authority to which it delivered its appointment proposal.
(3) The degree of independence of the NCJ
in respect of the legislature and the executive in exercising its
responsibilities could become relevant in ascertaining whether the judges it
selected would be capable of meeting the requirements of independence and
impartiality under Article 47 of the Charter.
(4) The circumstances in which the
members of that body were appointed and the way in which that body actually
exercised its role were relevant for that assessment.
(5) Notwithstanding
the assessment of the circumstances in which the new judges of the Disciplinary
Chamber had been appointed or the NCJ’s role in that regard, there were various
other features of concern, such as the exclusive jurisdiction of that Chamber
in cases involving the employment, social security and retirement of the
Supreme Court judges, the fact that it had been constituted solely of newly
appointed judges – as judges who had previously been sitting in the Supreme
Court were excluded – and the particularly high degree of autonomy within
that court.
250. As to the application of Article 47
of the Charter and Article 9(1) of Directive 2000/78 (see
paragraphs 152 and 164 above), the CJEU held as follows:
“Article 47 of the Charter and Article 9(1) of
Directive 2000/78 must be interpreted as precluding cases
concerning the application of EU law from falling within the exclusive
jurisdiction of a court which is not an independent and impartial tribunal,
within the meaning of the former provision. That is the case where the
objective circumstances in which that court was formed, its characteristics and
the means by which its members have been appointed are capable of giving rise
to legitimate doubts, in the minds of subjects of the law, as to the
imperviousness of that court to external factors, in particular, as to the
direct or indirect influence of the legislature and the executive and its
neutrality with respect to the interests before it and, thus, may lead to that
court not being seen to be independent or impartial with the consequence of
prejudicing the trust which justice in a democratic society must inspire in
subjects of the law.
It is for the referring court to determine, in the
light of all the relevant factors established before it, whether that applies
to a court such as the Disciplinary Chamber of the Sąd Najwyższy
(Supreme Court). If that is the case, the principle of the primacy of EU law
must be interpreted as requiring the referring court to disapply the provision
of national law which reserves jurisdiction to hear and rule on the cases in
the main proceedings to the abovementioned chamber, so that those cases may be
examined by a court which meets the abovementioned requirements of independence
and impartiality and which, were it not for that provision, would have
jurisdiction in the relevant field.”
251. On 5 December 2019 the Labour and
Social Security Chamber of the Supreme Court gave judgment in the first of
three cases referred for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU. Emphasising that in
that case it was performing exclusively the role of an EU court implementing
the CJEU ruling and that it was not examining the constitutionality of the 2017
Amending Act but rather its compatibility with EU law (see
paragraphs 72 and 75 above), the Supreme Court made an
extensive analysis of the domestic legislation in the light of the CJEU’s
guidance and the Convention case-law under Article 6 of the Convention
(see paragraphs 71-86 above).
252. As regards the circumstances in
which the NCJ had been created and the Constitutional Court judgment of 20 June
2017 that had given rise to the change in the election procedure, the Supreme
Court observed that, given the absence of any amendment to the Constitution,
the Constitutional Court had not so much changed the position taken in the 2007
judgment but, rather, had created a divergence in its case-law regarding
systemic issues of fundamental importance to the enforcement of the right to a
fair trial and fundamental obligations under EU law. In its view, the new
interpretation was not supported by legal theory and the judgment itself had
been a manifestation of a constitutional crisis in Poland as it had been
delivered by a formation including two members appointed in an unlawful
procedure (see paragraph 73 above).
253. It further found that under the 2017
Amending Act, which had been enacted notwithstanding the long tradition of
judicial members of the NCJ being elected by their peers and the principle of
the separation of powers, the legislature and the executive had gained almost a
monopolistic position in deciding on NCJ membership, since twenty-three out of
twenty-five its members were ultimately appointed by authorities other than the
judiciary. In consequence, the principle of division of State powers and their
separation, laid down in Article 10 of the Constitution, had been disregarded.
254. As regards the manner in which the
NCJ had exercised its role of safeguarding the independence of the courts and
judges in practice, the Supreme Court found that it had failed to fulfil its
constitutional obligation in that respect since it had taken no action in
defence of the Supreme Court’s independence or in order to forestall attempts
to force the Supreme Court judges into retirement after the 2017 Act on the
Supreme Court took effect. Moreover, the NCJ members had publicly demanded that
disciplinary action be taken against judges filing requests for a preliminary
ruling to the CJEU and had challenged the right to make such requests (see
paragraph 80 above). Having regard to all the relevant circumstances,
the Supreme Court concluded that that NCJ did not provide sufficient guarantees
of independence from the legislative and executive authorities in the judicial
appointment procedure (see paragraph 81 above).
255. As to the Disciplinary Chamber, the
Supreme Court followed the guidance given by the CJEU in the judgment of 19
November 2019 and looked at various elements. It considered that, when taken
separately, they were not conclusive of that chamber’s failure to comply with
the standards set out in Article 47 of the Charter, Article 6 of the Convention
and Article 45 § 1 of the Constitution. However, in view of such
circumstances, taken together, as:
(i) the chamber being created from
scratch;
(ii) its being composed of persons with
very strong connections to the legislative and executive powers and who, prior
to their appointment, had been beneficiaries of the reorganisation of the
justice system;
(iii) the chamber being afforded a broad
autonomy within the Supreme Court, with a distinctive structure and
jurisdiction which included competences taken away from other courts and other
chambers of the Supreme Court; and
(iv) the fact that its members were
selected and proposed for judicial appointment by the NCJ, which lacked
independence from the legislature and the executive;
the Disciplinary Chamber clearly and unequivocally
was not a “tribunal” or “court” within the meaning of the above
provisions.
256. The above conclusions regarding the
NCJ’s lack of independence and the Disciplinary Chamber’s lack of attributes of
a “tribunal” were fully endorsed by the Supreme Court, sitting in a formation
of fifty-nine judges of the joined Civil, Criminal and Social
Security Chambers, in its interpretative resolution of 23 January 2020. In that
context, it is to be noted that this resolution resulted from a divergence in
the Supreme Court’s case-law, having been caused, in particular, by the
resolution of the Chamber of Extraordinary Review and Public Affairs, which, in
contrast to the above judgment of 5 December 2019, had interpreted narrowly the
consequences for the Disciplinary Chamber of the CJEU ruling of
19 November 2019 (see paragraphs 48‑50 and 89 above).
257. The joined Chambers found that,
following the change in the election procedure under the 2017 Amending Act and
the circumstances in which the NCJ had been constituted, this body lacked the
necessary independence from the legislative and executive powers and that a
judicial formation including a person appointed upon its recommendation – be it
a judge appointed to the Supreme Court or to military or ordinary courts – was
contrary to the law and amounted to a breach of Article 47 of the Charter,
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 45 § 1 of the
Constitution (see paragraphs 89-105 above).
These conclusions, explained in extensive reasoning,
were reached after a thorough, meticulous assessment of all the elements
relevant to an “independent and impartial tribunal established by law” in the
light of the constitutional principles governing the NCJ’s functioning,
including the principle of the separation and balance of the legislative,
executive and judicial powers and the principle of the independence of the
judiciary (see paragraphs 93-94 above).
258. The Government submitted that the
Supreme Court’s interpretative resolution had been “removed” by the
Constitutional Court’s judgment of 20 April 2020 holding that the
President of Poland’s decisions on judicial appointments could not be subject
to any type of review, including by the Supreme Court, and declaring that the
resolution was incompatible with a number of constitutional provisions, including, inter
alia, the principle of the rule of law (Article 2), the obligation to
respect international law binding on Poland (Article 9), the principle of
legality (Article 7), the right to a fair hearing before an impartial and
independent court (Article 45 § 1) and the provision setting out the
President’s prerogative to appoint judges (Article 144
§ 3 (17)), and that it was also in breach of Articles 2 and 4(3)
of TEU and Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
259. The Court does not share this
assessment for a number of reasons stated below. In that regard, it would again
stress that it is not this Court’s task to interpret the Polish Constitution
and that the statements below are not to be read as in any way implying that
the Court seeks to substitute itself for the Constitutional Court in its role
(see paragraph 231 above). However, this Court has a treaty-given
power under Article 32 § 1 of the Convention to rule on all matters concerning
the interpretation and application of the Convention. In the exercise of that
power, in accordance with its case-law, it may review the domestic
courts’ decisions so as to ascertain whether those courts struck the
requisite balance between the various competing interests at stake and
correctly applied the Convention standards (see paragraph 230 above)
260. In this context, the Court
reiterates that the right to a fair trial under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention
must be interpreted in the light of the Preamble to the Convention, which, in
its relevant part, declares the rule of law to be part of the common heritage
of the Contracting States. The right to “a tribunal established by law” is a
reflection of this very principle of the rule of law and, as such, it plays an
important role in upholding the separation of powers and the independence and
legitimacy of the judiciary as required in a democratic society (see Guðmundur
Andri Ástráðsson, cited above, § 237).
It is also to be reiterated that although the right
to a “tribunal established by law” is a stand‑alone right under Article 6
§ 1 of the Convention, there is a very close interrelationship between that
specific right and the guarantees of “independence” and
“impartiality”. While all three elements each serve specific purposes
as distinct fair trial safeguards, the Court has discerned a common thread
running through the institutional requirements of Article 6 § 1, in
that they are guided by the aim of upholding the fundamental principles of the
rule of law and the separation of powers (see Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson,
cited above, §§ 232‑233).
261. Turning to the present case, the
Court is not persuaded that the Constitutional Court’s judgment relied on by
the Government deprived the Supreme Court’s resolution of its meaning or
effects for the purposes of this Court’s ruling as to whether there has been a
“manifest breach of the domestic law” in terms of Article 6 § 1. This judgment
appears to focus mainly on protecting the President’s constitutional
prerogative to appoint judges and the status quo of the current NCJ, leaving aside
the issues which were crucial in the Supreme Court’s assessment, such as an
inherent lack of independence of the NCJ which, in that court’s view,
irretrievably tainted the whole process of judicial appointments, including to
the Disciplinary Chamber. The Constitutional Court, while formally relying on
the constitutional principles of the separation of powers and the independence
of the judiciary, refrained from any meaningful analysis of the Supreme Court’s
resolution in the light of these principles.
The same is true in respect of the Constitutional
Court’s interpretation of the standards of independence and impartiality of a
court under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention that led it to the
conclusion that the Supreme Court’s interpretative resolution was incompatible
with that provision. In particular, the Constitutional Court found that those
Convention standards excluded the power of “other judges” to generally question
a “judge’s right to adjudicate” or to verify “the regularity of the procedure
preceding the appointment of a judge by the President” (see
paragraph 116 above).
The Court sees no conceivable basis in its case-law
for such a conclusion. In that regard, it would reiterate that “independence of
a tribunal established by law” refers to the necessary personal and
institutional independence that is required for impartial decision making, and
it is thus a prerequisite for impartiality. It characterises both (i) a state
of mind, which denotes a judge’s imperviousness to external pressure as a matter
of moral integrity, and (ii) a set of institutional and operational
arrangements – involving both a procedure by which judges can be appointed in a
manner that ensures their independence and selection criteria based on merit –,
which must provide safeguards against undue influence and/or unfettered
discretion of the other State powers, both at the initial stage of the
appointment of a judge and during the exercise of his or her duties (see Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson, cited
above, § 234 and the case-law cited therein).
262. Considering the apparent absence of
a comprehensive, balanced and objective analysis of the circumstances before it
in Convention terms, the Court finds that the Constitutional Court’s
evaluation must be regarded as arbitrary and as such cannot carry any
weight in the Court’s conclusion as to whether there was a manifest
breach, objectively and genuinely identifiable as such, of the domestic law
involved in the procedure for judicial appointments to the Disciplinary
Chamber (see paragraph 259 above).
263. Furthermore, in the Court’s view
this judgment must be seen in conjunction with the general context in which the
Constitutional Court has operated since the end of 2015 and its actions aimed
at undermining the Supreme Court resolution’s finding as to the manifest breach
of domestic and international law due to the deficient judicial appointment
procedure involving the NCJ.
These actions started from an unprecedented interim
decision of 28 January 2020, suspending the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction
to issue resolutions concerning the compatibility, with international law and
the case-law of international courts, of the NCJ’s composition, the
procedure for judicial appointments conducted by that body and the President’s
prerogative to appoint judges (see paragraph 119 above). The Court
considers that this kind of interference with a judicial body, aimed at
incapacitating it in the exercise of its adjudicatory function in the
application and interpretation of the Convention and other international
treaties, must be characterised as an affront to the rule of law and the
independence of the judiciary.
The Constitutional Court’s final decision on that
matter given on 21 April 2020 perpetuated this state of affairs, in holding
that the Supreme Court had “no jurisdiction” to issue resolutions on the
interpretation of legal provisions that could lead to “modification of the
legal situation regarding the organisational structure of the judiciary” (see
paragraphs 120 ‑ 121 above).
Lastly, the Court would note in passing that the
bench of the Constitutional Court that issued
all four above-mentioned rulings of 20 June
2017 and 28 January, 20 and 21 April 2020 included Judge
M.M. (see paragraphs 112, 116 and 120 above), whose own appointment to the
Constitutional Court raised doubts as to whether it was lawful and whose
participation in the Constitutional Court formation has been the subject of the
Court’s assessment as to whether such formation met the criteria of a “tribunal
established by law” in a judgment given by the Court in the case of Xero
Flor w Polsce sp. z o.o. (cited above).
264. Having regard to all the above
considerations, and in particular to the convincing and forceful arguments of
the Supreme Court in the judgment of 5 December 2019 and the resolution of
23 January 2020, and that court’s conclusions as to the procedure for judicial
appointments to the Disciplinary Chamber being contrary to the law –
conclusions reached after a thorough and careful evaluation of the relevant
Polish law from the perspective of the Convention’s fundamental standards and
of EU law, and in application of the CJEU’s guidance and case-law – the Court
finds it established that in the present case there was a manifest breach of
the domestic law for the purposes of the first step of the Ástráðsson test.
265. The applicant alleged a second breach
of the domestic law in that the President of Poland’s announcement of vacant
positions in the Supreme Court had lacked the Prime Minister’s countersignature
(see paragraph 189 above).
The Court notes that, in that respect, the
Government’s position on the matter differs from opinions expressed by the
Supreme Court and, most recently, the Supreme Administrative Court (see
paragraphs 97 and 122‑125 above). However, given
that, as established above, the process of judicial appointments to the
Disciplinary Chamber was inherently defective on account of the involvement of
the NCJ as a body lacking independence from the legislature and
executive, the Court does not find it necessary to ascertain whether in
addition there was a separate breach of the domestic law resulting from the
fact that the President’s announcement of vacant positions in the Supreme Court
was made without the Prime Minister’s countersignature.
(iii) Whether
the breach of the domestic law pertained to a fundamental rule of the
procedure for appointing judges
266. When determining whether a
particular defect in the judicial appointment process was of such gravity as to
amount to a violation of the right to a “tribunal established by law”, regard
must be had, inter alia, to the purpose of the law breached, that
is, whether it sought to prevent any undue interference by the executive or the
legislature with the judiciary, and whether the breach in question undermined
the very essence of the right to a “tribunal established by law” (see Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson, cited above,
§§ 226 and 255).
267. The process of appointment of judges
may be open to such undue interference, and it therefore calls for strict
scrutiny; moreover, it is evident that breaches of the law
regulating the judicial appointment process may render the participation of the
relevant judge in the examination of a case “irregular”, given the correlation
between the procedure for the appointment of a judge and the “lawfulness” of
the bench on which such a judge subsequently sits (ibid., § 226).
268. In that context, the Court would
also refer to the following statement in the CJEU preliminary ruling of
19 November 2019:
“139 The degree of independence enjoyed
by the [NCJ] in respect of the legislature and the executive in exercising the
responsibilities attributed to it under national legislation, as the body
empowered, under Article 186 of the Constitution, to ensure the independence
of the courts and of the judiciary, may become relevant when ascertaining
whether the judges which it selects will be capable of meeting the requirements
of independence and impartiality arising from Article 47 of the Charter.”
269. As regards the degree of
independence of the NCJ and the issue whether there was undue interference by
the legislative and executive powers with the appointment process, the Court
would first refer to the various – and in substance unanimous – opinions of the
international organisation and bodies which have already been cited above,
according to which the changes in the election procedure for the judicial
members of the NCJ introduced under the 2017 Amending Act resulted in the NCJ
no longer being independent or able to fulfil its constitutional obligation of
safeguarding the independence of courts and judges (see paragraphs 240‑245 above).
270. In that context, the Court also
finds it important to take into account the circumstances in which the new NCJ
was constituted.
271. After the entry into force of the 2017
Amending Act on 17 January 2018, Sejm proceeded with an
examination of the applications from candidates to the new NCJ and elected its
fifteen judicial members on 6 March 2018 (see
paragraph 14 above). As submitted by a third-party intervener, the
Polish Commissioner for Human Rights, the elections were apparently boycotted
by the legal community as only eighteen candidates applied for fifteen
positions to the new NCJ (see paragraph 206 above). As pointed
out by the second intervener, the ICJ, six judges out of fifteen appointed to
the NCJ by the Parliament had been in the past six months appointed as
president or vice-president of courts by the Minister of Justice (see
paragraph 212 above). The concerns were raised by the Council of
Europe Commissioner for Human Rights (see paragraph 29 of the report of
28 June 2019 in paragraph 135 above) and the ENCJ (see
paragraph 175 above) that the majority of the members of the current
NCJ were either members of the ruling party, holders of governmental office or
chosen by Parliament on the recommendation of the ruling party.
272. The Supreme Court, in its judgment of 5
December 2019, found that it was the executive, through persons directly or
indirectly subordinate to it, which proposed most of the candidates for
election as judicial members of the NCJ (see paragraphs 77-79 above).
The Supreme Court, in its resolution of
23 January 2020, established that there had been a significant influence
exerted by the Minister of Justice, who was also the Prosecutor
General, on the composition of the NCJ. It noted that this had been confirmed
by the official statement of the Minister himself in the Senate of the Republic
of Poland (see paragraph 100 above).
273. There also appears to have been some
controversy surrounding the initial non-disclosure of the endorsement lists by
the executive authorities, which had made it impossible to verify whether the
candidates had obtained the required number of signatures of judges to endorse
their candidatures for election to the NCJ (see
paragraphs 16-22 above). In the Court’s view, a situation where the
public is not given official clarification as to whether the formal requirement
of obtaining sufficient support for the candidates for the NCJ has been met may
raise doubts as to the legality of the process of election of its members.
Moreover, a lack of scrutiny of who had supported the candidates for the NCJ
may raise suspicions as to the qualifications of its members and to their direct
or indirect ties to the executive. According to the information now in the
public domain, the NCJ had been elected with the support of a narrow group of
judges with strong ties to the executive (judges seconded to the Ministry of
Justice and the presidents and vice-presidents of courts recently promoted to
those offices by the Minister of Justice; see
also paragraph 176 above). As indicated by the Supreme Court,
there were also doubts as to whether all elected members of the NCJ had
fulfilled the legal requirement of having been supported by twenty-five active
judges (see paragraphs 78 and 96 above and the
statement by the third-party intervener at paragraph 207 above).
274. In view of the foregoing, the Court
finds that by virtue of the 2017 Amending Act, which deprived the judiciary of
the right to nominate and elect judicial members of the NCJ – a right
afforded to it under the previous legislation and recognised by
international standards – the legislative and the executive powers
achieved a decisive influence on the composition of the NCJ (see
paragraphs 126-148 and 155-176 above). The Act
practically removed not only the previous representative system but also the
safeguards of independence of the judiciary in that regard. This,
in effect, enabled the executive and the legislature to interfere directly or
indirectly in the judicial appointment procedure, a possibility of which these
authorities took advantage – as shown, for instance, by the circumstances
surrounding the endorsement of judicial candidates for the NCJ (see
paragraphs 271-272 above).
275. At the same time, under the 2017 Act
on the Supreme Court, the First President of the Supreme Court was divested of
her prerogative to announce vacant positions in that court, this prerogative
being taken away from her in favour of the President of Poland. Even though the
Court has not found it necessary to ascertain whether or not the President’s
announcement of vacant positions in the Disciplinary Chamber was contrary to
the domestic law (see paragraph 265 above), it must note that
depriving the First President of that prerogative further weakened the
involvement of the judiciary in the judicial appointment process, in particular
appointments to the Supreme Court.
276. Assessing all the above circumstances
as a whole, the Court finds that the breach of the domestic law that it has
established above, arising from non-compliance with the principle of the
separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary, inherently
tarnished the impugned appointment procedure since, as a consequence of that
breach, the recommendation of candidates for judicial appointment to the
Disciplinary Chamber – a condition sine qua non for
appointment by the President of Poland – was entrusted to the NCJ, a body that
lacked sufficient guarantees of independence from the legislature and the
executive. A procedure for appointing judges which, as in the present case,
discloses an undue influence of the legislative and executive powers on the
appointment of judges is per se incompatible with Article 6 §
1 of the Convention and as such, amounts to a fundamental irregularity
adversely affecting the whole process and compromising the legitimacy of a
court composed of judges so appointed.
277. In sum, the breaches in the
procedure for the appointment of judges to the Disciplinary Chamber were of
such gravity that they impaired the very essence of the right to a “tribunal
established by law”.
(iv) Whether the allegations regarding the right to a
“tribunal established by law” were effectively reviewed and remedied
by the domestic courts
278. The Government considered that it
was not necessary to carry out the third step of the test (see
paragraph 193 above). Neither the Government nor the applicant argued
that there had been a procedure under Polish law whereby the applicant could
challenge the alleged defects in the procedure for the appointment of judges to
the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court.
279. The Court finds that there was no
such procedure directly available to the applicant. Consequently, no remedies
were provided (see Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson,
cited above, § 248).
280. The Court has established that there
was a manifest breach of the domestic law which adversely affected the
fundamental rules of procedure for the appointment of judges to the
Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court, since the appointment was effected
upon a recommendation of the NCJ, established under the 2017 Amending Act, a
body which no longer offered sufficient guarantees of
independence from the legislative or executive powers.
The irregularities in the appointment process
compromised the legitimacy of the Disciplinary Chamber to the extent that,
following an inherently deficient procedure for judicial appointments, it did
lack and continues to lack the attributes of a “tribunal” which is “lawful” for
the purposes of Article 6 § 1. The very essence of the right at
issue has therefore been affected.
281. In the light of the foregoing, and
having regard to its overall assessment under the three-step test set out
above, the Court concludes that the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court,
which examined the applicant’s case, was not a “tribunal established by law”.
282. Accordingly, there has been a
violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in that regard.
- ALLEGED VIOLATION
OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION AS REGARDS THE RIGHT TO AN INDEPENDENT
AND IMPARTIAL TRIBUNAL
283. The applicant complained that the
facts of the case also disclosed a breach of the right to an independent and
impartial tribunal as provided for in Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention. The Government contested this view and argued that there had been
no violation of this provision of the Convention.
284. The Court notes that in the present
case the complaints concerning the “tribunal established by law” and
“independence and impartiality” requirements stem from the same underlying
problem of an inherently deficient procedure for judicial appointments to
the Disciplinary Chamber of the Supreme Court. As the Court has found
above, the irregularities in question were of such gravity that they
undermined the very essence of the right to have the case examined by a
tribunal established by law (see paragraphs 280-281 above).
Having made that finding, the Court concludes
that the remaining question as to whether the same irregularities have
also compromised the independence and impartiality of the same court has
already been answered (see paragraphs 227-280 above) and does
not require further examination.
- APPLICATION OF
ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
285. Article 41 of the Convention
provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation
of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High
Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the
Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
- Damage
286. The applicant claimed 135,000 euros
(EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage and EUR 25,000 for non-pecuniary damage.
287. The Government contested the claims
and considered them excessive.
288. The Court does not discern any
causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it
therefore rejects this claim. On the other hand, it awards the applicant EUR
15,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable.
- Costs and
expenses
289. The applicant, who was represented
by a lawyer of her choice and was granted legal aid, also claimed EUR 420 for
the costs and expenses incurred before the Court.
290. The Government considered that the
applicant’s claims should be rejected as unsubstantiated.
291. According to the Court’s case-law,
an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so
far as it has been shown that these were actually and necessarily incurred and
are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the
documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it
reasonable to award – in addition to the amount of EUR 850 received under the
Court’s legal aid scheme – the claimed sum in full, plus any tax that may be
chargeable to the applicant.
- Default
interest
292. The Court considers it appropriate
that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of
the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE
COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
- Declares the application admissible;
- Holds that there has been a violation of
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;
- Holds,
(a) that the respondent State is to pay
the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes
final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the
following amounts, to be converted into the currency of the
respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:
(ii) EUR 420 (four hundred and twenty
euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of
costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the
above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable
on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the
European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
- Dismisses, the remainder of the applicant’s claim for
just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 22
July 2021, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Renata
Degener Ksenija
Turković
Registrar President
In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the
Convention and Rule 74 § 2 of the Rules of Court, the separate
opinion of Judge Wojtyczek is annexed to this judgment.
K.T.U.
R.D.
CONCURRING OPINION OF JUDGE WOJTYCZEK
Although I agree with the outcome in the instant
case, I have reservations concerning the reasoning.
The weight of the instance case stems from the fact
that it encompasses the most important aspects of the reforms of the judiciary
in Poland and therefore provides an opportunity to clarify in a comprehensive
and systemic manner almost all the important questions linked to those reforms.
- Application of
the criteria established in the Grand Chamber judgment Guðmundur
Andri Ástráðsson v. Iceland
1.1. In the instant case, the Court decided to apply
the test devised in the judgment in Guðmundur
Andri Ástráðsson v. Iceland ([GC], no. 26374/18, 1 December 2020). This test was devised to deal
with some types of irregularities in the appointment of judges but is not
really adapted to a situation such as that in the instant case where the
problems with the Disciplinary Chamber are multidimensional and concern many
other issues such as its organisation and functioning.
1.2. According to the methodology devised in Guðmundur
Andri Ástráðsson, the first question to be addressed is whether there was a
manifest breach of domestic law. To answer this question one has,
first and foremost, to identify and state with precision one or more legal
rules which were breached. It is impossible to establish a breach of the law
without explaining which legal rules were breached. I note that such a legal rule
was clearly identified in the case of Xero Flor v. Poland (no. 4907/18, § 277, 7 May 2021).
The issue is important for the determination of the
scope of the case, its legal consequences and the correct execution of the
judgment (see below, point 2).
1.3. In its judgment in the case of Guðmundur
Andri Ástráðsson (cited above), the Court, when applying
the first element of the test (whether there had been a manifest breach of
domestic law) addressed the issue in one paragraph. This was fully convincing.
The reasoning in the instant case is self-contradicting on this question. It
takes thirty-nine paragraphs to show that there was a breach of domestic law
and that this breach was manifest. A breach which requires thirty-nine
paragraphs of reasoning does not appear manifest.
1.4. The Court seeks to proceed upon the basis of
the following disclaimer (paragraph 231, see also paragraph 259):
“The Court’s task in the present case is therefore
not to resolve the existing conflict of opinions as to the application and
interpretation of the domestic law or to substitute itself for the national
courts in their assessment of the applicable provisions ...”
Nonetheless, in the circumstances of the instant
case there has been no option other than to do the exact opposite and in fact
the Court has resolved this conflict (see, for instance, paragraph 262).
1.5. The most important argument for finding a
breach of domestic law is presented in paragraphs 237, 238 and 239. The Court
attaches crucial importance to the Constitutional Court’s judgment of 18 July
2007 (K 25/07) and the dicta contained therein.
The judgment of 18 July 2007 (K 25/07) decided the question whether some newly introduced
provisions, prohibiting the concurrent holding of certain positions in the
judiciary together with membership of the National Council of the Judiciary
(NCJ), were compatible with the Constitution. The Constitutional Court did not
have to decide the issue of how the members of the NCJ should be elected. The view
that, under the Constitution, judges sitting on the NCJ had to be elected by
judges was a mere obiter dictum. The issue was not examined in
depth and no argument was provided in support of that view, which is
understandable because at that time no one argued that another interpretation
of Article 187 § 1 point 2 of the Constitution was possible. Until 2016
there was broad agreement in Poland that judges who were elected to the NCJ
should be elected by fellow judges. The question whether this is the only possible
interpretation of Article 187 § 1 point 2 of the Constitution has not really
been asked and was certainly not in issue at that time.
In paragraph 237, the Court states the following:
“... this justification alone cannot be seen as
sufficient to substantiate the Constitutional Court’s complete reversal of its
previous case-law without being based, as emphasised above, on a duly conducted
assessment, weighing in the balance the competing interests at stake, as
required under the Convention (see paragraph 230 above).”
It is difficult to see here a “complete reversal of
its previous case-law”. As stated above, there was a view expressed by the
Constitutional Court as an obiter dictum but it would be
difficult to refer to it as case-law on the issue.
In paragraph 238 the Court further states as follows
(emphasis added):
“In this connection, the Court observes that, apart
from its statement of dissent that ‘the Constitutional Court in its
current composition does not agree with the [Constitutional Court’s] position
in the judgment [of 18 July 2007] that the Constitution specifies that
[judicial] members of the NCJ shall be elected by judges’, the Constitutional
Court did not engage substantively with
legal arguments contained in the earlier ruling. While it is true
that the judgment was given after the composition of the Constitutional Court
had changed following the December 2015 election of five new judges (for
factual details see the information on the election process in Xero
Flor w Polsce sp. z o.o. v. Poland, no. 4907/18, §§ 8-35, 7 May 2021 (not yet final); see also
paragraph 112 above), this by itself could not serve as a ground for creating a
new and divergent interpretation of the Constitution. Nor should it be an
obstacle for the Constitutional Court judges to give convincing reasons – or
explain specific legal considerations – for their departure from the
final judgment, universally binding in its application, given by their
predecessors, a judgment which had been in force for the previous ten years
(see also Article 190 of the Polish Constitution cited in paragraph 59 above).”
If I understand this part of the reasoning
correctly, the Constitutional Court can still cure the flaws of its judgment of 20 June 2017 (K 5/17), provided that: (i)
it gives stronger arguments for departing from the view expressed in the
judgment of 18 July 2007 (K 25/07), balancing the competing interests in the light of
Convention standards (see below point 1.8), and (ii) the bench is composed
of judges whose election is not contested.
The approach developed in the reasoning is
problematic and misses the most important point. The problem is not that the
Constitutional Court in 2017 departed from an earlier judgment without giving
sufficient reasons for this, but lies in the fact that it decided a crucial
constitutional question while providing weak arguments in support of its view.
Had the judgment of 18 July 2007 not been delivered, the problem would have
been the same.
The Constitutional Court did not engage
substantively with legal argument contained in the earlier ruling because there
were no arguments therein on the issue of the election of judges to the NCJ.
Moreover, although the judgments of the Constitutional Court must be reasoned –
and this legal obligation should be understood as “duly reasoned” – in the
domestic legal system there is no legal rule requiring that the domestic
courts, while departing from views expressed in earlier case-law, should
provide specific reasons for the departure as such. I would add that in the
Polish legal system case-law is not a source of law, the Polish courts do not
feel bound by earlier case-law and it is not uncommon for them to depart from
views expressed in earlier judgments or decisions, without providing any deeper
justification for such departure.
The argument that the Constitutional Court departed
from a “final judgment, universally binding in its application” is based upon a
misunderstanding of the domestic law. The binding force of a Constitutional
Court judgment is limited to the operative part. As explained in legal
scholarship, relying on domestic case-law, “the attributes of final character
and universally binding force do not pertain to the reasoning of a judgment”
(L. Garlicki, “Artykuł 190”, in Konstytucja RP. Komentarz, L.
Garlicki (ed.), Warsaw, Wydawnictwo Sejmowe 2007, vol. 5, par. 6; similarly, A.
Mączyński, J. Podkowik, “Art. 190”, in Konstytucja RP, M.
Safjan, L. Bosek (eds), vol. 2, Warsaw C.H. Beck 2016, pp. 1189-1190). A
mere dictum expressed in the reasoning is not binding. The
binding force of the judgment of 18 July 2007 (K 25/07), as defined in Article 190 of the Constitution, has
not been called into question.
I further note that the previous domestic case-law
is placed at the centre in the instant case, whereas well-established domestic
case-law has been implicitly found irrelevant in the case of Broda and
Bojara v. Poland (see my separate opinion appended thereto, especially
point 1.2).
1.6. In paragraph 274 the Court expresses the following
view (emphasis added):
“In view of the foregoing, the Court finds that by
virtue of the 2017 Amending Act, which deprived the judiciary of the right to
nominate and elect judicial members of the NCJ – a
right afforded to it under the previous legislation and
recognised by international standards – the legislative and the
executive powers achieved a decisive influence on the composition of the NCJ.”
This wording implies that the right in question was
not afforded by the Constitution itself in Article 187 § 1 point 2 and in any
event makes it quite clear that the alleged violation of this constitutional
provision does not appear manifest for the Court.
1.7. The Court’s reasoning invokes various
international standards, sometimes stemming from sources which have not been
clearly identified, as well as opinions of different international bodies. This
reinforces the impression that the Constitution as such allows different
legitimate interpretations in respect of the body electing judicial members to the
NCJ and that only international standards restrict this freedom. In other
words, it seems that had Poland not been bound by the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, different interpretations
of the Constitution would have been possible. I note that such an approach
considerably weakens the argument. Moreover, the opinions of different
international bodies concern compliance with international standards and these
bodies have no mandate to interpret the Polish Constitution.
1.8. In the case of Guðmundur Andri
Ástráðsson (cited above, § 251), the Court required the domestic
courts to carry out a balancing exercise in the assessment of the legal
consequences of a manifest breach of the law:
“However, once a breach of the relevant domestic
rules has been established, the assessment by the national courts of the legal
effects of such breach must be carried out on the basis of the relevant
Convention case-law and the principles derived therefrom. Where the national
courts have duly assessed the facts and the complaints in the light of the
Convention standards, have adequately weighed in the balance the competing
interests at stake and have drawn the necessary conclusions, the Court would
need strong reasons to substitute its assessment for that of the national
courts (see, mutatis mutandis, Von Hannover v. Germany (no.
2) [GC], nos. 40660/08 and 60641/08, § 107, ECHR 2012, and Satakunnan
Markkinapörssi Oy and Satamedia Oy v. Finland [GC], no. 931/13, § 164, 27 June 2017). Accordingly, while the
national courts have discretion in determining how to strike the relevant
balance, as mentioned in paragraph 243 above, they are nevertheless required to
comply with their obligations deriving from the Convention when they are
undertaking that balancing exercise.”
Under this approach, the balancing exercise takes
place only once the manifest breach of domestic law has been established.
In the instant case, the Court – without providing
any reasons for such a departure from earlier case-law – modifies the approach
devised in Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson. The requirement of balancing in the
light of the Convention standards is moved to a different – earlier – stage,
the establishing of a manifest breach of domestic law (see in particular
paragraphs 230, 231, 239, 259, 262). This reference to a “balancing exercise”
further reinforces the impression that the breach of domestic law was not
manifest and that had Poland not been bound by the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, different interpretations
of the Constitution would have been possible.
1.9. The Court’s reasoning states that there was a
manifest breach of the law (paragraph 264), but it remains unclear which legal
rule(s) was (were) breached. Was it the rule requiring that the Constitutional
Court, while departing from earlier case-law, engage substantively with legal
arguments contained in earlier rulings (paragraph 238)? Was it Article 187
§ 1 point 2 of the Constitution (paragraphs 233-244)? “European standards”
(paragraph 240)? Article 6 of the Convention (paragraphs 260 and 264)? The
general requirement to carry out a balancing of competing interests in the
light of Convention standards (paragraphs 230, 231, 239, 259, 262)? The
principle of the separation of powers and the
independence of the judiciary (paragraph 239 and 276)? If so, is this
the separation of powers and the independence of the judiciary as laid down in
the Polish Constitution or as understood under the Convention or other
international instruments? Or, maybe, has there been a breach of all, or at
least most of, the rules and principles mentioned above?
Moreover, the various references to the general
principle of the independence of the judiciary bring us to the core of the
right to an independent and impartial tribunal, guaranteed by Article 6, an
issue addressed separately in paragraphs 283-284.
1.10. To sum up this part of my opinion, the Court’s
reasoning, when applying the test devised in the Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson judgment,
is confused.
In my view, the applicant’s right protected by
Article 6 was violated for the reasons explained in the Resolution of the
formation of the combined Civil Chamber, Criminal Chamber, and Labour Law and
Social Security Chamber, dated 23 January 2019, BSA I-4110-1/20 (paragraph 45)
as well as in the Supreme Court’s judgment of 5 December 2019, III PO 7/18.
Given several factors indicated therein and taken cumulatively, the
Disciplinary Chamber does not fulfil the criteria of an independent tribunal
set forth in Article 6.
- The question of
the legal and practical consequences of the judgment
2.1. The rule of law, highlighted in the Preamble to
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms,
requires legal certainty. When deciding cases concerning structural problems
and fundamental constitutional questions in the respondent States, the Court
bears a special responsibility for upholding the rule of law and especially
enhancing legal certainty. The judgments of the Court in the relevant cases
should be worded in such a way that they take into account their possible
consequences for individuals and especially any risk of legal uncertainty they
may entail. Therefore, the Court should always be guided by the requirement to
provide clear and precise guidelines for the States concerning the steps
required to restore the Convention standards and to exclude divergent views as
to their meaning and interpretation.
2.2. The Court’s reasoning entertains ambiguity on
two crucial points.
2.2.1. Firstly, it is not clear whether the breach
of the law established by the Court concerns only the Disciplinary Chamber or
all judges in Poland appointed upon nomination by the new NCJ from the time it
was set up in 2018. In some paragraphs, the Court limits the scope of the case
to the Disciplinary Chamber (see in particular 225, 226 and 280) and uses
arguments specific to that Chamber (for instance 249, 255, 256, 264). They will
be invoked by those who argue that the scope of the judgment is limited to the
Disciplinary Chamber.
Other parts of the reasoning concentrate on the new
mode of election to the NCJ, which concerns appointments to other chambers of
the Supreme Court and to ordinary, military and administrative courts. They
will be invoked to support the view that the scope of the judgment relates to
all judicial appointment proceedings in Poland in which the NCJ, established in
2018, has been involved.
I regret that the bench was not able to take a clear
stance on this issue. The ambiguity will entail uncertainty for thousands of
persons whose cases have been decided with the
participation of judges appointed upon nomination by the new NCJ created in
2018.
2.2.2. Secondly, the reasoning remains silent on the
question of the consequences of the instant judgment for the applicant and –
much more importantly – for other persons whose cases have been decided by the
Disciplinary Chamber or by other tribunals – with the participation of judges
appointed upon nomination by the new NCJ. This will also trigger disputes
concerning the possible re-opening of the proceedings not only in the instant
case but also in other similar cases. Moreover, the two uncertainties will
amplify each other.
2.3. Concerning the second of the above-mentioned
problems, I note that the Court has addressed the issue of the legal
consequences of its judgments in the judgment delivered in Proceedings
under Article 46 § 4 in the Case of Ilgar Mammadov v. Azerbaijan (no. 15172/13, 29 May 2019). The Court stated, in particular, as
follows (at § 162, emphasis added):
“According to the Court’s established case-law the
execution process concerns compliance by a Contracting Party with its
obligations in international law under Article 46 § 1 of the Convention. Those
obligations are based on the principles of international law relating to cessation,
non-repetition and reparation as reflected in the ARSIWA ... They have
been applied over the years by the Committee of Ministers and currently find
expression in Rule 6.2 of the Rules of the Committee of Ministers ...”
I further note Rule 6 § 2 of the Rules of the
Committee of Ministers for the supervision of the execution of judgments and of
the terms of friendly settlements (adopted by the Committee of Ministers on 10
May 2006 at the 964th meeting of the Ministers’ Deputies and amended on 18
January 2017 at the 1275th meeting). This provision is worded as follows:
“When supervising the execution of a judgment by the
High Contracting Party concerned, pursuant to Article 46, paragraph 2, of the
Convention, the Committee of Ministers shall examine:
a. whether any just satisfaction awarded by the
Court has been paid, including as the case may be, default interest; and
b. if required, and taking into account the
discretion of the High Contracting Party concerned to choose the means
necessary to comply with the judgment, whether:
i. individual measures have been taken to ensure
that the violation has ceased and that the injured party is put, as far as
possible, in the same situation as that party enjoyed prior to the violation of
the Convention;
ii. general measures have been adopted, preventing
new violations similar to that or those found or putting an end to continuing
violations.”
I also note the following view, expressed in the
above-mentioned case of Guðmundur Andri Ástráðsson (at § 314,
emphasis added):
“The Court further considers that in accordance with
its obligations under Article 46 of the Convention, it falls upon the
respondent State to draw the necessary conclusions from the present judgment
and to take any general measures as appropriate in order to solve the problems
that have led to the Court’s findings and to prevent similar violations from
taking place in the future. That being said, the Court stresses that
the finding of a violation in the present case may not as such be taken to
impose on the respondent State an obligation under the Convention to reopen all
similar cases that have since become res judicata in
accordance with Icelandic law.”
I note that this view has been expressed in the
context of criminal proceedings. It should apply a fortiori to
civil proceedings, as in the instant case (see the finding in paragraph 185).
Under the Convention, the obligation to take
individual measures and provide reparation is limited to the individual case of
a specific applicant. The States have the obligation to prevent new violations
of the Convention but there is no general Convention obligation to provide
individual redress for past violations to persons in similar situations who did
not lodge applications with the Court and, in particular, no general obligation
to re-open proceedings in similar cases. Obviously, the States are always free
to extend the scope of individual reparation.
2.4. To sum up this part of my opinion, I would like
to stress that the Court’s reasoning, as worded, will exacerbate the existing
problems in the domestic legal system by adding to them the issue of the exact
meaning and scope of the instant judgment. This will entail additional problems
which could easily have been avoided by careful wording of the reasoning.
Fundamental legal issues of the utmost importance for individuals which could
have been fully clarified in the instant case will have to wait in order to be
clarified by the Court in future cases.
- Concluding
remarks
In the instant case, the Court has focused
exclusively on general and structural issues concerning the judiciary. The
situation of the applicant was presented in five brief paragraphs (54-58) in
the “Facts” part and assessed in two paragraphs
(288 and 291) in the “Law” part. It would have been useful to integrate
into the analysis the perspective of the applicant and to look at judicial
independence not only from the viewpoint of objective law but also from the
perspective of the parties to the domestic judicial proceedings, with their
individual rights, interests and legitimate expectations.
[1] The
translation is based on the English version of the judgment published on the
Supreme Court website, edited by the Registry of the Court: http://www.sn.pl/aktualnosci/SiteAssets/Lists/Komunikaty_o_sprawach/AllItems/III-PO-0007_18_English.pdf
[2] The
translation is based on the English version of the judgment published on the
Supreme Court website, edited by the Registry of the
Court: http://www.sn.pl/aktualnosci/SiteAssets/Lists/Wydarzenia/AllItems/BSA%20I-4110-1_20_English.pdf
[3] Section
11(3) and (4) in conjunction with section 13(1) an (2) as well as section 11(2)
in conjunction with section 12(1) of the 2011 Act on the NCJ (see
paragraph 62 above).
[4] The
translation is based on the text available on the Constitutional Court’s
website, edited by the Registry.
[5] Adopted
by participants from European countries and two judges’ international
associations, meeting in Strasbourg on 8-10 July 1998 (meeting organised
under the auspices of the Council of Europe), endorsed by the meeting of the
Presidents of the Supreme Courts of Central and Eastern European countries in
Kyiv on 12-14 October 1998, and again by judges and representatives from
Ministries of Justice from 25 European countries, meeting in Lisbon on 8-10
April 1999.
[6] For
the legislative process and the President’ proposal of the draft Act
on the NCJ see paragraphs 8 and 10 above.
[7] Editorial note: see
paragraph 152 above.